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ABSTRACT

The Leap and the Gap:
Writing Suicide in Modernist Britain
by
Aaron Botwick

Advisor: Richard A. Kaye
Suicide is integral to the history of British literature, and yet the subject has yielded scant
scholarly attention. This study attempts to partially rectify the absence by identifying a
transformation in English suicide discourse between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I
argue that, informed by both rationalism and cause-and-effect reasoning, Victorian literature—
including poems, triple-decker novels, broadsheets, and sermons—largely conceived of suicide
as a public phenomenon. The action, rather than the actor, is the object of study, and as a result
what Andrew Bennett calls “the phenomenology, the lived experience … of suicide” is
abandoned in favor of social concerns. Suicide means what it means to others. Thus, in the
Victorian novel, voluntary death generally serves as a function of the narrative rather than its
subject. Think, for example, of Bertha Mason, whose jump from Thornfield Hall liberates
Rochester to marry Jane and Jane from her unruly double; or of Mirah Lapidoth, whose
attempted suicide forces Daniel Deronda “to take part in the battle of the world.” I argue that, at
the end of the century, Jude the Obscure indicts such rationalism with its child suicide: Father
Time kills his siblings and himself “Because we are too meny,” an explanation that is
functionally irrefutable.
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The modernist writer, then, reconciles with the absence Thomas Hardy reveals: the facts
are barren. Suicide cannot produce first-person testimony, and as a result all narratives—
psychological, sociological, historical, fictional—must imaginatively fill in the gap to assemble a
coherent etiology. Borrowing from Barbara Leckie, I argue that suicide becomes the exemplary
modernist act due to the questions it raises about objective truth, narrative causality, and the
nature of witnessing; authors like John Galsworthy, Ford Madox Ford, James Joyce, and Virginia
Woolf interrogate the epistemological doubt its raises through a series of tropes central to the
modernist project: non-linearity, unreliable narration, textual fragmentation, and narrative
irresolution.
Finally, I examine the origins of suicidology, a discipline that emerges in the late
nineteenth century and attempts to codify scientific knowledge of suicide. I argue that early
suicidologists like Enrico Morselli and Émile Durkheim fail to investigate the lived experience
of voluntary death because it cannot be measured by their tools; the upshot is an egregiously
incomplete view of suicide, one that denies a voice to the subject because they are not present to
contribute evidence. I propose that Sigmund Freud’s interdisciplinary approach better reconciles
scientific and humanistic views on suicide and conclude with an exploration of D.H. Lawrence’s
relationship to the death drive, a creation-through-destruction concept that has its origins in the
work of the psychoanalyst Sabina Spielrein. In his preference for “blood knowledge” over
“mental knowledge”—embodied fictionally by the suicide of Gerald Crich in Women in Love—
Lawrence not only chronicles his variation of Spielrein and Freud’s death drive but advocates for
it as well. What Freud saw as pathology, Lawrence saw as salvation. Rejecting the rationalism
of modernity, Lawrence viewed suicide as a gesture toward spiritual rebirth.
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Introduction
Suicide has a history. Or rather, suicide has histories, and in many of these histories,
England plays a central role. Beginning in the eighteenth century, commentators both at home
and abroad began to identify the sceptered isle as a bastion of voluntary death. In The Spirit of
the Laws (1748; translated into English 1750), Montesquieu unfavorably compares the suicides
of the English to those of the Romans: “the English are apt to commit suicide most
unaccountably; they destroy themselves even in the bosom of happiness.”1 Voltaire offers a
similar, neoclassical take in his Dictionnaire philosophique (1764; translated into English 1765),
arguing in an entry on Cato that, in contrast to the “reasoned” Romans, “who never had the
spleen,” the “Englishman quits this life proudly and disdainfully when the whim takes him.”2 In
his autobiography, Truth and Poetry (1811-33; translated into English 1848), Goethe likewise
associates “the weariness of life, which does not unfrequently result in suicide” with the
“accomplished misanthropes” of English poetry.3
The view from afar was vindicated, and indeed originated, in England itself. In 1653, the
Puritan minister Sir William Denny wrote that his ears “tingled” from all the suicide stories told
in London.4 The Restoration playwright William Congreve, who blamed both the weather and
the people, asked in 1698, “Are there not more Self-murders, and melancholick Lunaticks in

1

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, in The Ethics of Suicide: Historical Sources, ed. Margaret Pabst
Battin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 395.
2
Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary Volume the First, trans. unknown (London: W. Dugdale, 1834),
243.
3
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Truth and Poetry: From My Own Life Volume I, trans. John Oxenford
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1881), 502 and 505.
4
Quoted in Georges Minois, History of Suicide: Voluntary Death in Western Culture, trans. Lydia G.
Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 148.

England, heard of in one Year, than in a greater part of Europe besides?” (emphasis in original).5
Almost a century later, the Methodist preacher John Wesley redoubled Congreve’s claim: “It is a
melancholy consideration, that there is no country in Europe, or perhaps in the habitable world,
where the horrid crime of self-murder is so common as it is in England!”6 In 1733, George
Cheyne termed it “the English malady,” which found its French counterpart in “la mort à
l’anglaise.”7 Like Congreve, Cheyne attributed the English preponderance of suicide to the
weather and the atheism of the people. Boswell was one of a few contemporaries to make light
of the English malady, and he suggested as a solution freezing Englishmen on ice for the month
of November.8 Finally, on the fifth night of Edward Young’s popular mid-century poem “Night
Thoughts” (1742-5)—which Goethe calls a “frightful text” (505)—the speaker apostrophizes, “O
BRITAIN, infamous for suicide!”9
Parsing this deluge of opinion, the historian Roland Bartel admits that the English
proclivity for suicide “may well have been one of the most popular generalizations of the
[eighteenth] century” (149). Even Thomas Jefferson had something to say on the subject,
writing of his native country to Count de Volney, “It is our cloudless sky which has eradicated
from our constitutions all disposition to hang ourselves, which we might otherwise have
inherited from our English ancestors.”10 Historians would later challenge this argument, but it
was powerful enough that more treatises on suicide were published in England than in all of

5

Quoted in Roland Bartel, “Suicide in Eighteenth-Century England: The Myth of a Reputation,”
Huntington Library Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1960), 147.
6
John Wesley, Thoughts on Suicide, in The Ethics of Suicide: Historical Sources, ed. Margaret Pabst
Battin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 404.
7
Michael MacDonald and Terence R. Murphy, Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modern England
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 308.
8
MacDonald and Murphy, 312.
9
Edward Young, Night Thoughts (London: T. Heptinstall, 1798), 101.
10
Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Volume XI, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb
(Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), 64.
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continental Europe.11 This belief would also persist into the nineteenth century, and in one of the
first modern works of suicidology, The Anatomy of Suicide (1840), Forbes Winslow complains
that the “English have been accused by foreigners of being the beau-ideal of a suicidal people”
(emphasis in original).12 As late as Hardy’s The Return of the Native (1878), when Clym reaches
“the stage in a young man’s life when the grimness of the general human situation first becomes
clear,” he adds ironically, “In France it is not uncustomary to commit suicide at this state; in
England we do much better, or much worse, as the case may be.”13
Suicide has also had a long and enduring influence on the histories of literature in general
and British literature in particular. The sheer volume of texts that depict suicides or take suicide
as their subject is so overwhelming that a brief sketch of its prevalence is, I believe, justified.
Because my concern here is primarily with England, this potted history will veer in that direction
as I approach the period under consideration, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In
any case, the first known piece of literature on voluntary death is the Egyptian “Dispute between
a man and his Ba” (c.2040-1759 BCE), a Middle Kingdom fragment in which the eponymous
man argues with his ba, sometimes translated as soul, because a suicide—and therefore an
improper burial—will cause the separation of the two in the afterlife. The man reassures his ba,
and it appears convinced: “Whether you offer on the brazier, whether you bear down on life,” the
ba says, “we shall dwell together!”14 “Dispute between a man and his Ba” is notable not only for
its precedence but also for the author’s primarily psychological orientation: we listen to the
thoughts of a man who is contemplating death. It is a conversation with the self.

11

Minois, 219.
Forbes Winslow, The Anatomy of Suicide (London: Henry Renshaw, 1840), 132.
13
Thomas Hardy, The Return of the Native, ed. Simon Gatrell, Nancy Barrineau, and Margaret R.
Higonnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 185.
14
Anonymous, “The Dispute between a man and his Ba,” in Ancient Egyptian Literature Volume I: The
Old and Middle Kingdoms, ed. Miriam Lichtheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 169.
12
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In contrast, most early religious narratives ignore the interiority of the suicide. For
instance, there are six traditionally recognized suicides in the Hebrew Bible and the New
Testament, all of which are rendered without consideration of the psychology of the subject:
Abimelech and Samson in Judges (c.600 BCE), Saul and his armor-bearer in 1 Samuel,
Ahitophel in 2 Samuel (both c.800-550 BCE), Zimri in 1 Kings (c.600-550 BCE), and Judas in
Matthew (c.75 CE). The spare prose extended to the latter’s death is typical: “And he cast down
the pieces of silver in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself” (Matthew 27:5).15
This is what Erich Auerbach characterizes as Biblical “speech … [that] serves to indicate
thoughts which remain unexpressed,” and suicide is no exception.16 Furthermore, the crucifixion
of Christ can also be read as a voluntary death, a controversial argument that martyrdom is a
form of suicide, made most famous by John Donne in Biathanatos (1608). Vālmīki is no less
circumspect than the Biblical authors in the Rāmāyana (c.500-200 BCE), and when Lakshmana
drowns himself in the Sarayu River, the reader is offered a sober, almost clinical account of his
death: “he stopped the activities of his senses and ceased to exhale.”17 Rāma soon announces
that he wishes to join Lakshmana, and his silent, ritualized march into the Sarayu is accompanied
by a crowd of chattering subjects who wish “to follow Rāma to heaven” (527). Finally, in the
Qu’ran (c.644-56), Mohammad tells his followers not to “kill (or destroy) yourselves,” making it
the only Abrahamic scripture to issue such a proscription (An-Nisā’ 29).18
The Greek tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides staged a pantheon of suicides
and attempted suicides in the fifth century BCE, including those of Antigone, Heracles, Jocasta,

15

The Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha, ed. Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
16
Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 11.
17
Vālmīki, Rāmāyana, trans. Arshia Sattar (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 525.
18
The Holy Qur’an, trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000).
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Ajax, Phaedra, and Iphigenia. In the Aeneid (29-19 BCE), Virgil has Queen Dido, “fearful yet
crazed at the ghastly extent of her planning,” ascend a pyre and throw herself on Aeneas’
sword.19 In the contemporaneous Heroides (25-16 BCE), Ovid pens her a kind of suicide note:
“Soon, I will be able to escape,” she writes to her lover, “a Trojan knife nestles in my lap; tears
fall from my cheeks on its hammered steel blade / and soon it will be stained with my blood.”20
For his part, Encolpius just barely escapes hanging himself in Petronius’ Satyricon (c.100 BCE),
one of two ancient texts in which many characteristics of the modern novel are first recognizable.
In the other, Chariton’s Callirhoe (c.50 BCE-200 CE), a lovesick Dionysus threatens to kill
herself by starvation. Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (c.200 CE), the only extant ancient Roman
novel, is practically a series of suicides occasionally interrupted an ostensible narrative: it
chronicles seven successful attempts and seven failed, not including the protagonist Lucius’ three
tries.21 Embracing stoicism in both life and art, Seneca the Younger staged Phaedra’s suicide
before opening his own veins under order from Nero.
Literary interest in the subject did not wane during the Middle Ages. Ukifune cannot
choose between her two suitors in The Tale of Genji (c.1021)—arguably the first modern
psychological novel—and rather than make a decision, she unsuccessfully tries to drown herself
in the Uji River “like a sheep being taken to slaughter.” She leaves a note that reads,
With sighs of regret I cast away my life
Knowing that after my death my woeful name
Will flow onward, drifting in the shadows.22

19

Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Frederick Ahl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), IV.642
Ovid, Heroides, trans. Harold Isbell (New York: Penguin, 1990), 64.
21
See Andreas N. Michalopoulos, “Lucius’ Suicide Attempts in Apuleius’ ‘Metamorphoses,’” The
Classical Quarterly 52, no. 2 (2002): 538-48.
22
Murasaki Shikibu, The Tale of Genji, trans. Dennis Washburn (New York: Norton, 2016), 1215.
Emphasis in original.
20
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When Gahmuret’s second wife, Lady Herzeloyde, learns of his death in Wolfrom von
Eschenbach’s romance Parzival (c.1200-25), she “wrestled with death” before concluding, “it
would be a second death for Gahmuret, if I were to slay myself, while I still carry with me what I
received from his love.”23 Six hundred fifty years later, Wagner would finally grant Herzeloyde
her suicide in the libretto for his Parsifal (1882). In the Inferno (c.1308-20), Dante visits the
self-murderer Pietro della Vigna, transformed into a bleeding thorn bush in the seventh circle of
hell, while four members of Boccaccio’s party tell stories of suicide in The Decameron (c.134853). One depicts a jealous husband who feeds his wife a “special dish,” the heart of her lover.
When he reveals its ingredients, she immediately leaves the table and “allowed herself to fall”
out an open window.24
At the peak of the proto-Romantic Sturm und Drang movement, Goethe inadvertently
made a secular religion out suicide in The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774; revised 1787;
translated into English 1779), one of the first European novels written in spoken rather than
literary prose.25 Werther, whose name means “worthy,” inspired men’s fashion and women’s
perfume; Byron called him “the first literary character in Europe,” and Madame de Staël wrote,
“Werther has caused more suicides than the most beautiful woman in the world.”26 Though
accounts of Werther-inspired suicide contagion are anecdotal and inconclusive, in France, a
woman drowned herself with a copy of the novel in her pocket. In England, another was

23

Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival and Titurel, trans. Cyril Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 109 and 111.
24
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, ed. and trans. G.H. McWilliam (London: Penguin, 1995), 351
and 352. This is from the ninth story on the fourth day; the others are the the first and eighth stories on
the fourth day as well as the eighth story on the fifth day.
25
Harry Steinhauer, afterward to The Sufferings of Young Werther (New York: Norton, 2012), 144.
26
David Constantine, introduction to The Sorrows of Young Werther (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), xxvii and vi; quoted in Minois, 268.
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reported “dead by her own hand,” with Werther under her pillow.27 Its author responded to the
problem in the 1775 second edition, appending a poem that concluded, “Be a man, and do not
follow me” (emphasis in original).28 For our purposes, it is notable that England, too, “went
Werther-mad,” and a wax museum on Fleet Street featured the “Group of the Death of Werter,
attended by Charlotte and her family.”29 In fact, seven English translations of Werther were
published between 1779 and 1810.30 As Romanticism gave way to realism, the nineteenthcentury European novel proved particularly amenable to depictions of suicide: there is Javert in
Hugo’s Les Misérables (1862; translated into English the same year), Thérèse and Laurent in
Zola’s Thérèse Raquin (1867; translated into English 1887), Raskolnikov in Dostoevsky’s notes
for Crime and Punishment (1866; translated into English 1885),31 Kirillov, Stavrogin, and
Matryosha in Demons (1871-2; translated into English 1916), and, of course, Madame Bovary
and Anna Karenina in the widely influential novels that bear their names.32
Across the channel, Chaucer introduced iambic pentameter to English verse while telling
the story of Pyramus and Thisbe for the first time in the language. In Le Morte d’Arthur (14691470), a “damesel” in love with Lancelot throws herself on his sword.33 Such notions of
classical chivalry would continue to influence ruling class conceptions of self-murder into the
sixteenth century.34 Edmund Spenser rehearses the arguments against suicide in The Faerie

27

Constantine, xxvii; MacDonald and Murphy, 191.
Stanley Corngold, introduction to The Sufferings of Young Werther (New York: Norton, 2012), vii.
29
Constantine, xvii.
30
MacDonald and Murphy, 191.
31
Kenneth Lantz, The Dostoevsky Encyclopedia (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 2004), 426.
32
According to Frank R. Giordano Jr, Balzac wrote twenty-one suicides. Frank R. Giordano Jr., “I’d
Have My Life Unbe”: Thomas Hardy’s Self-destructive Characters (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1984), 40.
33
Sir Thomas Malory, “Le Morte Darthur,” March 1469 to March 1470, MS 59678, The British Library,
London, f.25v.
34
MacDonald and Murphy, 95.
28
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Queene (1590), and in both versions of Sir Philip Sidney’s Arcadia (c.1580-1590), most of the
major characters attempt to kill themselves and quite a few succeed.35 Shakespeare, of course,
littered his stage with the bodies of suicides, and in this he only exaggerates the proclivities of
his contemporaries: Jonathan Dollimore counts two hundred between 1580 and 1640, fifty-two
of which belong to Shakespeare.36 Christopher Marlowe (Dido), Ben Jonson (Silius), John
Webster (The Duchess), and Thomas Kyd (Bel-imperia) all wrote characters who commit or
attempt to commit suicide. Hamlet, of course, turned his contemplation of death into the most
famous words in English, a moment that Marjorie Garber argues “has come to define … the
birth, in effect, of the modern subject, of modern subjectivity itself.”37 Sir Thomas Browne,
inspired by the same neoclassicism as Montesquieu and Voltaire, coined the word suicide in his
revision of Religio Medici (1643). Though the unauthorized edition of 1642 condemns those
“that can allow a man to be his own Assaßine, and so highly extoll the end of Cato,” the 1643
first edition reads “the end and suicide of Cato” (emphasis in original).38 The word soon spread
to French, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese.39
In the widely read religious allegory Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), Hopeful talks Christian
out of suicide; in Paradise Lost (1667; revised 1672), Adam Eve. Aphra Behn’s royal slave, the
eponymous Oroonoko (1688), makes a suicide pact with his lover Imoinda in one of the earliest
novels in English. In his “Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate Lady” (1717), Alexander
Pope elegizes his “heap of dust” as well as all who “act a lover’s or a Roman’s part,” those “who

35

See Paul D. Green, “Doors to the House of Death: The Treatment of Suicide in Sidney’s Arcadia,” The
Sixteenth Century Journal 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1979): 17-27.
36
Jonathan Dollimore, Sex, Literature, and Censorship (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 149.
37
Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 475.
38
Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici (London: Andrew Crooke, 1642), 81; Sir Thomas Browne, Religio
Medici (London: Andrew Crooke, 1643), 98.
39
MacDonald and Murphy, 146.
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greatly think, or bravely die.”40 The Romantic poets were obsessed with self-destruction, from
Keats’ “half in love with easeful Death” to Byron’s Manfred, who seeks “Oblivion, selfoblivion” in the Bernese Alps.41 Thomas Chatterton, a poet whose poisoning at seventeen was a
cause célèbre—Michael MacDonald and Terence R. Murphy call it the “zenith of sentimental
suicide in England” (191)—appears in poems by both Coleridge and Wordsworth.42
Frankenstein, perhaps the most enduring creation of English Romanticism, is himself a suicide.
This brings us to the mid-nineteenth century, where my dissertation begins.

Literary Suicidology
It seems fairly uncontroversial, then, to claim that suicide is one of the persistent tropes in
the history of global literature, from early religious narratives to the modern novel. Furthermore,
it is well-established that England long occupied an important if unpleasant role in both British
and European conceptions of suicide. For at least three hundred years, the English were
synonymous with suicide. Yet scholarship on the subject of suicide and British literature is
surprisingly spare—a complaint frequently registered by those who work in the field.43 What
follows is, I believe, an exhaustive list of the books on the subject, including cross-disciplinary
cultural histories: there are two on early modern suicide, Michael MacDonald and Terrence R.
Murphy’s Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modern England (1991) and Rowland Wymer’s
Suicide and Despair in the Jacobean Drama (1986); one on the Georgian era, Kelly McGuire’s

40

Alexander Pope, The Major Works, ed. Pat Rogers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 147-9.
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Dying to Be English: Suicide Narratives and National Identity, 1721-1814 (2012); two on
Victorian suicides, Barbara T. Gates’ Victorian Suicide: Mad Crimes and Sad Histories (1988)
and Victor Bailey’s “This Rash Act”: Suicide Across the Life Cycle in the Victorian City (1998);
and only three on suicide in twentieth-century literature, A. Alvarez’ The Savage God: A Study
of Suicide (1971), Jeffrey Berman’s Surviving Literary Suicide (1999), and Andrew Bennett’s
Suicide Century: Literature and Suicide from James Joyce to David Foster Wallace (2017).44
Throughout my dissertation, I draw on the work of MacDonald and Murphy, Gates, and Bailey,
but since my argument focuses on modernist texts, I will limit my discussion of scholarship here
to work on the twentieth century.
In The Savage God, Alvarez writes a history of suicide in literature, but he is “not writing
for the literary specialist.”45 Instead, he uses his personal experiences to argue that a modern
obsession with death and suicide—coinciding with Dostoevsky and a rise in atheism—has
contributed to a corresponding rise in the voluntary deaths of artists. His concern, unsurprising
considering his friendship with Sylvia Plath, is ethical rather than literary-critical. “[F]or the
artist himself art is not necessarily therapeutic,” he writes. “[H]e is not automatically relieved of
his fantasies by expressing them. Instead, by some perverse logic of creation, the act of formal
44
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expression may simply make the dredged-up material more readily available to him” (53).
Ultimately, he believes, Plath’s death was “a last desperate attempt to exorcize the death she had
summoned up in her poems,” and this informs his reading of the many twentieth-century writers
whose attraction to suicide traversed both their fiction and their lives (ibid.).
Berman’s Surviving Literary Suicide is mostly a pedagogical text, outlining a course he
taught on the subject. He argues in favor of “the personal element in learning” that does not shy
away from the therapeutic effects of literary study” and takes a great number of authors to task
for romanticizing the relationship between art and suicide, urging a distinction “between healthy
and unhealthy art.”46 For the most part, the latter glamorizes suicide while the former illustrates
its effects on relatives and friends. Berman cites one story that neatly epitomizes the sentiments
of unhealthy art: “Upon being told of Hemingway’s death, the great Spanish bullfighter Juan
Belmonte responded, in carefully chosen words, ‘Well done,’ and not long afterward shot
himself in the same way” (136). Thus, his concern is the audience as much as the writer and the
text. The fact that he soon follows this anecdote by reflecting on “the growing number of
students who have seriously contemplated suicide and who may be at risk when reading a writer
whose stories abound in fantasies of heroic death” should clarify his priorities (ibid.).
My own area of study hews closest to Bennett’s Suicide Century. Beginning with the
claim that “imaginative literature … that most fully, most consistently, and indeed most
rigorously explores the phenomenon, and in particular the phenomenology, the lived experience,
so to speak, of suicide,” he goes on to argue that it “streams like a poison through the tainted life
blood of the modernist literary canon” (4, 57). For Bennett, suicide is “the act of modernity…
modernist suicide confronts the possibility that it is also … the space in which nothing can

46

Jeffrey Berman, Surviving Literary Suicide (Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1999), 5 and 3.

11

finally be justified or explained” (61, 68; emphasis in original). Though Bennett discusses Ford
Madox Ford, James Joyce, and Stevie Smith, his project is larger in scope, eventually
encompassing postwar American writers like Sylvia Plath, Michael Cunningham, and David
Foster Wallace.
To my mind, then, there has been no attempt to unemotionally and specifically account
for the modernist response to suicide in English literature. This dissertation attempts to build on
Bennett’s work toward creating a “literary suicidology” (21) by outlining major discursive
transformations in English literature on suicide between Jude the Obscure (1895) and Women in
Love (1920). Whereas Bennett sees modernist literature as a project that “to conceive of the
suicide’s thoughts, feelings, impulses, desires, actions,” I will instead chart another course, one
of modernist silence and phenomenological absence (53). This divergence in approach can best
be seen in Bennett’s attempt, in his final chapter, “take the inside of David Foster Wallace’s head
as my final case study … and discuss a small number of the many things—the almost infinite
number of things—that may have happened inside it” (167). He recognizes “the impossibility of
knowing any such thing,” but he forges on nonetheless.

The Leap and the Gap
Strictly speaking, no one can testify to the physical and psychological experiences of
suicide. Both perpetrator and victim are silenced by the act, and this silence is its essential
lacuna. Artists, historians, psychologists, and sociologists must construct their narratives without
the key piece of evidence: access to the thoughts of those who have taken the leap. In discussing
the victims of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben writes,
The survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear
witness to a missing testimony. And yet to speak here of a proxy makes no sense;
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the drowned have nothing to say, nor do they have instructions or memories to be
transmitted … Whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name
knows that he or she must bear witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing
witness.47
He continues, “The Shoah is an event without witness in the double sense that it is impossible to
bear witness to it from the inside—since no one can bear witness from the inside of death, and
there is no voice for the disappearance of voice—and from the outside—since the ‘outsider’ is by
definition excluded from the event” (35). Agamben takes as his exemplar of this
phenomenological problem the Muselmänner, inmates who chose voluntary death by means of a
passive combination of starvation and exhaustion.
The witness to suicide—and here I understand witness to mean both third parties present
before, after, or during the suicide and commentators on suicide in general—must contend with
the same aporia: the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of speech in the wake of voluntary
death. Even Jean Améry, who attempted to understand “the interior of those who call
themselves suicidal or suicides” rather than “viewing voluntary death from the outside” was
forced to admit, “[E]very time someone dies by his or her own hand or even just tries to die, a
veil falls that no one can lift again, which in the best of cases can only be illuminated sharply
enough for the eye to recognize as a fleeting image.”48 What, then, can we know about them?
“Everything that can be known from outside, that is, nothing” (9). Taking its epistemological
cues from Agamben and Améry, my dissertation will be concerned with the ways in which
languages and narratives of suicide were constructed in Britain between 1895 and 1920—how
everyone managed to fill in the gap. In other words, I will attempt not to speak for suicides but
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for the witnesses. The historian Kenneth M. Pinnow writes, “To commit suicide is to hand over
one’s self and story to others.”49 It is that story I would like to tell.
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1. Public Suicides, Victorian Fictions:
Novelists and Newspapers, 1844-1898
The February 14, 1891 edition of the Jersey Weekly Press and Independent includes the
following article, quoted in its entirety:
An inquest was held at Hampstead to-day, on the body of Kate Carter, aged 15,
domestic servant of Netherwood-street, West Hampstead. The girl’s mutilated
body was found on the Midland Railway, near Cricklewood Station last Thursday
night. Evidence showed that the girl’s late master and mistress had spoken to her
about gossiping, and this appears to have upset her, as she feared they would write
to her stepfather. The jury found she committed suicide while of unsound mind.1
The address of the deceased, her professional circumstances, and the personal details that
precipitated her death are all available for public perusal. Her body—rather than her person—is
the issue at hand, and it is tagged with the unforgiving word “mutilated.” With a special touch of
cruelty, the author even reveals information that the suicide may have been meant to protect:
Kate Carter’s stepfather is likely to hear about her gossiping now, along with much of the
newspaper’s readership.
Still, the ruling, “while of unsound mind,” also called non compos mentis or “temporary
insanity,” is a sympathetic gesture, one that denies the actor moral responsibility for the crime.2
In Ulysses (1922 but set in 1904), Martin Cunningham insists on such a reading when discussing
the suicide of Leopold Bloom’s father: “Temporary insanity, of course … We must take a
charitable view of it.”3 Another possible ruling, felo de se or “self-murder,” was punished, like
all felonies, with a seizure of the suicide’s property until 1870.4 Until 1882, they were buried in
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unconsecrated ground.5 However, enforcement ebbed throughout the century, and juries were
divided on the harsher verdict: in fact, the historian Victor Bailey found a case in which a
pregnant woman, Mary Wiles, drowned herself and was found non compos mentis for the suicide
but guilty of the felonious “willful murder” of her child.6 The perceived high frequency of
“temporary insanity” verdicts was a point of contention for some critics, who believed its
overuse had in effect eliminated the force of punishment.7 A third verdict, “state of mind
unknown,” was returned when juries did not have enough information to determine whether the
suicide was a felo de se or non compos mentis.8
In the case of Kate Carter, despite the ruling of “unsound mind,” or rather in part because
of it, she remains the object of the inquiry, not its subject. She disappears behind the various
pieces of her circumstances and state of mind, which are assembled into a cohesive profile that
resolves all lingering questions or doubts. The writer, of course, never claims outright that her
fear led to her suicide, but the implied relevance of its inclusion suggests a neat and legible
resolution of her death. Because the claim is only implicit, there is no need for substantiation.
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The conclusion is thus both tidy and, because hidden, irrefutable. Two years after her suicide,
when a Nottingham laborer named Chambers hanged himself, The Morning Post dispassionately
noted that he was “completely dressed in his wife’s garments, and even [had] her earrings in his
ears.”9 In 1897, when the eleven-year-old Mary Paine drank two mouthfuls of morphine, The
Evening Telegraph and Star reported, following a section titled “CHIT-CHAT,” that Mary was
“of weak intellect, and was in the habit of telling falsehoods and stealing.” The author adds
without further comment that her mother “died in a lunatic asylum.”10
Parroting the language of coroner and jury reports, these articles are inevitably
accompanied by implicit explanations of the acts—professional or family problems, crossdressing, hereditary madness—that deny agency to the suicide. Apparent causes become
unchallenged truth, and the reader is provided with a closed narrative unfettered by
epistemological doubt. Furthermore, their very currency in these newspapers speaks to the
popular belief that suicides were shared and not private deaths. In fact, they were public events,
events that entertained as well as enlightened, that encouraged audience participation. In the
case of Mary Wiles, a number of women showed up at the funeral to protest her husband, whom
they found responsible for her death despite his exoneration by the coroner.11
In the following chapter, I will argue that Kate Carter represents a larger pattern in
Victorian print media. A profusion of texts, from religious tracts to broadsheets to three-decker
novels, offered their readers easily-digestible suicides, framed as they are by legal, religious,
journalistic, medical, and literary discourses that combine a genuine desire to understand and
excuse voluntary death with still-rudimentary Enlightenment tools. Furthermore, I argue that
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this multi-vocal, interdiscursive quality is characteristic of the era. Contributors included
newspaper reporters, newspaper readers, judges and juries, coroners, physicians, religious
leaders, poets, novelists, and, in some cases, even the suicides themselves. But by remaining
focused on the action rather than the act, these interlocutors foster a culture of communal
creation of suicide narratives that shrouds the victims, in effect silencing their voices by speaking
on their behalf. For Jean Améry, after a suicide or an attempted suicide, “a veil falls that no one
can lift again, which in the best of cases can only be illuminated sharply enough for the eye to
recognize as a fleeting image.”12 For many Victorians, however, a suicide is the lifting of a veil,
a moment of social enlightenment, not obfuscation. The result is that the interiority, or what
Andrew Bennett calls “the phenomenology, the lived experience … of suicide,” is ignored in
favor of the act’s significance to the culture—or to the narrative—as a whole.13 As the historian
Olive Anderson writes, “A good suicide was almost as gripping as a good murder, and far more
interesting than most fatal accidents” (195).

The Construction of a Public Suicide
In England, much of the culture coalesced to facilitate such narratives, not least in its
national religion. After the so-called “Age of Martyrs,” the Church established an
uncharacteristically consistent and civic-minded stance on voluntary death. In City of God (426),
Augustine, who was distinguishing his beliefs from those of the Stoics, establishes the basis for
much subsequent Christian thought on the subject, arguing for a reading of Mosaic law that
implies prohibition: “Thou shalt not kill,” because it excludes the conditional “thy neighbor,”
12
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includes thyself and must therefore be read as a proscription of suicide.14 Note that Augustine
grounds his reasoning in a commandment that regulates man’s relationship to man—in contrast
to the Jewish tradition, which finds a prohibition of suicide in man’s relationship to the divine:
“God blessed Noah and his sons, and said to them … ‘But for your own life-blood I will require
a reckoning’” (Genesis 9:1, 5).15 From the beginning, Christian texts have emphasized a
communal stake in the body of the individual and thus read suicide in social as well as
theological terms—appropriate for a religion that anthropomorphizes Yahweh. As early as the
Epistle to the Philippians, Paul confesses that he is “in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to
depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better” (1:23).16 Ultimately, he recognizes that he is
more useful alive, the better to “continue with you all for your furtherance and joy of faith”
(1:25). Thus, the need to proselytize proscribes suicide; the Macedonians have a claim on Paul
that forces him to abandon thoughts of voluntary death.
Justin Martyr elaborates on the Pauline argument in The Second Apology (c.150-7),
writing that suicide opposes the will of God because otherwise “no one would be born and be
instructed in the divine doctrines.”17 In the earliest ecclesiastical laws on the subject, the First
Council of Braga (561) forbade commemoration of suicides at Mass, while the Council of
Auxerre (c.561-605) prohibited priests from accepting “offerings,” gifts exchanged in
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expectation of prayers, on their behalf.18 The punishment is public silence. Thus Ophelia is
buried without a requiem—“We should profane the service of the dead,” says the priest, who is
already uncomfortable leaving “her virgin crants” in a churchyard rather than “ground
unsanctified” (V.i.215, 211, and 208).19 In Summa Theologica (1485), Thomas Aquinas lists
three reasons suicide is unlawful. The second is that “every thing that is a part belongs to the
whole,” and therefore “every man is part of a community … he who kills himself injures the
community.”20 For Aquinas, suicide is a theft from the group—that word community echoes like
a refrain throughout the passage—and therefore society at large is also a victim of such acts. In
eschewing Paul’s proselytization argument, Aquinas secularizes this collective claim on the
suicide; he even cites “the Philosopher,” the pagan Aristotle, for confirmation of his position
(229).21
Many influential post-reformation English theologians would adopt such an
understanding of voluntary death. The Stuart preacher John Adams argues against “SelfMurther” because it “may prove destructive to the very Being of Society”—indeed, it would
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“void all Obligation to Humane Laws” as it deprives punishments of their threats: “no Law
would signify any thing.”22 Suicide is an offense that deprives divine revelation of signification;
it would void the power of language. The dissenter Caleb Fleming grounds his argument in
similar terms, speaking both literally and metaphorically of human law when he equates
“capitally abus[ing] ourselves” with “high-treason, not only against the sovereignty of the
universal Lord, but against the laws of human society.” Suicide rejects “the very foundation of
social virtue,” Christ’s commandment to “love thy neighbor as thyself.”23 Fleming is notable in
his use of Christian rather than Mosaic text—and for reversing the traditional direction in which
we read this commandment: for Fleming, it is love thyself as thy neighbor. It is a social
commandment, and his euphemism, “capitally abuse ourselves” employs language of the state
rather than the Lord. Suicides are to be rendered unto Caesar.
English law long followed the Augustinian argument, terming the act “self-murder.” For
centuries, the bodies of suicides were dragged to the gallows and hung face down before being
thrown into ditches and highways for animals to eat, a practice that survived as late as 1598 in
Edinburgh and 1749 in Paris.24 Suicides were then staked through the heart and buried between
nine and midnight at crossroads, a custom that was appropriated from pre-Christian societies and
was meant to prevent revenants from returning home, as the crossroads would scramble their
orientation.25 Wordsworth is referring to this practice in his early, polemical “Argument for
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Suicide” (c.1796-7) when he writes, “Live, if you dread the pains of hell, or think / Your corpse
would quarrel with a stake.”26 An 1753 article in the Manchester Mercury likewise reports that
“the Man who hang’d himself at the Saracen’s Head,” a group of buildings in Birmingham, had
“a Stake driven thro’ his Body … in the Presence of numerous Concourse of Spectators.”27
Reform came in 1823, when the passage of 4 George IV, c. 52 required that coroners
“shall give Directions for the private Interment of the Remains of such Person … without any
Stake being driven through the Body of such Person.”28 Thus, in Wuthering Heights (1847)
Catherine Earnshaw is admitted into the churchyard but buried beneath the wall, following a
northern British custom that attempted to prevent the living from walking on the graves of
suicides.29 Still, memories of the practice lingered, and two decades later, Quilt’s death is ruled a
suicide in Charles Dickens’ The Old Curiosity Shop (1841). Therefore, he is “left to be buried
with a stake through his heart in the centre of four lonely roads.”30 Eighty years after Quilt, and
with characteristic empathy, Leopold Bloom, in the scene quoted above, thinks, “They used to
drive a stake of wood through his heart in the grave. As if it wasn’t broken already” (80). And,
of course, Bram Stoker would immortalize this death practice in Dracula (1897), a novel that
would incorporate the stake-through-the-heart into another living dead tradition.
In any case, the ritual asks the public to serve as witnesses to a kind of postmortem
execution, as judges at their burials; thus the “Concourse of Spectators.” In his brief thoughts on
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suicide, John Wesley conceives of “the horrid crime of self-murder” entirely as a national
epidemic, one that requires precisely this kind of rigorous, public shaming:
[H]ow can this vile abuse of the law be prevented, and this execrable crime
effectually discouraged? By a very easy method. We read in ancient history,
that, at a certain period, many of the women in Sparta murdered themselves. This
fury increasing, a law was made, that the body of every woman that killed herself
should be exposed naked in the streets. The fury ceased at once. Only let a law
be made and rigorously executed, that the body of every self-murderer, Lord or
peasant, shall be hanged in chains, and the English fury will cease at once.31
Though Wesley quietly excises the gendering and sexualizing of the Spartan practice, he
maintains the public’s interest in the body of the suicide. “Self-murder,” which was by Wesley’s
time a legal term, dates to at least 1570 in English (OED). The word denotes an interpersonal
rather than a private act. It implies a public cost.
Though the first treatise on English law, Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni
Anglie (Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England, c.1187-9), fails to address
suicide, it is handled exhaustively in De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and
Customs of England, c.1210-68). Attributed to Henry de Bracton, the authors of the Laws and
Customs coin the enduring term “felony de se” (OED) and equate suicide with murder, even if
victim and assailant are one and the same: “Just as man may commit felony by slaying another
so may he do so by slaying himself, [and] the felony is said to be done to himself.”32 Another
systematic attempt to comprehensively account for English law would not be written for five
hundred years. In Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769), William Blackstone
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praises the wisdom of the English legal system for prohibiting suicide, as the perpetrator is guilty
not only of spiritual but also “temporal” offense “against the king, who hath an interest in the
preservation of all his subjects.”33 For Blackstone, like Aquinas, suicide is not murder but theft,
not from God but from the monarchy. The metaphor would spread to other disciplines. William
Godwin argues that “we are but one, and the persons nearly or remotely interested in our
possible usefulness innumerable,” and therefore the suicide has no right to his life, which is “so
much wealth to be put to the account of the general stock.”34 The economy is just another in a
succession of communal metaphors that suicides have apparently defiled. The mathematician
and essayist Richard Hey went so far as to ventriloquize the voice of the suicide, whom he
imagined to be contemptuous of social obligations: “I consign to oblivion those dull maxims;
which, under the title of Virtue, would teach me to distract myself by an assiduous attention to
the rights and interests of others, instead of giving myself freely to my own gratification.”35
Furthermore, because the process of investigating suicides was not professionalized until
the twentieth century, it long operated at the intersection of the public and professional spheres,
enabling discourse on the subject to flow freely between the two. By 1893, fewer than half of
British coroners were members of the Coroners’ Society founded almost fifty years earlier in
1846.36 They worked part time and required no professional qualifications.37 Until 1888, they
were elected rather than appointed.38 Anderson writes that inquests were
irretrievably associated with undignified proceedings which went on in hired
rooms in public houses, before very humble jurors (who might sometimes be
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allowed to solace themselves with beer and tobacco), amidst the coming and
going of stray cats, dogs, infants, and members of the public. (33)
In other words, both coroners and jurors represented a vast intersection of middle-class life.
Friends, relatives, employers, and other witnesses would testify to the behavior and state of mind
of the victim. There is little indication that a distinction between the public and professional
spheres even exists: the scene described here resembles a circus as much as it does the scientific
investigation of a crime. And there is no sense—except when the victim is wealthy—that only
the suicide and his or her mourners experience their deaths.39 Rather, a suicide is a public event
that allows a gaggle of voices to collectively produce the narrative of one person’s death.
“[T]hanks to trial by jury,” writes Anderson, “it was the ideas of ordinary people which often
shaped the practical working of the law” (219).
Unsurprisingly, this discourse thrived in the Victorian press. The increase in newspaper
circulation at the end of the nineteenth century meant that the community of suicide readers was
larger than ever before: children who had benefited from the 1870 Education Act were now
adults, while reduction in the work week provided additional leisure hours to read the news.40
This phenomenon of large-scale participation, bolstered by religious and legal precedents as well
as new medical discourse, did not even exclude the victims, who often collaborated with the
press. As far back as the eighteenth century, suicides would request publication of their notes,
which often incorporated “whole phrases” they had read in newspapers.41 Take as an example
the letter of Mary Ann Tenant, who wrote before committing suicide in 1895, “I did not want my
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brother John to go with Mary, and they knocked me down, and kicked me black and blue.”42
Clearly, this rebuke is meant to pain her living relatives, as it blames them for her death. But the
expository “my brother” suggests a larger audience, one that has to be informed of the
relationship between the characters in the drama. Others were more ambitious. The insurance
collector Frank Howell announced from the pages of the Cardiff Times and South Wales Weekly
News, “I long to solve the mysteries of eternity. I shall soon know what comes after death.”43
And the electrician Edgar Herbert Dell, after his sister’s suicide and before his own, addressed
his note to his coroner, employing both apostrophe and Shakespearean metaphor:
Would you believe it, dear Coroner, during that drive in the hearse all the
laughable and comical incidents that I had seen in life came upon me in full fury,
and I smiled as the world has not seen one smile before … Then one candle
vanished, and an army of extinguishers hovered around us. I said, ‘Drive on, for I
will not be one of them’ … Enough! The history of the world cannot be written
on a sheet of foolscap. Do you ask why men kill themselves? Then ask why, as
one falls, why men mourn for the dead; why a north pole attracts a south; why a
man loves a woman; and why men live.44
The literary language almost demands a larger audience than a single civil servant.
Consequently, in the culture of communal suicide that newspapers both reported and
helped produce, the relationship between fiction and journalism was bidirectional and symbiotic.
It was not uncommon, for example, for newspapers to use phrases typically reserved for
describing literature: in the Lancashire Evening Post, a double suicide is “a very tragic love
story,” while The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent begins one report with an
announcement: “Here is a sensational suicide story.”45 Making a more explicit connection, a
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story from the Dundee Courier & Argus features a correspondent who refers to Robert Louis
Stevenson’s short story collection in telegraphing, “The Suicide Club is not a myth.”46 Lest we
are misled into believing that modifiers such as tragic indicate sincere affect—in other words,
that they denote anything but stories—we have only to examine a piece in the Falkirk Herald,
whose author, writing on the “fad” of jumping in front of Italian express trains, is more
concerned with “the delay which they were causing by their selfish thoughtlessness” than with
these suicides’ deaths. He adds that the solution—a “special suicide catcher … [that] is placed in
front of the locomotive like the American cowcatcher, and … scoops up the person who tries to
use the engine for his own unpleasant purposes”—offers the suicide-cum-rider “a free trip to the
nearest station.”47 In 1898, a sailor left a slip of paper with Hamlet’s entire “To be or not to be”
soliloquy in his pocket before shooting himself in the chest.48
From the victims who mimic actors, poets, and stage characters to the witnesses who
refashioned their deaths into literature, each participant in this process constitutes suicide as a
public action, one whose meaning can be found in a judicious combination of religious, legal,
journalistic, medical, and literary knowledge—in listening to a wide array of expert and amateur
voices. When A. Alvarez claims that the “history of suicide in Christian Europe is the history of
official outrage and unofficial despair,” he forgets to mention the public that stands between the
official and the unofficial, a public that often controls the narrative (64). The sailor’s death, after
all, would eventually belong to the newspapers.
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Hood, Brontë, Eliot, and the Teleology of Suicide
Like the work of the press, much of the literature of the period orients its focus on the
reader rather than the suicide that is being read. Consider Thomas Hood’s “The Bridge of Sighs”
(1844), an enormously popular poem about a woman who leapt into the Thames. In many
respects, it is a generous effort, asking its reader to “Take her up tenderly” (5), to “Lift her with
care” (6), to “Take her instantly, / Loving, not loathing,” the use of tail rhymes clarifying the
structural logic for the reader or listener (14).49 He continues, “Make no deep scrutiny / Into her
mutiny / Rash and undutiful: / Past all dishonour, / Death has left on her / Only the beautiful”
(21-6). In fact, Hood admonishes us, rather than this “Unfortunate” (1), practically barking in
shorter, staccato lines, “In she plunged boldly— / No matter how coldly … Picture it—think of
it, / Dissolute Man! / Lave in it, drink of it, / Then, if you can!” (72-3, 76-9). Still, in Hood’s
humanizing attempts to universalize this problem, the suicide herself disappears, her given name
replaced with a common noun or even an adjective; the only named woman is Eve, a stand-in for
all women (28). Furthermore, in his catalogue of instructions, Hood fetishizes a litany of body
parts: we must “Wipe those poor lips of hers / Oozing so clammily” and “Loop up her tresses /
Escaped from the comb … Ere her limbs frigidly / Stiffen too rigidly,” we should “Decently,
kindly, / Smooth and compose them” (31-2, 84-6). As for her eyes, we should “close them” (87).
In this context, the respectful gesture doubles as one that symbolically blinds the victim. Wiped
of its Romantic condensation, “Bridge of Sighs” is asking its reader to embrace a dead, wet
stranger. Finally, and perhaps inevitably, our narrator asks us to complete the religious
transformation: “Cross her hands humbly / As if praying dumbly, / Over her breast!” (100-3).

49

Thomas Hood, Poems (London: Henry Frowde, 1907), 167-70. Parenthetical citations refer to line
numbers.

28

The Waterloo Bridge is thus a site for our own edification, the body of the Unfortunate a
commodity for self-reflection. From its title to its final stanzas, “Bridge of Sighs” pulsates with
sexuality—“Stiffen too rigidly” stands out in particular—and at its culmination, the poem
instructs us to cover her chest and voice the Unfortunate, who remains ultimately “dumb.” The
reader is meant to share narration with Hood, who provides a whiff of sexual impropriety with
lines like “Sisterly, brotherly, / Fatherly, motherly / Feelings had changed” (49-51). Unwanted
pregnancy was a common feature of Victorian suicide narratives, albeit one that does not reflect
the historical record.50 Earlier in the poem, Hood’s narrator asks us to invent her circumstances,
waylaying us with questions such as “Who was her father? / Who was her mother? / Had she a
sister? / Had she a brother?” And of course, we must wonder, “Or was there a dearer one / Still,
and a nearer one / Yet, than all other?” (40-2). He concludes by exempting himself from such
judgmental restraint, outlining her sins while excusing them, “Owing her weakness, / Her evil
behaviour, / And leaving, with meekness, / Her sins to her Saviour!” (103-6). His poem, then,
embodies a fundamental contradiction of Victorian suicide discourse: he cannot help
condemning at the same time he defers judgment; he asks us to imagine her plunge but to avoid
scrutiny into the crime of “mutiny.” Condemn, forgive, reflect, and do not linger. Incidentally,
Hood found success with at least one reader: in The Memorials of the Hamlet of Knightsbridge
(1859), Henry George Davis recounts the suicide of Harriet Shelley, and—while suggesting that
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he is quoting eyewitnesses—he writes that her remains were treated “tenderly” and laid out “with
care.”51
In Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847), Bertha Mason also serves a function, one that,
like “Bridge of Sighs,” obscures her interiority. But rather than invoking charitable thoughts in
the reader, Bertha’s suicide works to grease the wheels of the narrative. While her “mirthless”
laughter, her “goblin ha! ha!” haunts the passages of Thornfield Hall from the moment our
narrator crosses its threshold, we do not read the name “Bertha Antoinetta Mason” until the end
of Volume II, almost halfway through the novel.52 This, perhaps, is Brontë’s most insistent
shrouding of the interiority of her novel’s suicide. Since Gilbert and Gubar, at least, “the specter
of Bertha” has rightly been seen as “Jane’s truest and darkest double,” as “the ferocious secret
self Jane has been trying to repress ever since her days at Gateshead.”53 Both are imprisoned for
their failure to cede to authority, both prone to “flaming rages,” and scenes in the red-room serve
as a counterpoint to the madwoman’s attic (362). When Aunt Reed is on her deathbed, she
remembers that Jane “talked to me once like something mad, or like a fiend” (231); the next time
the word appears in the text, it is Rochester who is speaking to Jane after their aborted wedding:
she must leave this “narrow stone hell, with its one real fiend, worse than a legion as such as we
imagine” (300). Comparing the two, he calls Jane “my better self—my good angel,” Bertha, his
“hideous demon” (315). But there is a consistent sense that Jane, too, could follow Bertha into
insanity, either as partner to St. John or to Rochester. If she looks too closely, she may become
Bluebeard’s next wife. Thus, before order can be restored to their lives, before the good angel
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can triumph, the hideous demon in all its manifestations must be purged: Thornfield must be
burned to the ground, Rochester “castrat[ed]”;54 Bertha must commit suicide, and Jane must molt
her own darker half, the half inclined to those flaming rages, the ones that flare up at both
Gateshead Hall and Lowood.
In suicide specifically, Jane shadows Bertha’s steps. During her final rage, Bertha takes
the leap, setting Thornfield aflame and jumping off its roof. While locked in the red-room, Jane
considers various means of “escape,” including the passive suicide of “never eating or drinking
more, and letting myself die” (15). This is, of course, the method Heathcliff chooses in
Wuthering Heights. But Jane, intellectually a mostly-dutiful Victorian, is soon horrified that she
even contemplated the act: “All said I was wicked, and perhaps I might be so: what thought had I
been but just conceiving of starving myself to death? That certainly was a crime” (16). At this
point in the novel, Jane has spent her entire life as a burden, as an encumbrance whose
disappearance would bring only relief to her relatives. And yet, by framing suicide as a legal
rather than a moral issue—she uses the word crime, not sin—Jane, like Augustine, understands it
as an offense against others, against society as a whole. Its meaning, then, is located in its
witnesses—who are here the victims of the crime—and not in those who take the leap.55
Appropriately, when she begins to get a whiff of a mystery at Thornfield, Jane repeats the
word, asking, “What crime was this, that lived incarnate in this sequestered mansion, and could
neither be expelled nor subdued by the owner?” (210).56 The “lived incarnate” suggests that
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Bertha’s very body is the crime, and indeed, by Victorian standards, her “savage face,” her “lips
… swelled and dark,” and “bloodshot eyes” all suggest a criminality associated with the Creole
and colonial of the British imagination (284).57 The inscription of criminality onto Bertha’s
body prepares us for her suicide, which is simply a fulfillment of this fixed state of criminal
madness, one determined by three generations of “idiots and maniacs” (292). Bertha is stable in
her instability, her suicide a realization of character that is legible from her first appearance in
Jane’s room. Rochester, too, stares down the barrel of a gun, but he “only entertained the
intention for a moment; for not being insane, the crisis of exquisite and unalloyed despair which
had originated the wish and design of self-destruction was past in a second” (308). In the stark
and rational divisions this novel sketches, neither Jane nor Rochester falls into a class of people
who commit suicide. Bertha’s end is contained in her beginning, her drunk, Creole mother just
one in a series of cues to her fate. It is no surprise, then, that Jane compares her to “the foul
German spectre—the Vampyre,” a creature both alive and already dead (284).58 Though wrong,
Rochester assures Mason, “[W]hen you get back to Spanish Town, you may think of her as dead
and buried” (213). The whole novel seems to insist on Bertha’s death even before she gets there
herself.
John Reed, the cousin who terrorizes young Jane, is also dispatched to self-destruction.
Late in the novel, when Jane asks the family coachman about him, she hears that he “ruined his
health and his estate … How he died, God knows!—they say he killed himself” (222). Moment
later, Jane reports to Rochester, “[H]e ruined himself and half-ruined his family, and is supposed
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to have committed suicide” (223). Supposed, rather than registering doubt, indicates collective
agreement, the easy legibility of such actions, and within only a page Jane has excised the
irresolute “God knows!” from her retelling. John, too, has a legible body, one that even at
fourteen is bloated like Bertha’s: he is “large and stout for his age, with a dingy and
unwholesome skin; thick lineaments in a spacious visage, heavy limbs and large extremities …
with a dim and bleared eye and flabby cheeks” (9, 10). John looks like a sinner. John is a
sinner. Ergo John commits suicide.
Because such legibility neatly resolves the question of why one chooses death, its
meaning is redirected to the public and the interpersonal; it means what it means for others.
Caroline Rody calls Bertha “a functional subplot,” but in this she is not alone.59 There is a trend
in the Victorian novel toward writing suicide as a function of the plot, a means of fulfilling a
narrative purpose rather than the substance of the narrative itself; occasionally, it serves as
punctuation.60 Dickens, for example, uses suicide to punish Ralph Nickleby (1839), as Brontë
does with John Reed, and Eliot, like Hood, for her protagonist’s self-realization (1876). Thus, in
Jane Eyre, Bertha liberates Rochester, enabling him to marry Jane and even wounding him in a
manner that strengthens the intimacy between the soon-to-be-newlyweds: “I love you better now,
when I can really be useful to you,” Jane tells Rochester, “than I did in your state of proud
independence, when you disdained every part but that of the giver and protector” (445). What I
am suggesting is that this epistemological certainty about the motivations of a suicide leads to an
imaginative exclusion of, to use Bennett’s term, its “lived experience.” We have as little access
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to Bertha’s interiority as we did to Thomas Hood’s Unfortunate, reinforcing the understanding of
suicide as a social rather than a personal phenomenon. Brontë ultimately admitted she had “not
sufficiently dwelt” on pity for Bertha, that she “erred in making horror too predominant”
(emphasis in original).61 And Bertha’s horror is the horror she inspires in those she encounters,
not the horror she experiences herself. After all, we never even peek into, let alone dwell upon,
Bertha’s version of the red-room. She is a metaphorical ghost who literally haunts her home,
dashing around at night in the shadows, but unlike most ghost stories her message remains
uncommunicated: the haunting ends rather than begins with her violent death. Indeed, in
committing suicide, Bertha is becoming the good wife, the sacrificial instrument St. John wanted
in Jane. No wonder Jean Rhys, in Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), felt compelled to “write her a
life.”62
In the now-voluminous criticism on Bertha, she is described as a subplot, an avatar,63 a
surrogate,64 a double, a sacrifice,65 an education.66 In other words, she is a symbol. For Jane,
she is at first the “mystery at Thornfield,” an entertainment she is trying to nose her way into
(165). But since Jane does not witness Bertha’s death, the suicide is related to us secondhand,
from a stranger to both reader and protagonist, the host of a local inn:
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And then they called out to him that she was on the roof; where she was standing,
waving her arms, above the battlements, and shouting out till they could hear her
a mile off; I saw her and heard her with my own eyes. She was a big woman, and
had long black hair: we could see it streaming against the flames as she stood. I
witnessed, and several more witnessed Mr. Rochester, ascend through the skylight
on to the roof: we heard him call ‘Bertha!’ We saw him approach her; and then,
ma’am, she yelled, and gave a spring, and the next minute she lay smashed on the
pavement. (428)
The innkeeper emphasizes the act of witnessing the suicide almost as much as the suicide
itself—its audience extends a mile, he exaggerates—and by the end of his telling, that witnessing
has become a communal experience, one shared even through common senses: We saw him
approach her. Rochester never fills in the gaps here, and his “Bertha!” remains our single
glimpse at his emotional and physical response: subsequent conversations with Jane are
consumed by his self-pity, sexual insecurity, and suspicion about her relationship with St. John.
Bertha, having served her purpose, disappears.
Suicide features less prominently, but no less crucially, in Daniel Deronda (1876),
George Eliot’s final novel and her successor to Middlemarch (1871-2). Near the end of Book II,
in “Meeting Streams,” the title character is drifting down the Thames—both literally and
metaphorically—on a late July evening.67 He is in a contemplative mood “perhaps more
common in the young men of our day—that of questioning whether it were worth while to take
part in the battle of the world.”68 After preventing Mirah Lapidoth from committing suicide,
Deronda is thrust into such a world, and her Jewishness enables him to realize his own, effecting
the kind of personal transformation Eliot’s novel demands. Catherine Belsey, in summarizing
the major moves of realist fiction, writes that its realist characters “all learn from experience,
moving in the course of the narrative towards an enhanced awareness of themselves and the
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world,” while “[i]gnorance, misunderstanding and misrecognition generate a series of crises
(episodes) which finally produce a new and more stable pattern of relationships (closure).”69 But
such transformation, even such closure, is reserved for Deronda, not Mirah.
Right before he first sees her, Deronda is identified by Jewish clothing and (potential)
Ashkenazi features: “Rowing in his dark-blue shirt and skull-cap, his curls [were] closely
clipped” (155). Looking at Mirah, weighed down by “the saturated cloak,” he is touched by her
“little woman’s figure” and cries out, “Great God!” (159). In case we read this as idiomatic, the
narrator follows, “the words escaped Deronda in a tone so low and solemn that they seemed like
a prayer become unconsciously vocal.” His heroism brings out a latent religiosity; contact with a
Jewess has already aroused a vocal spirituality. The impression of “this forsaken girl” leads him
to wonder, “perhaps my mother was like this one,” and sustained contact with both Mirah and
her brother, Mordecai, bears out this prophecy. His place in the battle is now assured. Here is
how the chapter ends:
Deronda felt himself growing older this evening and entering on a new phase in finding a
life to which his own had come—perhaps as a rescue; but how to make sure that
snatching from death was rescue? The moment of finding a fellow-creature is often as
full of mingled doubt and exultation as the moment of finding an idea. (163)
The suicide attempt is a device to effect this enhanced awareness. In Eliot’s free indirect
discourse, Deronda is the subject and a contributor. Mirah, who has not yet given her name, is a
type, the “fellow-creature” who ignites “an idea,” in this case an intellectual aliyah. The
ambiguous “perhaps as a rescue” suggests the encounter saves Deronda in addition to Mirah, that
the substance of this encounter is the effect it has on his development. In this sense, her suicide
is teleological: it serves a religious purpose in bringing Deronda back to Judaism.

69

Catherine Belsey, “Re-Reading the Great Tradition,” in Re-Reading English, ed. Peter Widdowson
(Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 123.

36

Sally Shuttleworth writes that Eliot abandons her previous empiricist position in Daniel
Deronda, instead undermining the “conception of a unified, integrated character, which had
underpinned the traditional linear development of the realist novel.”70 This is accomplished
through her exposure to organic theory, which “stressed the interdependence of the whole, rather
than the freedom of the parts,” in contrast to the science of natural history, which was “primarily
concerned with the recording and classification of details of external form” (270). Therefore,
“the organic ideal” is realized through “membership in the symbolic language community of
Hebrew” (271). As for Gwendolen, “the conflict and contradiction that characterize her psyche”
challenge “the dominant social conception of the rational actor and the theory of causality upon
which it is based” (276). Furthermore, Shuttleworth cites the “abrupt opening” and “fracturing
of temporal and special continuity” as evidence of Eliot’s “departure from the smooth sequence
of cause and effect … traditionally associated with the realist novel” (282). In this last point she
is joined by Joseph Allen Boone, who finds that “the novel’s unsettling, open ending” denies
Gwendolen a happy remarriage but also “withholds from [its] heroine any tragic catharsis, [there
are] no definite assures of a rebirth of selfhood.”71 With respect to Gwendolen, all of this is true.
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In her understanding of Mirah, however, Eliot maintains her adherence to a popular
Victorian empiricism that views suicide and attempted suicide in terms of cause and effect. Her
interest in “organic interdependence between part and whole” must necessarily draw focus from
the phenomenological, and the narrative silence on Mirah’s experience of her attempt—indeed,
the narrative silence on anyone’s experience or thoughts except Deronda’s—reveals its sheer
functionality (ibid.). Oliver Lovesey says as much when he writes that Mirah is “radically
overdetermined” and “provides Deronda access to his essential difference … [her suicide
attempt] is the first major incident in the novel’s chronology of events … her narrative functions
to bring Deronda into an understanding of his identity and to embody the sufferings of all
English Jews” (emphasis added).72 Punning on her racial difference, Lovesey calls Mirah the
novel’s “other woman.” Before Lovesey, Ellen B. Rosenman wrote that Deronda’s “plot
encloses hers when she appears on the riverbank,” and Mirah emerges unchanged: “she will be
the catalyst for Deronda’s future, initiating the complex and volatile reactions that constitute his
plot without undergoing any comparable development.” In the narrative itself, she is “[t]reated
as a commodity and nearly sold into marriage,” an “object of exchange between men.”73 In
words that could describe Bertha Mason, Rosenman continues, “Mirah’s typological story seems
to her the ultimately closed and coherent narrative … In terms of narrative structure, this is a
true repression, since the novel betrays no sign of remembering Mirah’s strong self in its
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resolution” (243 and 244).74 In other words, she is a textual commodity, and her suicide attempt,
conforming to Victorian notions about the beauty and tragedy of a suicidal woman, betrays no
interest in her understanding of the experience. The suicide attempt of this “other woman,” then,
is one part of Shuttleworth’s whole, albeit a crucial one in that it unites others—Deronda,
Mordecai, and in a social sense the Meyricks, too. Mirah gets lost in the shuffle.
Deronda’s initial impressions, like the innkeeper’s of Bertha’s, comprise the most robust
account of Mirah’s suicide attempt. For Deronda, the encounter is a cacophony of artistic
allusions, Mirah a reflection of his own thoughts and words. He finds ready collaboration in his
narrator, and the chapter opens with a quotation from Tennyson—in part, “this is truth the poet
sings…”—an announcement that equates truth with artistic rendering (154). Furthermore,
Deronda’s hands are described as “long, flexible, firmly-grasping hands, such as Titian has
painted in a picture where he wanted to show the combination of refinement with force,” an
image that prepares us for the force of his coming decisive action (155). When he first spots
Mirah, he has just abandoned the idea of becoming an author, “a vocation which is understood to
turn foolish thinking into funds,” and he has “no thought of an adventure in which his
appearance was likely to play any part.” He is singing Rossini’s Otello, in fact, and reads this
woman entirely through his private web of musical and literary references, in effect diverting his
just-abandoned creative energy toward the real world: she is Desdemona brought to life, “a
figure which might have been an impersonation of the misery he was unconsciously giving voice
to” (156). Even though “her eyes were fixed on the river with a look of immovable, statue-like
despair,” he ignores the warning sign and decides to respect the “delicate beauty, picturesque
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lines and color of the image,” and he moves on (157). Why not, when the despair is immovable,
set in stone? One does not interfere with the drama of a Titian. Rather, one speculates and
reflects on its characters, its artistry.
Thus, Deronda “fell again and again to speculating on the probable romance that lay
behind that loneliness and look of desolation,” then smiles at himself “for feeling that sorrow
was the more tragic when it befell delicate, childlike beauty.” Finding the scene picturesque, he
lingers at the “deepening stillness and darkening masses of tree and building between the double
glow of the sky and the river … as if they had been an unfinished strain of music” (158). He
thinks of “some oriental poet,” who describes the sunset as “God’s call to the little stars, who
each answer, ‘Here am I,’” an image of unity between God’s creativity and nature’s action that
would appeal to a man who rows down a river and chooses to sing the lines of a fictional
gondolier. Until this scene, however, he is unable to integrate his own life with his art-infused
worldview; in the previous chapter, we learn that “Having read Shakespeare as well as a great
deal of history, he could have talked with the wisdom of a bookish child about men who were
born out of wedlock … But he had never brought such knowledge into any association with his
own lot” (139). Thus distracted, it is only, with a second sighting, that Eliot can rouse Deronda
to action, and he stops Mirah from jumping into the river before extending the charity of his
friendship with the Meyricks. Soon, however, he reverts to literary allusiveness, and when he
briefly worries about their reaction to housing a Jew, he assures himself that “this delicate,
sorrowful image of womanhood,” this “lovely Jewess” will be greeted like “Rebecca in
‘Ivanhoe,’” and then warms himself with a “beautiful story” from Plutarch (163).
At every turn, fiction, opera, and painting set the terms of the scene and establish the
grammar of their encounter. Still, despite the availability of literary precedents, Deronda’s
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attempt to infer a narrative—he fears “the wretched home and cruel friends he imagined her to be
fleeing” might be nearby—is unsuccessful (160). Yet Eliot and Mirah continue to accommodate
Deronda’s tendency to overdetermine his own experience with artistic allusions. Her first words
to him, “I saw you before … nella miseria [in misery]” (159), quote the song from Otello. “It
was you, singing?” she continues, “Nessun maggior dolore [No more pain].” In her dreamy
recollection of the suicide attempt, his web becomes a part of her experience, and Mirah
concludes, “Dolore—miseria—I think those words are alive” (161). The fragments “in misery”
and “no more pain” appear to echo the logic of suicide, but the novel that follows rejects
Shakespeare’s tragedy, and Eliot’s Desdemona will soon hear that she, too, is a Moor.
What gets lost, however, in Daniel’s perspective of her “project of suicide” and in
Mirah’s dreamy and adulterated recollection is the meaning of the action to the one who
attempted it. Mirah is figured early in this scene as animal rather than human, alerting the reader
to her symbolic relevance to Deronda. Like the romantic prey in, say, Edmund Spenser’s “Like
as a Huntsman” (1595), “Her look was something like that of a fawn or other gentle animal
before it turns to run away: no blush, no special alarm, but only some timidity which yet could
not hinder her from a long look before she turned” (157). Deronda approaches Mirah as if she
were a skittish tiger, “feared to frighten her by a sudden movement” but sure “she meant to wrap
the wet cloak round her as a drowning-shroud” (158). When she admits she is Jewish, he
observes “a sadness that pierced like a cry from a small dumb creature in fear” (162). Even
Mirah, when explaining her state of mind, reverts to Josephus, to religious history rather than
personal memory: “I know our fathers slew their children and then slew themselves, to keep their
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souls pure. I meant it so” (161).75 The terse explanation is suggestive and incomplete, but the
suicides at Masada served a function for the zealots: they conformed to the will of God.
Individual subjectivity was irrelevant. Mirah’s attempt also serves a function, this one both
religious and narrative. Her subjectivity, her experience of attempted suicide, is likewise
irrelevant. The action is understood solely in terms of cause and effect. If Bertha Mason
enabled the marriage of Jane Eyre and Edward Rochester, Mirah enables her own; like a suicidal
Jane, Mirah reflects the inherent and positive traits of the novel’s protagonist. Her accent
“suggested foreignness and yet was not foreign”—an elliptical clause that means foreignness to
Deronda and yet not foreign to Deronda (159). The orientation, while ostensibly set by an
objective narrator, nevertheless retains Deronda as its vantage point. In a sense, he is the whole.
Assembled from parts Jewish and English, he is the spirit of Daniel Deronda. Mirah’s
Jewishness, and her suicide attempt, comprise a piece of the Jewish part.

The Teleology Shatters: Father Time and Child Suicide
I now turn to Thomas Hardy. Hardy wrote about self-destruction from his first to his last
novel, and thus his work serves as a useful pulse on the course taken by one thinker in the later
years of Victorian England—a thinker, no less, who was a rapacious reader of the popular press.
Frank R. Giordano Jr., who identifies at least twenty-one suicides and attempted suicides in his
Hardy’s work, estimates “that of all the great Victorian novelists, none understood man’s selfdestructive instinct as thoroughly.”76 While I make no such claim, between 1871 and 1895, he
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did populate his novels with a range of suicides, both peripheral and central, enabling us to
follow a trajectory that begins with Hardy parroting popular Victorian tropes and ends with his
indictment of the same, an indictment, I will argue in the next chapter, that is picked up by
Edwardian novelists like John Galsworthy and Ford Madox Ford. For the Hardy of Jude the
Obscure (1895), the crude but reasoned logic of Enlightenment-influenced suicide commentators
had turned clinical and inhumane.
Let us begin with an early example: Aeneas Manston, the illegitimate-born villain of
Hardy’s anonymously-published debut novel, Desperate Remedies (1871), which he would later
assess as a “sensational and strictly conventional narrative” that “too exclusively” relies on
“mystery, entanglement, surprise, and moral obliquity” to excite interest.77 The novel ends with
Manston’s suicide, which follows a swath of crimes, including uxoricide and attempted
kidnapping. This, Anderson tells us, is a typical denouement of the period, and in contrast to

Durbeyfield. Giordano reads Hardy through an uncritical adoption of the work of Émile Durkheim,
Sigmund Freud, and Karl Menninger. For Giordano, these thinkers provide an “authoritative,
extraliterary view of precisely those social and psychological forces that loom so threateningly in the
lives of Hardy’s modern characters” (xvi-xvii). Thus, under Durkheim’s rubric, Jude is an anomic suicide;
under Freud’s, he pursues “frequent death wishes” (128). Giordano also identifies a consistent strain of
stoicism in Hardy, culminating in Jude’s suicide: “In terms of a pagan ethos, Jude’s act of self-destruction
may be seen as a heroic affirmation of his personal being” (130). Finally, Giordano argues that “Hardy’s
long-evolving sensitivity to modern man’s declining zest for life and his conviction that thought was
robbing existence of its joyousness and making life a heavy burden” (182), and thus the
“reasonableness” of a given suicide “increases as man’s estrangement from God and his fellow man
deepens, his capacity for joy atrophies, and his opportunities for experiencing pleasure and love
decrease” (184). Still, there is a strain of utilitarianism to Giordano’s Hardy: “Self-destruction is
appropriated,” he writes, “among Hardy’s imaginative raw materials; it is available as accompaniment to
or the culmination of catastrophe in a tragedy. Hardy could ‘use’ suicide just as he ‘used Jude’s
difficulties of study’ or as he might have used war, fire, or shipwreck” (13). Five years after Giordano’s
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female suicide, male suicide was “most often shown simply as the fitting end of a villain or a
weakling”—someone like Ralph Nickleby or Jonas Chuzzlewit (197). In Hardy, we hear the
report of Manston’s death from a bystander:
He was found dead the first thing this morning. He had hung himself behind the
door of his cell, in some way, by a handkerchief and some strips of his clothes.
The turnkey says his features were scarcely changed, and just caught the early
sunlight shining in at the grating upon him. He has left a complete account of the
murder, and all that led to it. So there’s an end of him. (363-4)
The elegance and simplicity of the implied explanation—Hardy, acting as moral arbiter, has
punished the wicked—is reinforced by the finality of the closing sentence, which echoes
Claudius’ ill-advised dismissal of Fortinbras, “So much for him” (I.ii.25). The narrator, after a
paragraph break, concurs: “It was perfectly true: Manston was dead” (364). Even the man
himself, who has helpfully left a detailed memoir, dedicates a mere half sentence to his suicide.
In his “last words”—and there are over two thousand five hundred of them—he shrugs at
voluntary death: “Having found man’s life to be a wretchedly conceived scheme, I renounce it”
(ibid).
The bystander’s description, then, acts as a full stop on the matter, the most evocative
narrative Hardy provides of his death, even though the pages that follow are written in the
suicide’s own voice. Features “scarcely changed” suggests a tranquil passing, one that did not
end in agony. While this might instead reflect a lack of contrition, the picturesque sunlight
provides an approving metaphor of Christian redemption rather than damnation: Manston’s death
as payment for Manston’s crimes, a solution that provides juridical, theological, and narrative
closure all at once. The reader, who is about to delve at length into Manston’s character and
actions, is directed beforehand to perish any further thought of his death. These remain the
authoritative details of the suicide, even though they have already passed through the mouths of
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two speakers—two speakers, it might be added, who are unlikely to have any particular insight
into Manston—before they reach us. For the Hardy of Desperate Remedies, the suicide belongs
less to himself than to the turnkey, the bystander, his listeners, and the reader. Collectively, we
compose a narrative that takes no account of the suicide’s interiority and instead relegates the
corpse to religious and narrative clichés. It is, in a sense, an equation, one that adds illegitimacy,
villainy, and capture and equals self-murder.
Twelve years later, in 1883, Hardy returned to Dorset and began to compile “Facts from
Newspapers, Histories, Biographies, & other chronicles — (mainly Local),” a sort of
commonplace and scrapbook that contained six hundred ninety items, many of them from the
Dorset County Chronicle between 1826 and 1830.78 One of these DCC entries describes a
“handsome, virtuous” young woman who is struck by her father and leaps from Harnham Bridge
in Salisbury. “[Y]oung man saw her, tried to save her,” writes Hardy, “but cd not.”79 The article
itself, “Melancholy Suicide,” predates Hood by over a decade in terming the woman, Mary Ann
Williamson, an “unfortunate girl.”80 She was not alone. In the years 1826-1830, often under the
heading “Accidents and Offences,” the “old DCC” reported dozens of suicides, including at least
four attempted and five “successful” leaps from bridges.81 These reports are sandwiched
78

William Greenslade, introduction to Thomas Hardy’s “Facts” Notebook: A Critical Edition (New
York: Routledge, 2016), xv-xvi.
79
Thomas Hardy, Thomas Hardy’s “Facts” Notebook: A Critical Edition, ed. William Greenslade (New
York: Routledge, 2004), 118.
80
“Melancholy Suicide,” Dorset County Chronicle, January 3, 1828.
81
An unnamed “unfortunate female,” a grieving mother, who is “very respectably dressed in a black
spencer, Leghorn bonnet, black veil, &c.” and who is saved by a lighterman, as reported in “Attempted
Suicide,” Dorset County Chronicle, January 12, 1826; Isabella Kelly, an Irish woman who kills herself by
swallowing “aquafortis,” but who had “several times attempted to destroy herself … by precipitating
herself from the South Bridge into the river Frome,” as reported in “Shocking Suicide,” Dorset County
Chronicle, June 1, 1826; Sarah Bland and an unnamed woman who is saved by “a young man named
Robin,” as reported in “Suicide,” Dorset County Chronicle, August 3, 1826; an “female unknown,” as
reported in “Accidents and Offences,” Dorset County Chronicle, October 12, 1826; an unnamed,
“fashionably dressed but wretched girl,” as reported in “Suicide,” Dorset County Chronicle, March 6,
1828; an unnamed “unfortunate lady,” a mother and “widow of a Welch clergyman” who is charged with

45

between births, deaths, marriages, murders, divorces, bankruptcies, amusing anecdotes, and
announcements of forthcoming local entertainments; suicides share column space with poetry,
gossip, book reviews, advertisements, letters to the editor, and market returns (or “The Funds”).
The news is local, international, political, legal, statistical, and agricultural.
The suicides themselves are frequently sensational. One begins with the theft of bee
hives. During a domestic dispute, the thief’s wife threatens to inform against him, and “in the
height of his passion he took a knife, and cut her throat; the effusion of blood from the wound
caused her to faint, when trembling at the effects of his rage, the man hastened to an out-house,
and hung himself.” But it doesn’t end there: “In the meanwhile, the unfortunate woman, though
the laceration in her throat was very considerable, recovered her senses.” She discovers her
husband “suspended by the neck” and her “former affection immediately reviving, like a good
wife she cut him down, before he had suffered much inconvenience from his rashness.” It’s still
not over. The following morning, the thief tries to sell the stolen honey and is spotted by its
original owner. However, “as great rogues have generally great cunning,” he quickly sells the
honey for a trifle and is therefore empty-handed by the time the constable arrives.82 This is in
effect a sensation fiction vignette, and much like Manston, here the attempted suicide is a means
of atonement for sins, punishment for crime. Apparently an attempted suicide is lex talionis for
theft and attempted murder.
Another report relates a series of statistics out of Paris, which include suicides sorted by
their causes. Under the heading “Foreign News,” we read,
317 persons committed suicide; of these were 206 males, 111 females; 21
destroyed themselves from ill-requited love; 128 from disgust of life, mental
attempted suicide, as reported in “Attempted Suicide,” Dorset County Chronicle, July 17, 1828; an
unnamed woman in “Suicides,” Dorset County Chronicle, September 10, 1829. (Unless otherwise noted,
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derangement, or domestic misfortune; 30 from bad conduct, gaming, the lottery,
and debauchery; 59 from poverty, the loss of their situations, or deranged affairs;
8 from fear of reproach or punishment; 71 from unknown motives.83
Both the pseudo-fictional and the proto-sociological, while genuinely motivated by a desire to
understand suicide, remain trapped outside, myopic in their emphasis on surface details. Make
no mistake: these are humanizing developments, often succeeding religious and legal precedents
that were increasingly viewed as unnecessarily cruel. They are designed to elicit sympathy and
understanding for the victim, and they employ psychological explanations of the act.
Nevertheless, it is almost always the action rather than the actor that is the object of study, and
therefore these developments remain fundamentally unimaginative. In sifting their suicides into
categories, they allow the category to overtake the human and lean on moral fable and narrative
closure to address humanistic as opposed to scientific or legal concerns. Again, only half a
sentence is dedicated to the attempted suicide on the honey thief and near-uxoricide, whose
choice of death is drawn with a clear line of causality from illicit behavior to contrite selfmurder. Like Kate Carter, whose voluntary death opened this chapter, the Parisian suicides are
the objects of their sentences, not the subjects. The “from” construction suggests that domestic
misfortune caused suicide, that deranged affairs caused suicide. Even unknown motives have
agency. The actors, meanwhile, are usually predestinate victims of a crime, their perpetration a
matter of scientific fate.
The DCC entries would serve as source material for The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886),
so it is no surprise that these legal, journalistic, literary, medical, and sociological discourses are
all at play when Michael Henchard, like “other unfortunates … before him,” passes his own
bridge of sighs. The now-ubiquitous “unfortunate” is not, like Hood, capitalized; they are
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categories, not allegories. Before Henchard can consider self-destruction, Hardy pauses for a
brief social history. The chapter begins, “Two bridges stood near the lower part of Casterbridge
town,” and “[t]hese bridges had speaking countenances.” To both “gravitated all the failures of
the town,” who have worn down its parapets with their anxious pacing. Those “of lowest
character” prefer “the near bridge of brick,” which adjoins the town and positions the act in “the
glare of the public eye.”84 Visitors of the near bridge of brick have included Jopp, Mother
Cuxsom, Christopher Coney, and “poor Abel Whittle,” all characters, incidentally, who do not
take the leap (224). Then, there are the misérables who pause at “the far one of stone” (223).
They are “of a politer stamp”:
They included bankrupts, hypochrondriacs, persons who were what is called ‘out
of a situation’ from fault or lucklessness, the inefficient of the professional class
… The eyes of this species were mostly directed over the parapet upon the
running water below … one in straits on this [bridge] never faced the road, never
turned his head at coming footsteps, but, sensitive to his own condition, watched
the current whenever a stranger approached, as if some strange fish interested
him, though every finned thing had been poached out of the river years before …
Some had been known to stand and think so long with this fixed gaze downward,
that eventually they had allowed their poor carcases to follow that gaze; and they
were discovered the next morning out of reach of their troubles. (224)
Bridges, of course, have become routine stages for literary suicides by the mid-eighties, a belief
that is apparently shared by the parasuicides like Mother Cuxsom and poor Abel Whittle, whose
choice of location appears in part to embrace the performative and therefore communal aspects
of their suicidal gestures. The poachers have even obliged the symbolism, making the site absent
of marine life.
But those who do not survive, who cannot return to speak on their own behalf, they are
unnamed by Hardy, identified only by the nature of their failure, which both explains their
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actions and elides their subjectivity. The experience of women, in particular, is buried under the
euphemism “out of a situation,” and the remaining examples are gendered as men—an odd
decision since all of the DCC bridge suicides are women. “Species” further alienates the victim,
and it is a word Hardy will use only one other time in the novel, when Elizabeth-Jane finds
respect in both the “nether” and “glorified” parts of society by teaching them “the cunning
enlargement … of those minute forms of satisfaction that offer themselves to everybody not in
positive pain”; this cunning enlargement is “a species of microscopic treatment” (334). The
metaphor of scientific observation is apt: in each of his examples, Hardy has explained suicide
through the use of sociological and medical categories—bankruptcy, hypochondria—but in each
he has also declined to imagine the lived experience of the dead. The closest he comes is with
Henchard, who walks to the far bridge of stone, but before he can think of suicide, he is
interrupted by Jopp, a survivor of the near one of brick. The social contact draws him back, at
least temporarily, to life. Meanwhile, the “carcases,” emerging from the light baptismal
associations of the water, are found “out of reach of their troubles,” another full stop that
provides religious and narrative closure and ends reflection on their suicides. We are told that
they think but not what they think. Even the bridges, with their “speaking countenances,” have
more to say than the dead themselves.
All this will change with Father Time. Despite the fact that he is a suicide who, in some
senses, shatters Victorian norms—Shuttleworth calls him a “direct assault … on our novel
reading sensibilities where children customarily represent hope for the future, a promise of
continuity and development” (The Mind of the Child, 133)—both Father Time’s death and the
death of his father, Jude Fawley, are legible to the reader long before they actually happen. After
Jude confronts Arabella about her feigned pregnancy, she counterattacks with the information
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that “your father ill-used your mother, and your father’s sister ill-used her husband … All you
Fawleys be a queer lot as husbands and wives.”85 Later, his great-aunt Drusilla confirms the
diagnosis: “There’s sommat in our blood that won’t take kindly to the notion of being bound to
do what we do readily enough if not bound” (65).86 Drusilla is speaking about marriage, but
following their separation, his “mother soon afterwards died—she drowned herself, in short”
(64). Furthermore, as Michael Millgate points out, Jude’s name, with its echoes of Judas in
Matthew, is no help.87 At the moment, then, he appears to be bound to fulfill biological destiny,
and he immediately attempts suicide by drowning. Walking out into a “large round pond,”
Jude put one foot on the edge of the ice, and then the other: it cracked under his
weight; but this did not deter him. He ploughed his way inward to the centre, the
ice making sharp noises as he went. When just about the middle he looked
around him and gave a jump. The cracking repeated itself, but he did not go
down. He jumped again, but the cracking had ceased. (65)
The simple, declarative sentences mimic the detached and methodological tone of scientific
discourse. The narrator rarely describes anything but Jude’s actions, the steps he takes to kill
himself. Once he has abandoned his attempt, he decides that “self-extermination” is not what he
is “reserved for,” as he is “not a sufficiently dignified person for suicide.” Jude is not among the
ranks of Socrates and Seneca. “Peaceful death abhorred him as a subject,” making him the
object of the sentence, despite the pun.
He is, needless to say, obscure, in a “degraded position,” and it is drinking that is “the
regular, stereotyped resource of the despairing worthless” (ibid.). This, too, is a form of self-
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destruction, à la Geoffrey Firmin in Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano (1947), and therefore
Jude does still follow his mother into death. But it is what Giordano, quoting Karl Menninger,
calls “suicide by inches” (36). It is a lower-class death without the dignity of the Stoics and one
that takes place in “public houses” rather than the company of family and friends, a key
distinction that locates his self-destruction in the presence of a range of sympathetic, hostile, and
relatively neutral witnesses. Significantly, it is the news of this hereditary relationship to suicide,
not the relationship itself, which prompts Jude’s suicide attempt. Note how much of his
character—as the report of his parents appears to have an immediate and permanent effect on his
personality—is constructed not through the granular details of his lineage but by the public’s
understanding of that lineage: Jude hears about the chronic domestic unhappiness and illtreatment from a secondhand source: His great-aunt tells him the breakup itself occurred outside,
in public space, “by the Brown House … where the road to Fenworth branches off, and the
handpost stands” (64). And like his parents, Jude will meet his own star-crossed lover, Sue
Bridehead, in public rather than following the “country custom” of calling on her (93).
Still, many of the details remain mysterious: Drusilla concludes her brief family history
with a partial but tantalizing bit of information: on the road to Fenworth a “gibbet once stood …
not onconnected with our history. But let that be.” The crime for which their relative was
executed is unnamed. Jude, then, is shaped by destiny, but not an entirely theological or
biological destiny. Instead, it is the public’s understanding of his character and fate, combined
with his own, that orient Jude toward the road to self-destruction. As for the details, about his
mother, for instance, those are let be. It is a hazy vision, an amalgamation of incomplete sources,
but it is one that is apparently shared by Marygreen at large. Like Bertha Mason, Jude’s ending
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is contained in his beginning—both Brontë and Hardy draw clear lines of cause and effect.88 But
unlike Bertha, whose death is memorialized by public narrative, in Wessex it is the public
narrative itself that condemns Jude to death. They are a chorus chanting biological destiny.
Eventually, Jude agrees, as if the evidence has finally convinced him—like his suicide attempt,
his decision to drink (“the regular, stereotyped resource”) has an empirical quality to its
reasoning, drawing on a combination of history, theology, psychology, sociology, and literature
to reach his conclusions. Though emotional in their effects, they are rational in their
determination, which allows us to read his hopes for his son—“What I couldn’t accomplish in
my own person perhaps I can carry out through him?” (268)—with proper irony.
Sue is herself no stranger to such pressures of interpretation. When she escapes from
Melchester Normal School, we do not read about the escape but about “seventy young women,
of ages varying in the main from nineteen to one-and-twenty” who hear about the escape (134).89
“[E]xclamations from the first-year’s girls in an adjoining class-room,” and then an anonymous
first-year herself, alert the authorities that Sue “got out of the back window” and “escaped in the
dark across the lawn, and disappeared” (136). The mistress assumes she “walked through the
river.” The porter offers another reading: “Or drounded herself.” The mistress, entertaining the
possibility, is “horrified—not so much at the possible death of Sue, as at the possible halfcolumn detailing that event in all the newspapers” (137). The link between suicide and publicity
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is irreparable. When she is assured that Sue “had not brought disgrace upon the school by
drowning herself,” she speaks “superciliously of her” and “express[es] gladness that she was
gone.” Though untrue, this brief flare-up of hearsay and premature, catastrophic speculation
demonstrates the speed and efficiency with which Hardy views these public narratives cohering.
Sue’s later summary of the events, “Walked through the largest river in the county! … 1 got out
of the window and escaped across the stream” is a gloss by comparison and hardly stands a
chance in the competition for the reader’s imagination (138).
This does not mean that the public is not always wrong. When Sue chooses the same
method in fleeing Phillotson—she “mounted upon the sill and leapt out”—we may not
unreasonably suspect that she, like Jude, is flirting with suicide, even if she happens to survive
her leaps (218). If Jude is inch-by-inch, Sue’s suicidality comes in bursts followed by coolingoff periods. Yet again, she does not get to tell her own story: Phillotson, “mechanically,”
“unconsciously,” enters their room and begins undressing. Upon hearing a cry, the narrator tells
us, “he perceived Sue starting up half-awake, staring wildly, and springing out upon the floor on
the side away from him, which was towards the window” (emphasis added). He “heard her
flinging up the sash,” and “[b]efore he had thought that she meant to do more than get air she had
mounted upon the sill and leapt out … [and] disappeared in the darkness” (emphasis added).
When Phillotson reaches Sue, she babbles before “actual circumstances seemed to come back”
after which “she was silent” (219). The repetition of “disappear” and the use of “dark” and
“darkness” in these twin accounts suggests a common language on which witnesses draw to
describe such acts, language that accumulates persuasive force with each retelling. Sue,
meanwhile, only mentions her leap to Jude in the middle of a fight, crying out “I jumped out of
the window … I jumped out of the window,” contrasting her heroic behavior on his behalf to his
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assignation with Arabella (234-5; emphasis in original). When he asks her to elaborate—
“Jumped out of a window?”—she replies, “I can’t explain!” (235). The dominant, the most
fully-rendered image of this jump thus remains Phillotson’s unconscious one, of an impulsive,
wild-eyed woman whom he finds on the gravel in a “white heap” (218). Late in Jude, when we
as readers have lost close contact with Sue, she regresses into a sort of asceticism. Had we more
knowledge of the psychological and circumstantial details, we might be able to argue that this, a
relinquishment of the world as she experiences it, is a form of self-destruction: Sue’s version of
Jude’s bottle. But here, as on all of her suicidal gestures, she is silenced.
Like his father, the stoic, passive Father Time is marked for death from the beginning: a
“victim of spoiled heredity,” writes Elaine Showalter.90 When the reader first meets the “boy
with an octogenarian face” (300), the boy who moves in “a steady mechanical creep” (267), he is
on the train to his new parents, and he “seemed mutely to say: ‘All laughing comes from
misapprehension. Rightly looked at there is no laughable thing under the sun’” (265-6). Later
he tries but fails to smile. Like Bertha, Father Time has long been considered “more of a
symbolic figure than a real one,”91 even “a major discursive breach with the conventions of
nineteenth-century realism,”92 his suicide “the most flagrant instance of Hardy’s preparedness to
sacrifice verisimilitude to his diagrammatic design.”93 For Hardy, who probably read about child
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suicide in Henry Maudsley’s essay “Heredity in Health and Disease” (1886), Father Time is also
a canary in the coal mine, another unfortunate whose death augurs “the coming universal wish
not to live” (326).94 He is a misérable who predicts an epidemic. Thus, it is appropriate he is
denied even the barest of identifiers, a given name. His mother eschews a christening—“if I died
in damnation, ’twould save the expense of a Christian funeral” (270)—and even when he is
“formally turned into ‘Jude,’ the apt nickname stuck to him” (287). His identity to others, then,
is his identity to the novel, “Father Time” better suited for a character in a morality play and or a
Christian allegory than a realist nineteenth-century novel. This makes him, in a sense, the
Victorian suicide par excellence: a cipher, a symbol, a plot device, but never an autonomous or
psychologically-realized subject. From his arrival in Aldbrickham, Father Time is already
wearing the noose around his neck.
Thus, the true scandal of the little boy’s suicide is that it is reasoned rather than
impulsive. The much-discussed note, “Done because we are too meny,” has, on its own terms,
an irrefutable logic, as if the children of Ireland had suggested their own infanticides in “A
Modest Proposal” (1729) (325).95 Father Time, we read earlier, “seemed to have begun with the
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generals of life, and never to have concerned himself with the particulars … regarding his
companions as if he saw their whole rounded lives rather than their immediate figures” (267,
266). This is a detached, academic, and almost sociological position, with its attention to life
cycles rather than the needs of the present moment. It is also what enables his violent home
economics. When the family arrives in Christminster, they are denied lodging. Father Time asks
Sue a series of questions, and she is too tired to lie:
“Father went away to give us children room, didn’t he?”
“Partly.”
“It would be better to be out o’ the world than in it, wouldn’t it?”
“It would almost, dear.”
“’Tis because of us children, too, isn’t it, that you can’t get a good
lodging.”
“Well––people do object to children sometimes.” (322)
He says children should be killed at birth, and Sue decides it is an appropriate time to be “honest
and candid” and admits that she is pregnant (323). Father Time storms into his bedroom, the
adjoining closet, and cries, “If we children was gone there’d be no trouble at all!” (324). We
witness both his gathering of evidence and his conclusion.
There is no reason, then, to expect anything but what follows: by mid-morning, he and
his siblings are dead. For Father Time, this is a gift to his parents, the resolution of a conflict, a
macabre variation of the tradition observed by Hood, Brontë, Eliot, and Hardy himself. Father
Time is an obliging Bertha Mason. Margaret Oliphant, a contemporary critic who had favorably
reviewed Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891), complained in Blackwood’s Magazine (January
1896),
Does Mr. Hardy think this is really a good way of disposing of the unfortunate
progeny of such connections? does he recommend it for general adoption? It is at
least a clean and decisive cut of the knot, leaving no ragged ends; but then there is
no natural provision in families of such a wise small child to get its progenitors
out of trouble … Mr. Hardy knows, no doubt as everybody does, that the children
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are a most serious part of the question of the abolition of marriage. Is this the way
in which he considers it would be resolved best?96
Her question is rhetorical, from her perspective damning, but Father Time, at least, has answered
it in the affirmative. In his spartan rendering, an author prone to effusive speech from his central
characters indicts the narrative logic that would demand such a conclusion, a conclusion that
leaves no ragged ends. Even Sue admits, “It was not unreasonable for him to die: it was part of
his incurably sad nature,” her use of unreasonable denoting a sort of judiciousness, nature her
reliance on popular hereditary science, as in Jude’s “It was in his nature to do it. The doctor
says…” (328 and 326).
Father Time, however, fails to account for the psychological cost of his actions, the
humanistic consequences of an exclusively scientific methodology, and rather than resolving a
conflict, he exacerbates one. Jude thus exposes the cruelty of these Enlightenment-based
interpretations of suicide, the complexity that is flattened by explanatory cliché. The details of
this “triplet of little corpses”—“the girl and the baby boy” hung on “hooks for hanging garments
… by a piece of box-chord round each of their necks”—are descriptively thorough but
emotionally barren to the point of indifference (325). Appropriately, the other two children
remain unnamed—two more misérables. Earlier, when Sue admits her pregnancy to Father
Time, she calls him “little Jude” for the first time (323), a secular christening that is repeated by
the narrator in the scene of his death: “the body of little Jude was hanging in a similar manner”
(325). Once he is already lost, once his fate is determined, Father Time becomes “little Jude,” a
named presence that distinguishes him from his siblings and from medieval characters like
Justice and Equity. In contrast to Shuttleworth, for whom “it is arguable that he could only have
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written it by suppressing his sense of the humanity of Father Time and Jude and Sue's children,”
I read Hardy as reminding us of his humanity in moments such as this (The Mind of the Child,
347).97
When all three children are buried in a “common grave,” Sue attempts to see them one
last time but is denied permission (330). She blames her conversation with Father Time to his
actions, and according to the simple, causal reasoning that has permeated Victorian
representations of suicide, she is right: these deaths are her fault. The logic is merciless. Neither
Jude nor, I suspect, the reader actually blames Sue, but the narrator, who structures the scenes
back-to-back, makes a case for incrimination. No wonder, then, that she insists on reading the
deaths in functional, narrative-churning terms: “They were sacrificed to teach me how to live!—
their death was the first stage of my purification,” she cries, “That’s why they have not died in
vain!” (351-2). But for the Hardy of Jude the Obscure, such transformations are not redemptive;
they are poisonous. The trope is no longer tenable.
Consistent with the historical record established by Anderson and Bailey, Father Time’s
suicide generates a large cast of interpreters, and his meaning for the reader is a collage of
scientific, religious, and narrative discourses. Inconsistent with the record, however, the
discourses of those closest to the boy are absent: we never read of their participation in the
inquiry. Jude tells Sue, “The doctor says there are such boys springing up amongst us—boys of
a sort unknown in the last generation—the outcome of new views of life,” adding with
assurance, “He’s an advanced man, the doctor” (326). Sue, in fact, is even excluded from
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looking at Father Time, forced instead to listen to “the people moving about above” and
restrained by “the woman of the house.” When she finally sees him, he is as legible as ever:
“The boy’s face expressed the whole tale of their situation.” She views him as “their nodal
point.” As if mocking the mourning mother, a nearby organist plays Psalm 73, “Truly God is
loving unto Israel,” about one whose “steps had well nigh slipped” in envy of the rich and
powerful until the psalmist realizes that God “castedst them down into destruction” (2, 18). The
speaker finds comfort in the knowledge that God will “guide me with thy counsel, and afterward
receive me to glory” (24; emphasis in original). Sue begins crying, and if she can hear the lyrics,
she is no doubt thinking that her three children, unchristened, are damned, undestined for glory,
and she sobs, “O, O my babies! They had done no harm! Why should they have been taken
away, and not I!” (326). Quoting 1 Corinthians, she moans, “We are made a spectacle unto the
world, and to angels, and to men!” locating their tragedy in the public sphere (327). The epistle
from Paul, about factionalism in the Church, offers further suggestive parallels, as when he
dissuades apostles from marriage, unless “they cannot control themselves,” in which case “it is
better to marry than to burn with passion” (7:9). Its chapter on love offers grim irony in this
context: “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but
when I became a man, I put away childish things / For now we see through a glass, darkly; but
then face to face” (13:11). Is there any child who speaks less as a child than Father Time?
In addition to herself, Sue blames their actions as a couple and “Fate” (328) or
“something external to us” (327). The author of an unsigned review of The Mayor of
Casterbridge calls this Hardy’s “almost Olympian ruthlessness towards his own creations.”98
Over eighty years later, Barry N. Schwartz mocked the now-critical commonplace, accusing one
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commentator of “discuss[ing] Hardy as if he were speaking of Homer” and arguing that this
“human lament” is in fact about “the epic hero without divine intervention.”99 Be that as it may,
as Mary Ann Kelly has demonstrated, Hardy’s novel is infused with coercive language: the
“predestinate” Jude acts “against his intention,” fore example, “almost against his will.”100 Jude,
for his part, agrees with the commonplace, and he projects a similar mythic structure around their
drama, quoting the chorus from Agamemnon (458 BCE), another story of sacrificial infanticide:
“Things are as they are, and will be brought to their destined issue” (328).101 The comparison to
the Oresteia casts their lives in terms of destiny and punishment: they are, like Agamemnon and
Clytemnestra, victims of retribution. The pun on issue, much like the eggs Sue boils before the
discovery of her children’s bodies, serves as a wicked joke at the expense of their tragedy. If the
death is a punishment, the punishment isn’t over, and Jude is soon informed that Sue’s “child had
been prematurely born, and that it, like the others, was a corpse” (330).
Aeschylus ends his trilogy with a trial, the establishment of justice through courts rather
than the Furies, and the exoneration of the second generation. With four dead kids, the Fawleys
have no such relationship to Fate: their children will never live to receive just admission to
Christminster. Still, like Clytemnestra, Sue has her chorus: in addition to the men upstairs and
the woman of the house, she is sure that a conversation she hears outside “about us, no doubt”
(327). But unlike “Bridge of Sighs,” Jane Eyre, Daniel Deronda, or The Mayor of Casterbridge,
none of these discourses, alone or in collaboration with one another, produce a comforting or
even a satisfying explanation. Still, explanations abound: in addition to those those already
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mentioned, witnesses include the jury, who “duly came and viewed the bodies,” and the coroner,
responsible for “the inquest [that] was held” (329). Furthermore, “[a]ccounts in the newspapers”
draw “curious idlers” to the funeral. “Doubt of the real relations of the couple added zest to their
curiosity,” doubt that is well-guessed or well-founded, the gossip likely influenced by the
newspaper, the coroner, the jury, other miscellaneous witnesses, and any ready sexual innuendo.
The news proliferates quickly, first reaching Arabella, who reads “all about it in the papers”
(336), then Phillotson, who eyes the headline, “Strange Suicide of a stone-mason’s children
(344). But the story that coheres in the public’s imagination is absent the details of little Jude’s
life and the thoughts of those closest to him, who do not testify at the inquest and therefore fail to
participate in the communal narrative we saw playing out in the legal, religious, and journalistic
contexts above. Sue doesn’t even attend the funeral. The emergent narrative is a suggestive
story, one that satisfies the public—who do not linger at his grave (329)—but neither the reader
nor the characters concerned. It is irresolution by nature of too-ready resolution.
Some members of the press, in both praise and criticism, adopted the biological and
psychological language Jude borrows for its Weltanschauung. In his mixed review of this
“terrible study in pathology,” Edmund Gosse, a close friend of Hardy’s, wrote that the Fawleys
are a “decayed and wasted race,” Sue bound for “religious mania” and Jude “a neurotic subject
in whom hereditary degeneracy takes an idealist turn, with some touch, perhaps, of what the new
doctors call megalomania.”102 “The vita sexualis of Sue is the central interest of the book,” he
continues, “and enough is told about it to fill the specimen tables of a German specialist” (280).
As for their son, “habitual melancholy, combined with his hereditary antecedents, has prepared
us for an outbreak of suicide” (279; emphasis added). Gosse goes so far as to say that Jude

102

Cox, The Critical Heritage, 280, 278, and 279.

61

demands both “a poet” and a “physician, the neuropathist,” who “steps in, and takes the pen out
of the poet’s hand” (278).103 R.Y. Tyrrell, writing seven months after the first reviews and
complaining about the novel’s reception of “unstinted and unqualified applause,” suggests Hardy
is deliberately trying the patience of his readership “to see whether they will accept in lieu of a
novel a treatise on sexual pathology, in which the data are drawn from imagination, and are,
therefore, scientifically invalid.”104
Havelock Ellis, a psychologist who had written an essay testifying to Hardy’s
psychological insight in 1883 and who ranked him among Austen, Brontë, and Eliot, returned to
his work in October 1886, hailing Jude as “the greatest novel written in England for many
years.” Still, he found Father Time’s suicide ill-suited to a book otherwise unconcerned with
“gross pathological degenerescence” and “the hereditary evolution of criminality.”105 Bloodshed
is better left to “a great psychologist, living on the barbarous outskirts of civilization, a
Dostoieffsky to whom the secret of every abnormal impulse has been revealed” (315). Ellis,
arguing against a reading of Jude as “a pathological ‘case,’” chastises fellow critics for their
misuse of medical terms: “Sue is neurotic, some critics say; it is fashionable to play cheerfully
with terrible words you know nothing about” (317). But later, he concedes that such discourses
are readily available: “We may take it that a novel, especially if written in English, is open to all
readers. If you wish to write exclusively for adult readers, it is difficult to say what form of
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literature you should adopt; even metaphysics is scarcely safe” (318; emphasis added). None
seem to suggest that Hardy, while certainly prone to treatise-writing, is also critiquing the very
inhumanity of such Victorian treatises; in the face of pathologies and hereditary science, of
outbreaks of suicide, he asserts a humanism that is often lost or ignored by his contemporaries.
Barbara Gates describes it as an era during which “physicians began commenting upon suicide
and insanity in literary works, while literary figures increasingly based their viewpoints upon
medical knowledge.”106 Indeed, Ellis was himself a physician in addition to a social reformer,
sexologist, and literary critic. His disciplinary promiscuity embodies, but by no means exhausts,
this interdiscursive quality of Victorian suicidology that enables both Hardy’s critique and his
object of critique: social cohesion around the knowledge of suicide. In the final pages of Jude
the Obscure, Hardy attempts to rent that cohesion.
Recall Shuttleworth, who argues that the suicide of Father Time “works as a direct
assault on the reader, a deliberate attack on our novel reading sensibilities where children
customarily represent hope for the future, a promise of continuity and development.” Hardy’s
reversal precludes these elements—hope for the future, continuity, and development—which are
indelible features of the nineteenth-century realist novel, often borne out in its final paragraphs.
The trope is typified, for example, by the narrator of Middlemarch, whose Finale begins with the
pangs of parting—“Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending. Who can quit young lives
after being long in company with them, and not desire to know what befell them in their afteryears?”—and then goes on to chronicle the afterlives of its characters, ending with the image of
“the number who lived faithfully a hidden life … [who] rest in unvisited tombs.”107 Unvisited
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because they rest well. It is a counterpoint to Austen’s affectionate and companionable
marriages—one ends in marriage and the promise of new life, the other in the good death.
Jane Eyre and Daniel Deronda conclude under similar circumstances. After her
marriage, Jane tells us, “My tale has drawn to its close,” but then offers a few pages on her ten
succeeding years with Rochester (450). She keeps the reader apprised the various marriages of
her characters and of the inevitable death of St. John. Still, the martyrdom of the unmarried
cousin, who “labours for his race: he clears their painful way to improvement,” is teleological,
not tragic (emphasis added). He will be “called at length into the joy of his Lord,” sure of his
reward, the “incorruptible crown” (452).108 Nothing, needless to say, of Bertha’s inquest, of the
testimony Jane and Rochester may have been called upon to provide, or of the ruling, whether
felo de se or the more probable non compos mentis. The final chapter of Daniel Deronda
likewise stresses both unity and the effects of Belsey’s cause-and-effect “enhanced awareness.”
After an epigraph that describes the oneness of both nature and the individual, Eliot begins,
“Among the blessings of love there is hardly one more exquisite than the sense that in uniting the
beloved life to ours” (680). The couple is married “according to the Jewish rite,” and Deronda
notes that “even with infantine feet” Mirah “had begun to tread among thorns” (681). He then
remembers “the first time he had beheld her face [and] it had seemed to him the girlish image of
despair.” Here is the final mention of her suicide attempt, which is laid to rest as an early image
in the development toward her identity as Mirah Deronda. Eliot ends with Mordecai’s peaceful
death and their newlyweds’ departure for “the East” (682). Before he passes, he chants “the
confession of the divine Unity,” effecting Deronda’s entrance into Shuttleworth’s symbolic
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language community of Hebrew (683). The reader, who belongs to no such community, does not
get to hear.
Then there is Jude. Two days after his death, Arabella chats with the Widow Edlin while
looking at her husband’s “’andsome corpse” (396). She asks about Sue, and Edlin tells her she
looks “[t]ired and miserable,” but offers consolation nonetheless: “She said she had found
peace!” (397). Arabella rejects the widow’s typical Victorian resolution: “She may swear that on
her knees to the holy cross upon her necklace till she’s hoarse, but it won’t be true … She’s
never found peace since she left his arms, and never will again till she’s as he is now!”109
Instead of a good life and good death, Jude, Sue, and Father Time are each miserable and
damned. Arabella’s cynical reading, which stands as the last word on this or any other matter in
the novel, figures the suicide of little Jude as an irrevocable rupture, one that reaps death,
disunion, and perpetual irresolution. Unlike Eliot’s, the tombs of Hardy’s characters neither rest
nor remain unvisited; once the crowd loses interest, Sue appears at little Jude’s grave dressed in
“coloured clothing, which she had never thought of changing for the mourning he had bought,
suggested to the eye a deeper grief than the conventional garb of bereavement could express”
(329). The symbols of loss are performative gestures, and clothing is no longer legible as an
expression of private experience.

A brief postscript: Hardy was not the first Victorian novelist to write a child suicide. In that he is
preceded by Emma Brooke, whose A Superfluous Woman was anonymously published in
January 1894, almost a full year before Jude’s serialization began in December. The novel
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follows a New Woman, Jessamine Halliday, who has an affair with a manual laborer in the
Scottish Highlands before wedding Lord Heriot, a blue-blooded playboy with hereditary bad
luck.110 Heriot’s father is paralytic, his brother a drunk, his sister “a microcephalous idiot,” and
therefore his anxiety over siring a healthy “single unit of the race” is pronounced.111 But he is
bound to destiny: “I believe in Providence,” Heriot cries toward the end of the novel (206;
emphasis in original), and the narrator agrees: while Jessamine reads Society’s Whispers, we are
told, “[M]ournfully tragical … are the inherited tendencies with which we are born, the
preformed habit which is in us at our birth … Behind the mounting steps of Evolution creeps the
stealthy shadow Atavism, like old guilt which can never be repudiated any more” (105). Thus,
all is ready when their daughter kills their son and then herself. In response, Jessamine wills
both a miscarriage and her own demise: “Death … will release me—death alone,” she tells
Cornerstone. “Death is the solver of my problem, doctor” (199; emphasis in original). The
parallels to Jude are, if nothing else, curious.
A Superfluous Woman received decent reviews and found a large audience, reaching its
fifth edition by June.112 The most frequent charge from dissatisfied critics was didacticism—an
unsigned reviewer from The Athenæum, after reflecting gratefully on the sermons he never
preached in youth, writes, “The author of ‘A Superfluous Woman’ has preached her sermon.”113
This criticism prompted a rebuttal from Brooke, who opened the fifth edition with a preface
declaring, “I should like to disclaim having written with any special theory. I am no convinced
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theorist” (241). Whatever her intentions, the accusation of sermonizing is not unearned: the
novel’s penultimate chapter, after all, is an extended dialogue on “the inequality of the sexes,”
the chief pontificator, Cornerstone, receiving an intellectual ribbing from his wife (225). Brooke
was a Fabian organizer in addition to a prolific novelist, and thus it is no surprise that her politics
infuse her fiction. She viewed socialism and women’s rights as intersectional, and in an 1888
article titled “Women and their Sphere,” she links economic and gender struggle, arguing that
women should be remunerated for domestic labor.
But the reviewer quoted above was not referring to “the marriage question” or even “the
woman question,” but to “the law of heredity,” which directs the course of her narrative from
beginning to end (243). Brooke corresponded with Karl Pearson, “a major influence,”114 and had
already defended Malthusianism in “Women and their Sphere,” arguing for restricting the
“license of the producers of superfluous or diseased children” but admitting that “[i]t is not
within the scope of this paper to go into the remedies and methods to be applied against overpopulation and bad population” (emphasis added).115 In A Superfluous Woman, however, it does
fall within her scope, and she carefully marks the bodies of her own bad population with signs of
their physical degeneration. Heriot, possibly syphilitic and bred from “enfeebled stock” (203),
speaks in “a voice whose minutest tone was saturated with mental disease and feebleness” (182).
Later, when Dr. Cornerstone, who attends Jessamine both before and after her Scottish dalliance,
looks at her husband, he thinks, “God! how the face was marred! What frightful excess was
written all over it, what bestial memories!” (206). Likewise, their children are “frail, tiny
forms,” and on their corpses “lay heavily the heritage of the fathers. The beaten brows, the
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suffering eyes, expiated in themselves the crimes and debauchery of generations” (200).
Jessamine herself insists on her daughter’s immediate legibility: “When I saw and understood the
face of my first baby,” she asks Cornerstone, “do you think I did not have my desperate
moment?” (201). Arguing for a form of eugenics, the doctor, who in some senses serves as the
novel’s moral arbiter, concludes, “The important thing was not that Heriot should reform, but
that he and his race should pass into annihilation” (208).116 Punning on the meaning of the word
fruits as the product of both biological, physical, or intellectual labor, Jessamine offers
supporting evidence, joking, “Do efforts of right-doing turn to fruits like those?” (201; emphasis
in original).
Her measured tone may be a result of the conclusion’s predictability. When she
catalogues the Heriot family tree, diagnosing the patriarch, she suggests their daughter has little
room for escape: “Violence and excessive animation” in the “tiger who founded the family,”
which “degenerated into meanness, irritation, and vice in such members as did not reap their
heritage in insanity, disease, and shocking malformation” (203). What other fruits could such an
inheritance bear? “The heir and the heritage of the House of Heriot both lay there together,” the
narrator writes of the children, and follows, almost with cynical glee, with a one-sentence
paragraph: “Thus had fallen the answer to the will and the designing of man” (214; emphasis in
original). Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair.
But the House of Heriot has a collaborator in Jessamine, who shares blame in the
unnamed children’s deaths. A Superfluous Woman begins with her own suicide attempt—
Cornerstone diagnoses her with ennui—and three years later he still remembers her eyes, like her
husband’s and her children’s, marked: “the sufferings of generations having been concentrated
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into one pair of orbs; they look at you with the pent-up grief of a race” (40). She has, then, at
least some of the same hereditary predispositions as her husband.117 This perhaps explains why
she comes to think “that our first child was my crime, and not his, my husband’s” (201; emphasis
in original). Gaining momentum, she adds, “I see it. A crime! … Crimes come from within”
(202; emphasis in original). In this characterization, her daughter embodies the crime—that is,
like Bertha, her body itself is a crime—which Jessamine perpetrates in birthing her, even though
the narrator depicts the murder and suicide as the product of various biological and sociological
forces rather than willed actions from psychologically-complex actors. It is indicative of the
novel’s attitude as a whole when Cornerstone, sentimentalizing Jessamine as “dainty bit of flesh
which some great man would buy,” refrains from blaming her: “Poor wretch! She—they—are
what Society makes them” (32). That slight correction to they betrays his political rather than
personal concern: this is a health epidemic, a public crisis, and the characters in the drama are
types used to explain social phenomena.
If there is any agency to be found in A Superfluous Woman, it is in Jessamine, who
dreams of “unborn children” with the “impress of her husband” and terminates her pregnancy
through sheer force of will (212).118 Still dreaming, she says, “They carry … my sins—my
crime!” and dies. The other crime, the daughter’s suicide—the only explicit, “successful”
suicide in the text, and the one with the largest symbolic implications—is among the last in a
long line of dominos. She is a function designed to substantiate her mother’s tragic death. Even
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Jessamine begins to think of her experiences in terms of fiction and therefore beyond her control:
“Life was a memory, a book she had read; she could turn the leaves and look at it now as though
it were the tale of another” (217). The skeleton of the narrative is showing, even to its central
character.
With the addition of sin to crime, Brooke completes the various expectations a Victorian
reader might have for a novelistic suicide: the character, who is never named, remains obscure.
The explanation for her act, while troublesome, is clear and leaves no sense of irresolution. For
causes, the reader is offered a babble of popular discourses, including religious, journalistic,
sociological, evolutionary, and, of course, literary. Rather than atomized languages, they are
multi-vocal and interdiscursive, and most offer little or conditional agency to their subjects. For
example, the sociological exists in harmony with the psychological as well as the literary when
Cornerstone, who believes “a woman’s thoughts, deeds, and words is prescribed, as you say,
beforehand by society” (37), nevertheless regards “all disease as being somewhat of the nature of
moral delinquency, or, at least, as being closely connected with it” (185). The daughter’s crime
is a failure of public and private morals, and the act is dispatched in the same cool language
Hardy uses for Father Time, minus the outrage: “In one moment of fierce horror the brood
concealed therein had destroyed itself, the hand of the idiot girl having been lifted suddenly and
dexterously against her helpless brother” (204). When Jessamine soon returns to the memory,
she will elaborate: “the wide, bright nursery, the sudden unlooked-for fury of the idiot girl, the
fear of the helpless cripple … and the shrieks that were suddenly silent to her ears” (215).119 The
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experience is marked by an absence of sight (that awkward construction unlooked-for) and the
absence of hearing (silent to her ears). She neither desires to nor succeeds in understanding her
daughter, not to mention her son, the “helpless cripple.” We never hear the “idiot girl” speak.
Perhaps this is why the deaths caused no great stir in the press: Brooke observes the
conventions, while Hardy indicts them. We listen to Father Time before we see the “glazed
eyes” of his corpse (325). If this is the case, then use of children in and of itself is not what
elicited the rebuke, scorn, and laughter of Hardy’s critics—like the one, for example, in the
Illustrated London News who protested, “We all know perfectly well that baby Schopenhauers
are not coming into the world in shoals.”120 It was the (admittedly sketchy) characterization of
the child suicide along with his uncompromising, cynical, and cataclysmic worldview. The
ending once again gives away the game. Like Jude, A Superfluous Woman closes with the
musings of a former lover: Cornerstone, at the end of a vacation, visits Colin, the Scotsman, to
tell him of Jessamine’s death. He notes “Dalfaber stood arrested … without the faintest sign of
an advancing notion,” perhaps a justification for the Romanticism that follows (234). When
Cornerstone gives him the news, Colin remains calm. He tells him that he has left “the door ever
on the latch all these years,” and one night, “it seemed to me that the house I had been building
was full” (239). Like Jane and Rochester, the pair have a psychic bond that traverses the
country. “I just knew she was dead,” he explains, “and had come to me that way,” and thinks to
himself, “And now … she has come home” (240). It is not Eliot’s Finale, with the radiating,
private goodness of Dorothea Brooke extending into old age. But neither is it Jude’s unrest until
death. It is closure in the tradition of the marriage plot, if one allows that the bridegroom is a
ghost. Ushering both Cornerstone and the reader out of his door, a gesture that protects the
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couple’s privacy, Colin “raised his hand quietly in the peasant’s salute.” No doubt both now rest
in unvisited tombs.
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2. An Edwardian Disappearance of Death:
Galsworthy, Ford, and the Roots of Modernist Suicide
In Fictional Death and the Modernist Enterprise (1995), Alan Warren Friedman
identifies a transformation in literary depictions of death between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. For much of the former, the prevalence of religious certainty made death “definitive,
public, and appropriate.”1 For example, he cites the passing of King George IV in 1830, quoting
a synopsis from the Times: “His Majesty, far from being dismayed by the awful intelligence [of
his imminent death], received it with the placid resignation of a Christian, and the fortitude of a
man” (31). There is a novelistic finality to the depiction of the scene; one could imagine
Dorothea Brooke dying in such a manner. For Friedman, however, the cumulative blows dealt
by the six horsemen of skepticism—Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche, Einstein, Arnold van Gennep, and
Freud—killed any such certainty, their vision of modernity confirmed by the devastation of
World War I. In response, modernist authors made death “attenuated, denied, or horrific:
initiatory or evaded rather than climatic” (18). Meanwhile, the culture at large ministered to “a
conspiracy of silence and willed ignorance” around the matter (61).2 The Victorian deathbed—
“emotionally extravagant, crowded and full of activity” (74)—was now the sterile, indifferent,
hospital sickroom. Thus, Friedman has given literary expression to Philippe Ariès’ famous
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argument that before The Great War, “the death of a man still solemnly altered the space and
time of a social group that could be extended to include the entire community,” while
industrialization, urbanization, and technological advancement would ultimately render modern
death “invisible.”3
Though Friedman does discuss modernist suicide in the context of Ars moriendi texts, the
subject is ancillary to his argument. In the following chapter, then, I would like to explore how
this “conspiracy of silence” attends to the subject. I argue that authors like John Galsworthy and
Ford Madox Ford uphold Friedman’s silence, serving as active participants in a project of
obfuscation and narrative irresolution. Without a proper witness—one who can testify to the
psychological experience of voluntary death—Galsworthy and Ford reject the teleological
closure, the finality and resolution of the Victorian narratives detailed in the previous chapter. I
then conclude by adapting to the study of suicide Barbara Leckie’s argument that English novels
of adultery are primarily concerned with questions of epistemology, arguing that voluntary death,
which cannot produce testimony, becomes a crucial site of modernist epistemological doubt.
Hence, the tropes identified by Leckie—non-linearity, unreliable narration, textual
fragmentation, and narrative irresolution—prove central to modernist writing of the act. While I
do not propose a single modernist response to suicide, I briefly consider works by James Joyce
and Virginia Woolf to suggest that the shift registered by Galsworthy and Ford represents a
larger and coherent line of thinking in English-language modernism. The neatness of a Bertha
Mason, a Mirah Lapidoth, can no longer sustain the attack on epistemological certainty.
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Galsworthy’s “Accident”
If it were not for its ironic tinge, John Galsworthy’s The Man of Property (1906) would
almost read like the Victorian suicide narratives of Brontë, Eliot, and early Hardy. There is
perhaps no better symbol of the faith in the stability of the English tradition than the Forsytes, a
family that has consciously forgotten its working-class roots and projects into the future an
unwavering faith in personal continuity. “[N]o Forsyte had as yet died,” we read in the fourth
paragraph of the novel, “death being contrary to their principles.”4 Even their features betray “a
racial stamp, too prehistoric to trace, too remote and permanent to discuss—the very hall-mark
and guarantee of the family fortunes” (17-18). In truth, they have merely stamped over their
Dorsetshire “farming stock,” maintaining an enforced silence around the matter that facilitates
the disappearance of knowledge with the passing of each generation (27). The Forsytes are so
successful that their manner suggests an unbroken line of bourgeois leisure: one gets the
misleading sense “that the primeval Forsytes had been content to walk Sunday after Sunday for
hundreds of years” (28). The men send their wives to church, demonstrating their own piety by
paying for pews and “thus expressing in the most practical form their sympathy with the
teachings of Christ,” but their true religion is earning four percent on the principal (ibid.).5
Thus, Philip Baynes Bosinney, an idealistic architect engaged to the scion June Forsyte,
presents something of a crisis for the family, interested as he is in art rather than capital. Like its
Victorian counterparts, the novel registers this aberration and swiftly signals his ultimate suicide.
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Early in The Man of Property, the man himself, Soames Forsyte, looks across the room at
Bosinney, who is “grinning behind the fumes of his cigarette … [and] shrouded in smoke” (58).
Bosinney’s uncle says he’s “got a streak of his father’s Byronism” (91), an easy synonym for the
kind of Sturm und Drang protagonist—Manfred being the obvious example—who would freely
court “Oblivion, self-oblivion.”6 Later, when June begins to suspect that he is having an affair
with Soames’ wife, Irene, she visits his apartment. He’s not home, but she spots him across the
street: “Their eyes met, and he raised his hat. An omnibus passed, obscuring her view; then,
from the edge of the pavement, through a gap in the traffic, she saw him walking on” (211). This
is a dress rehearsal, of sorts, for when Bosinney eventually does walk in front of an omnibus,
killing himself, while the tip of the hat serves as an ambiguous goodbye, since at this point
Bosinney is most certainly leaving June for Irene, though not yet for death. The exchange is
written as a series of fractured, almost cinematic images (omnibus passes; edge of the pavement;
gap in traffic) that, when repeated later, will end in suicide. It is a staging that conforms rather
neatly to mainstream Victorian ideas on the subject: Bosinney, as an adulterer, has committed a
moral crime, and the universe itself seems to call out for his punishment, his cigarette smoke
forming a burial sheet around his face.7 Speaking to young Jolyon of Soames, Bosinney says,
“He’ll never blow his brains out,” and Galsworthy’s stress on the He’ll is left dangling and
unanswered (195; emphasis in original).
Under the teleological framework of Daniel Deronda, Bosinney’s death would serve as
redemption for his sins and perhaps liberate Irene from the social suicide of an exposed,
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extramarital affair. At first, Galsworthy even appears to links the communal participation in
suicide with divine will, thereby framing Bosinney’s death in a similar manner: when Mrs.
MacAnder spots the lovers in Richmond Park, she soon reports this to the family, and the
narrator declares that “her all-seeing eye and shrewd tongue were inscrutably the means of
furthering the ends of Providence” (228). Despite the mocking tone, this is in fact the event that
exposes the lovers and sets Bosinney’s death in motion. Still, as Jeffrey Hunter reminds us, the
Forsytes are merely Edwardians “disguised as late Victorians,” or Victorians viewed with the
cynicism of the Edwardians’ hindsight.8 Thus, we soon read the following codicil, in case the
irony was unclear: “With an air of being in at the death, she had an almost distressing power of
taking care of herself” (ibid.). Mrs. MacAnder sees her role as passive—“bored” by her
companion, she considers the sight of the lovers “quite a merciful ‘pick-me-up.’” For
Galsworthy, however, the gossip network that enabled Victorians to freely consume suicide
narratives are active in means and violent in ends: the idiomatic “in at the death” suggests not
only physical presence but participation. Appeals to Providence serve only as a means of
denying responsibility for an expression of “distressing power.”
Earlier, at a General Meeting of the New Colliery Company, the first suicide of the novel
is treated to the severe logic of commerce. Several Forsytes, including Soames, distracted by his
failing marriage, meet to discuss “Pippin, their Superintendent, [who] had committed suicide in
endeavouring, after his extraordinary two years’ silence, to write a letter to his Board” (145).9
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That letter is on the table, and “it would be read to the shareholders, who would of course be put
into possession of all the facts.” We are not, and it is never reprinted for the reader. For our
purposes, the two years’ silence is permanent. The dominant ideology here is capital, not
Christianity, and capital does not read suicide as a redemption for sin but as an interruption of
work. Thus, many of the shareholders object to paying Pippin’s widow, one even calling it
“sentimental humanitarianism” (149). Galsworthy’s narrator, like his characters, denies the
suicide a voice, leaving us to imagine (or not) what Pippin was protesting, though a later
comment about “the explosion at the mines” hints at one possible explanation (150). As for his
interiority, that is a complete blank.
Instead, we listen to the shareholders discussing the matter:
‘[The Superintendent] who so—er—ill-advisedly (I say—ill-advisedly)
committed suicide, at a time when … the agreement which he has so
unfortunately cut short with his own hand was for a period of five years, of which
one only had expired—I—’ …
‘I ask whether this amount paid, or proposed to be paid, by the Board to the er—
deceased—is for services which might have been rendered to the Company—had
he not committed suicide?’ …
‘[O]ur worthy chairman … will in some way … record our grave disapproval that
so promising and valuable a life should have been thus impiously removed from a
sphere where both its own interests and—if I may say so—our interests so
imperatively demanded its continuance. We should not—nay, we may not—
countenance so grave a dereliction of all duty, both human and divine.’ (147-8;
emphasis in original)
Time and again the shareholders discuss his suicide in terms of utility, while words like illadvisedly suggest an inability to envision actions motivated by any but measured, cause-andeffect reasoning. Unfortunately, a word that denotes chance rather than choice, erases all
agency. Though callous, this is the logic that motivated the fictional suicides of the previous
he took action. Charlemagne commuted his death sentence and Pippin became a monk, likely dying of
the plague around 811.
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chapter. Even when the actor was illogical, the action was not: the suicide attempt of Mirah
Lapidoth, for one example, enables Daniel Deronda to realize his latent Jewishness. Her
flirtation with death generates tangible narrative results. The shareholders here are employing
the same teleological reasoning. Now, however, it comes up short: that action does not yield any
discernable profit. Their speech—halting, euphemistic—betrays an uneasiness around the
subject, a fear of addressing the substance of the action as well as its ethical consequences.
Twice the language of Christianity is employed—“impiously removed” and “dereliction of all
duty, both human and divine”—but the impiety is financial rather than spiritual, and in both
cases the word interests closely precedes or succeeds these condemnations. This is not only an
equation of capital with the divine but a pun on the shareholders’ lack of human interest. Hence,
the word expired refers not to Pippin but to his “agreement” with the Company. Furthermore,
the unnamed Company is given the capitalization of a proper noun, evoking both the authority
and the obscurity of Yahweh. Where suicide once represented an affront to God, it is now a
breach of contract.
Published in 1906, The Man of Property is only just historical fiction, set twenty years in
the past, around the time Galsworthy attended Oxford and before the publication of Jude the
Obscure (1895). If Jude challenged Victorian ideas about suicide by depicting one that forced
audiences to reconcile with the consequences of their Enlightenment-based thinking, Galsworthy
begins the humanistic work of highlighting the silencing of victims. His characters understand
voluntary death in terms of financial property, just as Hood’s, Brontë’s, and Eliot’s did so in
terms of emotional property. In both cases, the experience of the suicide is subsumed under the
response of its witnesses. However, the narrative is no longer satisfied with such resolute
conclusions. Despite the feigned determination of the shareholders, Galsworthy undermines the
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speakers through a series of hesitant em-dashes. None mention the letter, and the
superintendent’s name only appears one more time in the text (45).
Meanwhile, beginning to suspect Irene’s infidelity, Soames employs Bosinney to build
his country house, but the artist who insists on perfection keeps spending indiscriminately.
When the total reaches £12,400, Soames sues Bosinney for £350, the amount he exceeded their
final price limit. By the time they reach trial, Soames is certain about the affair, and the lawsuit
is his only means of expressing power over Bosinney. Irene he rapes: “the greatest—the
supreme act of property,” thinks Soames’ cousin George (256). It is George, in fact, who spots
Bosinney “acting under the stress of violent emotion”—perhaps he has just been told about the
assault—and decides to follow him (255). At first, the cousin expresses humanitarian concern,
even though he still uses money as a metaphor for Bosinney’s body, and not very much money at
that: “If the fellow meant to put his ‘twopenny’ under a bus, he would stop it if he could!” Be
that as it may, like Mrs. MacAnder, he soon assumes the role of audience rather than participant;
he longs to pluck the sleeves of passersby and say, “You don’t often see a show like this!” He
would even catch them up on the plot, which is itself about the recitation of plot: “Here’s a poor
devil whose mistress has just been telling him a pretty little story of her husband…” (256;
emphasis added). George calls his potential audience mates “spectres,” implying they disappear
into the background, an echo of the more accurate spectators (ibid.). Throughout this entire
ordeal, he has been silently following Bosinney in the manner of a reader of a serial devouring
the latest installment. The Forsytes, in fact, are great novel readers, often conceiving of their
lives in novelistic metaphors, and right before spotting Bosinney, George spends the day reading
one himself “in the paternal mansion at Prince’s Gardens” (254).10 Notably, when Soames is
10
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restless and distraught over Irene’s infidelity, he too picks up a book, but “instead of the print he
seemed to see his wife” (219). There is precedent, then, for a Forsyte adulterating life with
fiction, but here Galsworthy has subverted George’s ability to do so: his view is consistently
obscured by the fog and traffic, his hearing by the cacophony of the crowd. When he finally
touches Bosinney on the elbow, and Bosinney spins around, asking, “Who are you? What do
you want?” George is silent, as if one of the characters in his novel had returned his gaze,
demanding an explanation for his prurience (257). Still, this encounter doesn’t entirely deter
him, and he continues following Bosinney. Accenting the violence of this dynamic, the narrator
depicts George wielding a “knout” and pursuing his “quarry,” a fair characterization considering
it is the Forsyte ’Change that is responsible for many of the consequences of this affair,
beginning with Mrs. MacAnder in at the death and driving the knowledge into the public
sphere.11
Boredom, however, soon pares away his interest. George is startled by a voice and then a
cab, and—again almost cinematically—Galsworthy relocates to his retelling of the story in the
middle of a game of billiards: “And then … I lost him … He may be wandering out there now in
that fog. If he’s not a corpse” (258, 259). Appropriately, it is the following chapter that is titled

(71)—the narrator shifts to Soames’ very personal relationship to fiction: ““Like most novel readers of his
generation (and Soames was a great novel reader), literature coloured his view of life; and he had imbibed
the belief that it was only a question of time. In the end the husband always gained the affection of his
wife. Even in those cases—a class of book he was not very fond of—which ended in tragedy, the wife
always died with poignant regrets on her lips, or if it were the husband who died—unpleasant thought—
threw herself on his body in an agony of remorse” (71). He thus not only sees his reflection but his
ideology confirmed by literature. When he first sees Irene, he experience “a peculiar satisfaction …
which novelists and old ladies call love at first sight” (110). When James returns from London with the
spurned June, “Something of the sense of the impending, that comes over the spectator of a Greek
tragedy, had entered that upholstered room” (169), and a minor character is described as feeling “the
emotion with which we read a novel describing a hero and an inheritance, nervously anxious lest, by
some frightful lapse of the novelist, the young man should be left without it at an end” (208).
11
Naturally, the family gossip network borrows its name from the London Stock Exchange.
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“Bosinney’s Departure.” Even though we have just half-witnessed his suicide, the novel does
not register the “departure”—a typical Forsytean euphemism—until the family has heard the
news, until it has become public or semi-public currency, a published installment of the serial.12
Absent a reliable witness, the narrative becomes fractured, incoherent, diluted through retelling.
The news finally comes from old Jolyon, who has spoken to the police, but knowledge of the
suicide is public before it is private, with much of London finding out before Irene. In fact,
when James first hears about Bosinney, he recalls reading about the death in the papers; at the
time the body had not yet been identified. Soames, too, will walk by posters announcing “the
identity of the dead man,” though he, like the shareholders with Pippin, does not do the same,
“the dead man” rather anonymous for one’s cuckolder, even in free indirect discourse (293).
When Irene returns home after her aborted departure, he imagines she must have bought a paper
and read it on a “draughty corner of a street” (294). Soames, who has “a horror of seeing his
name in print” (236), is still a consumer of such material, and after raping Irene he soothes
himself with the “narcotic” of the “daily papers,” which include the item “Suicide of an actress”
(253). Actress, like Byronism, is a euphemism, denoting the kind of emotional turbulence and
temperamental predisposition for suicide. It is a one-word etiology. Bosinney’s death is
likewise narrativized and explained—George narrativizes it before he is even sure what has
happened—and thus consumable on a large scale.
The inspector tells them, “The driver says the gentlemen must have had time to see what
he was about, he seemed to walk right into it” (288-9). Pawn tickets are found in his room, and
his account at the bank is overdrawn. Meanwhile, Soames’ lawsuit is reported in the papers. For
anyone with an interest in his case, Bosinney’s suicide is perfectly legible. Even if financial
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The chapter in which Bosinney actually dies is titled “June’s Victory.”
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explanations have replaced religious ones, the language of Christianity will guide their
articulation of his crimes: young Jolyon, an outsider in his family and something of a Forsyte
anthropologist, suspects that the death will be felt as “an intervention of Providence, a
retribution—had not Bosinney endangered their two most priceless possessions, the pocket and
the hearth?” (292). In contrast to the internal commentary, Galsworthy suggests that both the
religious and the financial explanations, the public explanations, may be wrong: though we are
only granted George’s restricted view, Soames’ assault on Irene is quite possibly a factor in
Bosinney’s suicide. We are not given enough information to form the entire answer, but we
know enough to know that the ones we hear are incomplete. It remains to young Jolyon to raise
suspicion, even though he too relies on totalizing cliché: “[N]o one so madly in love committed
suicide for want of money; nor was Bosinney the sort of fellow to set much store by a financial
crisis” (292).
As for the Forsyte explanation, young Jolyon predicts that “they would talk of ‘that
unfortunate accident of young Bosinney’s,’” or “perhaps they would not talk—silence might be
better!” He is correct on both counts. When forced to speak about it, the Forsytes deny suicide.
After old Jolyon, echoing the halting speech of the shareholders, announces to the family,
“There’s—some—talk—of—suicide,” James sputters, “What should he do that for?” (287).
That for is typically Forsytean, a question about the product of his actions, the ends that would
illuminate the means. Cause and effect through and through. Soames, too, will offer the terse
but insincere explanation: “An accident” (293). There is even an impulse to control the narrative
and manipulate the public’s understanding of what has happened. After reading the news,
Soames thinks impotently about “stop[ping] their mouths if he could” (ibid.), while old Jolyon
worries about “how to keep June’s name out of the business” (289). But for the most part, the
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Forsytes spurn suicide through silence. James “instinctively all the time” rejects “that rumour of
suicide,” the wish father to the thought: “He dared not entertain this thought, so against his
interest, against the interest of his son, of every Forsyte … It was an accident! It must have
been!” (288). The repetition of interest recalls Pippin, whose death was likewise inexplicable to
the logic of his stakeholders. Old Jolyon joins James in willing himself to reject suicide: the
evidence of the pawn tickets and overdrawn account “seemed to make uncannily real that
suspicion of suicide which must on no account be entertained” (289). The brothers both use the
word entertain, a reference to the suicides that serve as entertainment in the newspapers that
Soames skims above, and the soft power of mutual interest ensures the “accident” version of
events is the one that will be inscribed on Forsyte memory. In “Indian Summer of a Forsyte,” he
is “poor young Bosinney” (302, 305) or “that young fellow who had got himself run over,” the
tone of frustrated paternalism suggesting the accident of a precocious youngster (325). Still, the
words themselves (“had got himself”) allow for the possibility of willed self-destruction.13 By
the novel’s second sequel, In Chancery (1920), Soames remembers “when that wretched
Bosinney was run over” (357). It is just a shade of a revision, but it removes the interpretive
possibility of suicide, completing a decades-long process of erasure.
And yet, even if there were an interest in understanding, Galsworthy suggests that any
complete explanation is a fiction, an artificial coherence assembled from only a few of the
necessary pieces. When Soames, young Jolyon, and his father view the corpse in the mortuary,
they are met not by Bosinney, not even by a body but by “a form covered by a sheet” (289). The
inspector removes the sheet to reveal a “sightless face,” and the handkerchief found in his pocket

13

Old Jolyon, looking at Irene, thinks angrily, “But what business had young Bosinney to have got run
over and left her stranded like this!” (320). Again, the sentiment is provocatively ambiguous, and “have
got run over” leaves open the question of intent.
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has had the name cut away. Even the light seems to accommodate this conceit of partial views,
the room “empty of all but a streak of sunshine smeared along the dustless floor.” For
Galsworthy, the suicide emphasizes the gulf that exists between all people: “Far from the others,
yet inscrutably close, each stood thus, alone with death, silent, his eyes lowered” (290). The
narrator, turning to old Jolyon, who stands “still as death, his eyes fixed on the body,” asks,
“Who shall tell of what he was thinking?” then lists possibilities: “Of himself …? Of his granddaughter…? Of that other woman? Of the strangeness, and the pity of it?” (290). The questions
we ask about Bosinney are those we ask about anyone—there is a gap between all of our
interiorities, a gap that can only be connected by imperfect and imprecise language. Suicide is
not unique but rather on the far end on a spectrum of universal illegibility. Unlike the Victorian
suicides, which were employed to solve a narrative problem—Jane can marry Rochester; Ralph
Nickleby is punished for his crimes—Galsworthy sees the act as a means of creating a problem,
one he ultimately leaves unresolved. At the end of the novel, Soames walks into “the square”
and considers the possibility of his own suicide, but he is left “in the dark, where the houses
seemed to stare at him, each with a master and mistress of its own, and a secret story of
happiness or sorrow” (296). For Galsworthy, the problem of what I am calling, after Jean
Améry, “the leap and the gap”—or the inaccessibility of the experience of the suicide—refracts
light onto the smaller gaps that are embedded in virtually every aspect of daily life. Suicide
precludes testimony, but Galsworthy raises a second question: how trustworthy is any testimony?
It is an ending that almost wasn’t. When Galsworthy originally sent The Man of Property
to his literary advisor, Edward Garnett, Garnett was apoplectic. He replied with a furious list of
reasons why Bosinney’s suicide was “psychologically false,” including that “it comes near to the
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average Philistine’s conception of ‘one of those artist chaps.’”14 Besides, if anyone were to
commit suicide, it would be Irene. Galsworthy stood by his decision, writing, “Bosinney
commits suicide because of the despairing shock, ‘perhaps the greatest mental shock a man
terribly in love can have,’ that Irene’s information produces on his sensitivity.”15 He didn’t,
then, take his friend’s suggestion to “make Bosinney and Irene go off, personifying Youth and
Joy, the indestructibility of Love, with £50 and her Jewels!” (emphasis in original).16 But the
criticism lingered, and after “sleeping or rather not sleeping on your letter,” he wrote back to
Garnett that he would leave “vague” the question of voluntary death.17 Since Galsworthy burned
the original manuscripts in 1913, we cannot determine how significant these changes were or if
they included Pippin, whose suicide sets the tone for Bosinney’s.18 Nevertheless, in revising the
latter’s death, in taking a Victorian suicide and making it “vague,” Galsworthy serves as a
fulcrum for a larger transition taking place in the culture. Garnett’s protest undermined the
epistemological certainty of his narrative, the same certainty we hear in his first rebuttal:

14

The complete list reads, “I consider Bosinney’s Suicide an artistic blot of a very grave order,
psychologically false, and seriously shaking the illusion of the whole story. B.’s suicide is like a chink of
light in the photographer’s dark room, weakening the negative. When I read it, I said ‘incredible,’ ‘not in
character.’ It is, for me, a thing out of keeping with what we have learnt of B. previously; secondly, it
comes near to the average Philistine’s conception of ‘one of those artist chaps’—’weak;’ thirdly, it
destroys our sympathy with B.; fourthly, it is psychologically false, for B. possesses Irene, and would be
strengthened and strung up by his possession of her to fight extra hard; fifthly, the financial ruin means
much less to the Bosinney type of man than you can be aware of; sixthly, it is scarcely credible that a
man who has held his own as Bosinney has done, should not have more strings to his bow than that
wretched Soames’ cheque. Very few people are quite isolated, and a man couldn’t have a small London
business without some connections; seventhly, if he had gone smash, he is an energetic (?practical)
man, who would defy his circumstances; and lastly, suicide only comes when hope practically dies …
with £20 borrowed or begged he would have started with Irene and her jewels for Paris … But even if it
were true to life it would be false to art. The young fresh forces of love and life are on their side: to
make them throw up the sponge suddenly is an artistic débâcle.” Quoted in Gindin, 157-8. Conrad,
otherwise effusive, agreed: “I myself, for instance, am not so sure of Bosinney’s tragedy.” Conrad, 195.
15
Ibid. 159.
16
Ibid. 158. Evidently Garnett agreed with young Jolyon.
17
Ibid. 160.
18
Ibid. 161.
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“Bosinney commits suicide because of the despairing shock.” In revision, however, Galsworthy
comes to acknowledge that as witnesses on the outside, we are no longer entitled to such
absolute knowledge.

Ford’s Scraps of Paper
The Good Soldier (1915) is premised on this conclusion. A witness of sorts to multiple
suicides, John Dowell introduces himself with a series of near-refrains: “I don’t know,” “I know
nothing” (12), “It is all a darkness” (15). He is in possession of one certainty: “I only know that I
am alone—horribly alone” (12). The revelation in Galsworthy’s mortuary is here a foundational
truth. To exacerbate matters, this is a suicide story told by someone who “know[s] nothing—
nothing in the world—of the hearts of men.” When it comes to women, Dowell can only guess
the secrets that mothers tell daughters “not with lips but with the eyes, or with heart whispering
to heart” (13-14).19 His choice of metaphor is apt: the hearts of others, both literally and
figuratively, are notoriously illegible to this narrator. Surely any vision of suicidal motivations,
then, is compromised. To his credit, Dowell is forthright about his inadequacies: “I don’t know
how it is best to put this thing down,” he admits, “whether it would be better to try and tell the
story from the beginning, as if it were a story; or whether to tell it from this distance of time, as it
reached me from the lips of Leonora or from those of Edward himself” (15). The double
meaning of story here illustrates the slippery distinction between narrativizing and fictionalizing,
and Dowell opts for a stream-of-consciousness approach that follows his own, belated
experience of the events. Oddly, he never quotes from the diary that he only mentions once, and

19

In contrast, Mrs. Ashburnham has with Edward “one of those conversations that English mother have
with English sons” (98).
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does not appear to rely on it for the structure of his memoir.20 This means that Dowell relies on
second- or third-hand accounts of key moments in his narrative, and the worshipful shading in
“the lips of … Edward himself” suggests an ill-placed faith in his friend’s veracity that will
inevitably corrupt his understanding of both Edward’s and Florence’s deaths.
The first mention of suicide in the novel is a denial, establishing what will become a
consistent uncertainty around the act. When Edward’s lover Maisie Maidan dies, Dowell
describes the scene in detail:
Maisie had died in the effort to strap up a great portmanteau. She had died so
grotesquely that her little body had fallen forward into the trunk and it had closed
upon her; like the jaws of a gigantic alligator … Her dark hair, like the hair of a
Japanese had come down and covered her body and her face. (58)
Perhaps anticipating a skeptical response from his audience, he clarifies, “You understand, she
had not committed suicide. Her heart had just stopped.” The claim itself is peculiar: why does
he feel the need to tell us this isn’t a suicide when no one has suggested that it is? We are, as he
keeps reminding us, his “silent listener,” and therefore any suspicion from the reader must be a
product of his own imagination (42, 106, 124, 134; emphasis added). “You understand”
introduces further ambiguity: its assumed authoritativeness has a nervous, desperate quality, and
the sentence is ordered so Dowell tells us that we understand before he tells us what we
understand. His understanding, blinded as it is by the halo he hangs above his protagonist, belies
his confidence. Did Maisie Maidan commit suicide?
Ford is typically unclear in reconstructing the discovery of the body:
Leonora lifted her up—she was the merest featherweight—and laid her on the bed
with her hair about her. She was smiling as if she had just scored a goal in a
hockey match. You understand, she had not committed suicide. [Note the
20

He checks to confirm that Edward accompanied he and Florence to Paris on September 4, 1904, where
he stayed with the couple until December (72). Later, he writes, “I wish I could put it down in diary
form,” apparently unaware that he could (148). See Max Saunders, introduction to The Good Soldier
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xxxviii-xxxix.
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abruptness in context.] Her heart had just stopped. I saw her, with the long lashes
on the cheeks, with the smile about the lips, with the flowers all about her. (58)
At some point, this passage relocates from the site of her death to that of her funeral, but any
delineation between the two scenes, one private, one semi-public, is absent. When Dowell first
mentions her smile (“as if she had just scored a goal in a hockey match”) he is referring to her
fresh corpse. Then, after an ambiguous “I saw her,” the phrase that pivots from deathbed to
casket, he again mentions “the smile about the lips.” Rhetorically, this suggests a continuity
between the body on discovery and its presentation for an audience. It also invites the
misunderstanding that he witnessed both, a misunderstanding he prepares for a few pages earlier
when he writes, “We found her dead when we got back” (53). In fact, Leonora found her. She
“showed her to me,” he confides, “She would not let either of the others see her,” adding that
Edward is spared because he cannot bear the sight of corpses: since Florence “never gave him an
idea that Maisie had written to her,” Edward imagines “the death had been the most natural thing
in the world” (58).
Dowell sneers at Edward’s gullibility, but his account of Maisie’s funeral is sheer artifice,
artifice with at least a few other witnesses, to boot, undermining the implied exclusivity of his
recollection. With flowers “all about her,” Maisie holds the stem of a white lily in her hand,
while “the white coifs of the two nuns that knelt at her feet … might have been two swans that
were to bear her away to kissing-kindness land.” Her symbolic virginity eclipses her deadness,
and the fairy tale language sends her off to marriage rather than oblivion: to Dowell, she looks
like “a bride in the sunlight of the mortuary candles.” It is from this tableau that he draws his
authority, and in his inverted, figurative language, the reality of death is dressed up as new life,
and a woman who died “grotesquely” is buried smiling and besieged by flowers, her
countenance lit by artificial metaphors for a natural phenomenon. He has, through his filtering,
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done the work of Hardy’s narrator in The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886), taking this particular
misérable and placing her “out of reach of [her] troubles,” thus offering closure when it is no
longer warranted.21 Throughout the scene, Dowell makes no demonstrably untrue statements of
fact. Nonetheless, he does misconstrue his intimacy with Maisie’s suicide: I saw her; Leonora
showed her to me; she would not let either of the others see her. He even describes her death as
if he were a witness. Yet all he saw was a corpse in a costume. Why, then, should we privilege
his story over the suggestive possibilities of his denial? Dowell’s version of events reads like a
Hans Christian Andersen staging of Ophelia’s water burial: the girl who was eaten by the
alligator trunk, her virgin figure preserved by her long “hair of a Japanese.” His credulity
stretches credulity.
This is not the only such lapse related to Maisie’s death. Why, in addition, does she
smile “as if she had just scored a goal in a hockey match”? This particular detail is Dowell’s, not
Leonora’s, or at least not explicitly hers. Dowell mentions hockey only one other time in the
novel, when recalling that Nancy played the sport on Corpus Christi, but he interrupts himself
with a possible correction: “it may have been some other saint’s day, I cannot keep these things
in my head” (88). It is the admission of uncertainty in these irrelevant moments that works to
mask the uncertainty of the larger ones; it is a posture of scrupulousness. In any case, while
Edward plans at one point to speak to Maisie about “polo-ponies and tennis-racquets,” she never
expresses an interest in hockey (80). Ford, like any good mystery writer, has us asking questions
that occasionally take on a conspiratorial tone, and it is possible that Dowell is simply
misremembering a detail, conflating two of Edward’s lovers, an easy mistake considering how
important sport metaphor becomes to his narrative (“Shuttlecocks!” [167]). He could, however,
21

Thomas Hardy, The Mayor of Casterbridge, ed. Dale Kramer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
224.
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be lying or misremembering a lie, and each of these irregularities increases the likelihood that
Dowell is hiding something—or that something is being hidden from him—even if they generate
nothing more definitive than suspicion. At the very least, “kissing-kindness land” interferes with
our reading this passage without irony. We cannot, of course, say that Dowell is covering up
Maisie Maidan’s suicide. We cannot even say that Maisie Maidan committed suicide—though if
her “heart was really so bad that she would have succumbed to anything like an impassioned
embrace,” the affair itself is a suicidal gesture, one in the manner of a Sue Bridehead, who
perpetually jumped out of windows (44). Admittedly, in studies of this novel, speculation can
too quickly become certainty.22 But Dowell’s denial of suicide raises its possibility, and a host
of answers are available to fill the explanatory void. This ambiguity is the point. For both
Galsworthy and Ford, authoritative accounts of suicide are no longer feasible. The nature of the
phenomenon prevents resolution.
In The Good Soldier, then, suicide is indeterminate, unstable, a challenge to our
epistemological certainty. A suicide story is never over. Soon we will read that Nancy’s mother
“committed suicide owing to the brutalities of her father” before finding out, much later, that she
is alive and well (70). Even in the ancillary suicides, Ford cannot help but muddy the waters.
Still, no matter their cause, Dowell’s narrative failures and potential untruths illustrate rather
than create the problem. All private scenes become public once they are recounted, particularly
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Most famously, Roger Poole doubts most of the fundamental facts of the novel, including Florence’s
duplicity, Edward’s infidelity, and Jimmy’s existence. In his account, Leonora and Dowell are the
adulterous lovers, the parents of Nancy Rufford and the murderers of Maisie, Florence, and possibly
Edward, too. Roger Poole, “The Real Plot Line of Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier: An Essay in
Applied Deconstruction,” Textual Practice 4, no. 3 (Winter 1990), 390-427. For a sober attempt to
deduce the facts of The Good Soldier—and one that comes to rather different conclusions—see Dewey
Ganzel, who argues that “Nancy is Edward Ashburnham’s natural daughter.” Dewel Ganzel, “What the
Letter Said: Fact and Inference in The Good Soldier,” Journal of Modern Literature 11, no. 2 (Jul. 1984),
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once they are written. They become stories, and in all public accounts of voluntary death, the
motivations of the speaker eclipse the experience of the suicide. The absence of testimony, of
first-hand evidence, condemns all suicide narratives to a fundamentally imaginative gesture
which must answer the question: What was it like and what does it mean? Kissing-kindness land
is no more or less plausible than any other polished teleology; it is where Thomas Hood may
have sent his Unfortunate. But Ford, whose narrator sees “no current to draw things along to a
swift and inevitable end” (113), also reminds us of a more practical truth: even if it were possible
to access the thoughts of the deceased, even if Améry’s problem were overcome—if we could
traverse the gap between the knowledge of the suicide and the knowledge of the witness, who
has no access to the suicide’s interiority—the game of telephone we play with our friends and
relatives, our memories, and our self-delusions would soon distort the original experience. Say
Dowell did witness the death, the discovery, even the private moments of Maisie’s affair with
Edward. Could he be relied upon the record it with accuracy?
Despite his wavering over how exactly to put this all down, Dowell soon settles in to a
specific understanding of his storytelling—or, more precisely, of his storytelling and his
audience:
I shall just imagine myself for a fortnight or so at one side of the fireplace of a
country cottage, with a sympathetic soul opposite me. And I shall go on talking,
in a low voice while the sea sounds in the distance and overhead the great black
flood of wind polishes the bright stars. From time to time we shall get up and go
to the door and look out at the great moon and say: ‘Why, it is nearly as bright as
in Provence!’ And then we shall come back to the fireside, with just a touch of a
sigh because we are not in that Provence where even the saddest stories are gay.
(15)
It is odd that reality corrupts fantasy here. He is not, after all, sitting at the fireside with a
sympathetic soul. He is writing. If Dowell can picture himself in a country cottage, why can he
not picture himself in Provence, where the saddest stories are gay? Perhaps, though
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untrustworthy, he is imposing some limitations on his imagination. Or perhaps it is another
gesture meant to signify scrupulousness and narrative modesty. The use of the word soul
prepares us for the visual echo of Provence and Providence, suggesting that his imaginative
reach does not extend to the teleological—recall that Providence is a malicious trickster, one that
performs “sinister jokes” (44), responsible for the “merciless proceedings … we call a
coincidence” (59). The sea sounds and the black flood of wind do not polish the bright stars and
the bodies of the dead are not illuminated by any apparent logic or order. There is no such
harmony between nature and the acts of humans—no boat ride with a Jewish Otello—and no
collaboration between space and speaker. Thus, while Dowell’s protestations of ignorance are
equivocatory—he is in possession of the facts—they are also true: he doesn’t know anything of
the hearts of men; he is alone. Still, the act of writing The Good Soldier betrays an optimism in
his project, which is fueled in part by a faith in interpersonal communication: we are, no doubt,
his candidate for “sympathetic soul.” By extension, he also places faith in his ability to perform
a kind of autopsy on Edward, a report on the emotional etiology of his suicide. He is a flawed
candidate, no doubt, but he is all we have, and if Dowell were sincerely operating under the
belief that it is all a darkness, he wouldn’t make it past the first page. There would be no need to
write much else but the refrain.23
The possibilities and limitations of this encounter—one between writer and reader
imagined as one between speaker and listener—comprises both the formal and, in terms of
suicide, the epistemological spine of The Good Soldier. Still, for Ford’s characters, if not for his
readers, the economy of knowledge transmission is much the same as it was for Galsworthy’s
and the Victorians: it is sustained by the press. Hence, when Edward cuts his throat, Nancy sees
23
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“the news of [his] suicide” in a “local paper,” which Dowell himself learns from an “brief …
inarticulate … [and] business-like” letter from her father, Colonel Rufford (156). Likewise,
another former lover, Mrs. Basil, “read the advertisement of it in an Indian paper” (119). She
sends “a quite proper, but very lamentable letter from her to Leonora, asking to be given
particulars as to Edward’s death.” The network across which this information stretches runs
far—his suicide makes it to an India he left nine years previously—but the need for the request
as well as the choice of the commercial advertisement suggests that neither Nancy nor Mrs. Basil
read much of substance about their ex-lover’s death.
One suicide report in The Dundee Courier from September 1913—three months before
Edward’s death—runs under seventy words: “A verdict of suicide during temporary insanity was
returned on Saturday …. It was stated that deceased, who had served in India, was depressed at
having to return to Africa on Tuesday. He was found with a revolver in his hand and a bullet
wound in the head.”24 Similar stories from the same year, of colonials’ and ex-colonials’
suicides, can run a little longer, up to four hundred words, but retain a sober tone that
distinguishes them from the Victorian press—they are reporting on legal verdicts, not on the
hearts of men.25 Thus we read in The Lichfield Mercury about the inquest of Private Petrie, who
in the canteen took “down a rifle when his companion’s back was turned … [and] placed the
barrel up to his mouth and shot half his head off. Two hours of unconsciousness elapsed before
he died.” Private Petrie leaves a note, “Everything to Mrs. Bodley, St. Mary’s Street,
Wolverhampton,” a reference to his fiancée, who is baffled by his behavior; the jury returns a
sympathetic verdict, non compos mentis.26
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“SOLDIER COMMITS SUICIDE,” The Dundee Courier, September 29, 1913, 8.
One does editorialize so far as to call the story “sad.” “EX-SOLDIER’S SUICIDE,” Evening
Telegraph and Post, April 24, 1913, 4.
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Another, in The West Sussex Gazette, details how Sidney Arthur Anderson “first fired
one shot from a revolver in the air and then fired a second shot with the barrel to his mouth,”
how the “bullet passed through the palate and through the side of his head.” But the coroner’s
jury returns the third verdict: “there was nothing to show the state of his mind when he
committed suicide.”27 The tone throughout is formal, the content empirical. Like Bosinney’s,
then—and like Lefroy’s, Petrie’s, and Anderson’s—the facts of Edward’s suicide are made
available to all who are interested but the truth to no one. The medium that used to telegraph
epistemological certainty is in The Good Soldier exposed for the paltriness of its reliance on facts
alone. Appropriately, Dowell says nothing of Edward’s inquest. Did he provide testimony? Did
he read the ruling? Or did he ignore the results? The last is unlikely, but his silence on the first
and second is just another in a novel riddled with outsized and unresolved narrative questions on
suicide.
In a sense, Dowell conceives of The Good Soldier as a counternarrative to the
“advertisement” of Edward’s death: it gives us few of the facts but purports to give us the
motivations. He has never had much faith in the printed word himself. When he writes to the
New York Herald to complain about missed connections on the Belgian State Railway, he finds
that a paper that was otherwise “always good enough for me” (31) fails him as an author: the
letters “never seemed to satisfy me when I saw them” (40). He then uses newspapers as a
metaphor for the detritus of his memory, and when recounting Florence’s death, he claims that
he has “never given her another thought,” that she “just went completely out of existence, like
yesterday’s paper” (86). His dismissal continues, “Florence was a personality of paper,” and
preventing her suicide “would have been like chasing a scrap of paper” (87). Of course, he is
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clearly contradicting himself—not only he is giving her another thought in denying that he has
given her another thought, but he continues to speak about her through the novel’s final chapter
(161). Likewise, his literal and metaphorical disdain for paper is undermined by the medium
through which he registers it. Not only is the material of his Tale of Passion, as Leckie has
demonstrated, precisely that of yesterday’s paper, but so too does the experience of reading The
Good Soldier feel very much like chasing scraps of paper, each offering provocative but
inconclusive evidence.28
The word itself, paper, is also a shot of derision at Florence, who exclaims before a
pencil draft of the Protest, “It’s because of that piece of paper that you’re honest, sober,
industrious, provident, and clean-lived. If it weren’t for that piece of paper, you’d be like the
Irish” (38). Like Dowell, Florence is both right and wrong. As an adulteress? She hardly has
claim to asserting her “clean-lived” superiority over Irish Catholic Leonora. Still, the paper does
represent substantive social change as well as a barrier between Leonora and the others. Thus,
the simultaneous success of the paper (in enacting that change) and its failure (in the sins of
Protestant Edward) mirrors Dowell’s own struggle with the inadequacy of his language and his
compulsion to continue producing it. Dowell derides the Protest as “a piece of paper, like the
half-sheet of a letter with some faint pencil scrawls that might have been a jotting of the amounts
we were spending during the day” (38), but The Good Soldier itself contains extensive jotting of
the amounts Edward spends—three hundred a year to a blackmailer, twenty thousand for a tiara
for his mistress La Dolciquita, forty thousand on gambling, etcetera (45). Dowell’s cynicism
ultimately provides cover for making the same romantic gesture as Luther, who expressed faith
in his readers, and faith in the potential of interpersonal communication through text, with his
28
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translation of the Bible into modern German. Dowell’s translation may not be as lucid, but it is
founded on the same sense of optimism. Furthermore, since any reader of The Good Soldier
must maintain multiple readings of its suicides in their head, his or her fracturing of a master
suicide narrative into smaller, conflicting ones has much the same effect as Protestantism on the
Gospel, which after Luther was subject to a new range of interpretations.
Demonstrating precisely this Protestant influence, Dowell employs King James English
to describe Florence’s suicide. Compare his reactions to her affair and her death. When Leonora
asks, “And isn’t it odd to think that, if your wife hadn’t been my husband’s mistress, you would
probably never have been here at all?” he writes, “That was how I got the news—full in the face,
like that” (76). But when she tells him, “I think it was stupid of Florence to commit suicide,” he
uses a different word: “So that that was the first knowledge I had that Florence had committed
suicide” (77). The affair, then, is news, information exchanged by those who were not present.
The suicide, on the other hand, demands language that evokes the fall of Adam and Eve (first
knowledge) and therefore acts as a means of communication and communion where sex fails.
The Biblical definition of knowing has been reversed—Edward has never learned anything about
or from desire—and it is instead death that creates knowledge. Thus, the chaste Dowell learns
the circumstances of his wife’s death while the adulterous Edward is again protected by his
ignorance: he “had not any idea that Florence could have committed suicide without writing at
least a tirade to him” (92). In fact, it is Edward’s suicide that liberates the knowledge: “Leonora
with an odd English sense of decency had determined,” he tells us, “to wait until Edward had
been in his grave for a full week before she spoke” (77). After she speaks, Dowell recognizes
their connection and “knew then that Leonora was about to let me into her full confidence.” For
Dowell, then, both suicides have provided an occasion for intimacy, an intimacy that was absent
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during their years of friendship as Leonora’s silence (about sex, no less) proscribed the natural
affinity that may develop between the spouses of adulterers.
Still, the knowledge of the suicide rather than the knowledge created as a result of the
suicide remains obscure. The focus is still interpersonal rather than phenomenological. Florence
does, in fact, leave a letter, for her aunt Miss Hurlbird, though whether it constitutes a “tirade”
we cannot be sure: “Leonora posted it without telling me” (133). As with Pippin, the letter is
discussed but never quoted. We are a long way from Aeneas Manston, the villain in Hardy’s
Desperate Remedies (1871) who left an extensive memoir for his audience before killing
himself. Meanwhile, Dowell suspects that “Florence had told Miss Hurlbird a good bit about
Edward Ashburnham in a few scrawled words,” but he and we are excluded from reading those
words. The details of the affair, which could in turn shed light on the motivations of the suicide,
remain out of reach, the gap recorded with a slight formal gesture: while “That was how I got the
news” and “So that was the first knowledge I had that Florence had committed suicide” serve as
parallel sentences, the first follows a paragraph break, the second a section break. In other
words, there is a literal gap between Leonora’s revelation of suicide and his assimilation of that
knowledge into his narrative (“But consider exactly the position…”). Florence, who in life was
an “unstoppable talker,” is here silenced without compunction, her suicide subsumed under the
concerns of Dowell and Leonora as well as Dowell and Edward (126).
It should surprise no reader by this point in the novel that Dowell’s memory of the night
is unilluminating, and much like George’s in the crowd and London fog, it is marked by
“circumstances of clamour, of outcry, of the crash of many people running together” (77). The
presence of the Grand Duke, the chief of the police, and the hotelkeeper, M. Schontz—all of
whom likely know the truth before Dowell (78)—prevents his having any sort of epiphany. The

98

community that played an integral role in constructing Victorian suicide narratives is here just
clutter, an obstacle to revelation. The montage-like juxtaposition of Florence “running with a
white face and with one hand over her heart” and her “lying upon her bed with the so familiar
little brown flask clenched in her fingers” leads Dowell to believe that she died of heart troubles,
suggesting a failure in storytelling that demands the teller infer connections between temporally
disconnected images:
She ran upstairs, arranged herself decoratively upon her bed—she was a sweetly
pretty woman with smooth pink and white cheeks, long hair, the eyelashes falling
like a tiny curtain on her cheeks. She drank the little phial of prussic acid and
there she lay.—O, extremely charming and clear-cut—looking with a puzzled
expression at the electric-light bulb that hung from the ceiling, or perhaps through
it, to the stars above. Who knows? Anyhow, there was an end of Florence. (86)
The first sentence echoes Maisie’s “long lashes on the cheeks,” and that “O” has the same
strained theatricality of her burial, but Dowell suggests that here the artifice is Florence’s. She
was, after all, “always playacting,” mimicking “one of the great erotic women of whom history
tells us” or “the heroine of a French comedy” (85). In other words, the curtains have fallen on a
play she both wrote and starred in. She even provides her own prop, the “little phial of prussic
acid” that had been dressed to look like amyl nitrate. Like Maisie’s mortuary candles, the
lighting is artificial, the electric-light bulb concealing the stars above. When he is later tasked
with spending her inheritance, he wants “to invest the money so that the interest could be used
for the relief of suffers from the heart,” adding, “Florence had certainly died of her heart, as I
saw it” (134). She gets the ending she wants, after all, the truth protected by a select few like
some secular kōan.
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His brusque punctuation, “Anyhow, there was the end of Florence,” demonstrates no
great desire to know himself.29 Edward is a different matter. A few pages earlier, after
dismissing the importance of the “sex-instinct,” Dowell argues that “the real fierceness of desire,
the real heat of passion” as the “craving for identity with the woman that he loves” (82). It is the
desire “to see with the same eyes, to touch with the same sense of touch, to hear with the same
ears, to lose his identity.” He could, of course, be describing his relationship to Edward, with
whom he attempts to identify throughout The Good Soldier. If there is passion to be found in our
narrator, it is in this friendship. But these are also the goals of any novelist, and this novel in
particular is concerned with modes of seeing, with limiting our knowledge to what Dowell alone
touched and heard.30 Thus, we too are experiencing the real fierceness of desire, seeing with the
same eyes as Dowell, at least in those moments we trust him. He in turn is a kind of reader, too,
of a novel written by Edward. During his “final outburst,” Dowell tells us, “the fellow talked
like a cheap novelist.—Or like a very good novelist for the matter of that, if it’s the business of a
novelist to make you see things clearly” (79)—a break from his usual speech, when Edward
“talked like quite a good book—a book not in the least cheaply sentimental” (26). Like the
cheap novelist, Ford wants his readers to see clearly, if the reader accepts that the impressionism
of a dream is a kind of clarity. That is, to see clearly, or to see Dowell clearly, is to see
obscurely, since Dowell sees obscurely. He accepts this logic implicitly in his own reading, and
Edward has oxymoronically impressed upon him his version of events “as clearly as if it were a
dream.” But our reading of Edward’s suicide should remain attentive to the dreamlike
conditions of his seeing. Dowell is much like Edward’s official biographer, writing hagiography
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and minimizing the magnitude of his subject’s emotional abuses. We should not be so
credulous.
Dowell begins his account of his friend’s death by sarcastically ventriloquizing Victorian
platitudes: “The villains—for obviously Edward and the girl were villains—have been punished
by suicide and madness” (166). He continues, “Society must go on, I suppose, and society can
only exist if … the passionate, the headstrong, and the too-truthful are condemned to suicide and
to madness” (167-8). This was the sociological angle that informed much of the Victorian public
and fictional conversations about suicide: Ralph Nickleby was such a villain, Nicholas the
embodiment of the society that must go on, his marriage to Madeline Bray an emblem of that
going on. The rules of the game are fixed, as if they were characters acting out a script: “Edward
must die, the girl must lose her reason because Edward died” (155). No surprise from a man
whose “sentimentalism required of him an attitude of Byronic gloom” (113). The well-worn
sign of self-destructiveness is now mostly deprived of its signification through repetition—it is a
requirement rather than an affectation or a sincere expression of emotion. Nonetheless, the
characterization is substantiated by Edward’s suicide; perhaps that, too, was required of him.
There is an X and therefore Y quality to this thinking, typical of Enlightenment cause-and-effect
reasoning. But Ford disappoints any reader with Victorian expectations, setting the stage for an
elaborate bait-and-switch. After Leonora confronts Edward about his love for Nancy,
She thought that … [he] must have committed suicide … She went straight to
Edward’s room, opened the door, and looked in. He was oiling the breech action
of a gun. It was an unusual thing for him to do, at that time of night, in his
evening clothes … He looked up when she opened the door, his face illuminated
by the light cast upwards from the round orifices in the green candle shades. (143)
In many ways, this is stock Victorian imagery, complete with a light cast on the condemned and
the ominous gun preparing us for news of an “accident.” But Edward is illuminated from below,
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not above, reversing the traditional redemptive metaphor. Furthermore, he eschews the
foreshadowing and opts instead to cut his throat: the tableau is thus a red herring. The certainty
that foresaw Bertha’s end in her beginning—her birth as a Creole daughter of a drunk
determining her fate as a lunatic and a suicide—has been undermined by Ford’s chaotic and
random universe. We can no longer look to these clues to find unity between nature and
character. Where once literature provided light on suicide, The Good Soldier is able only to
affirm a darkness.
In the novel’s final paragraphs, it “suddenly occurs” to Dowell that he has “forgotten to
say how Edward met his death,” setting up yet another expectation he does not meet: he proceeds
to tell us instead about his last conversation with Edward, before his suicide (168).31 In fact, he
offers the fullest portrait of the death earlier, dispatching a few concrete facts and a theory of the
causes with uncharacteristic concision:
Leonora made him a terrible scene about this expenditure of time and trouble.
She sort of had the vague idea that what had passed with the girl and the rest of it
ought to have taught Edward a lesson—the lesson of economy. She threatened to
take his banking account away from him again. I guess that made him cut his
throat. He might have stuck it out otherwise—but he had thought that he had lost
Nancy and that, in addition, there was nothing left for him but a dreary, dreary
succession of days in which he could be of no public service. Well, it finished
him. (132)
The explanation is vaguely poetic—there is no greater economy than suicide—but it conflicts
with the closing scene, which strongly suggests it is the loss of Nancy that destroys him. After
receiving a message that she is safe in Brindisi, Edward “looked up to the roof of the stable, as if
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he were looking to Heaven, and whispered something that I did not catch” (169). He asks
Dowell to bring the message to Leonora, and “[w]hen he saw that I did not intend to interfere
with him his eyes became soft and almost affectionate.” Edward bids him farewell, “So long,
old man, I must have a bit of a rest, you know,” and Dowell, though tempted to respond, “God
bless you,” says nothing in deference to “English good form.” The passage asserts a
knowingness, as if the two are engaging in mute communication. Yet each time Dowell makes a
claim for their connection, he hedges slightly: it is as if Edward were praying to heaven, his eyes
become almost affectionate.
The unspoken drama Dowell is enacting is thus pure fantasy. It reeks of wishful
thinking. This is his vision of “the mysterious way in which two people, living together, get to
know each other’s thoughts without a word spoken” (102). But given the duplicity of both
Edward and Florence, the appeal to telepathy is ludicrous: he is not Jane, hearing the “known,
loved, well-remembered voice” of Rochester (420). In truth, Dowell does not hear Edward’s
prayer just as he does not read Florence’s letter. Neither does Edward hear Dowell’s expression
of love and goodwill. As in Galsworthy’s mortuary, they are all of them alone. At the beginning
of The Good Soldier, our narrator complains that this English good form is responsible for such
ignorance: “the modern English habit of taking every one for granted is a good deal to blame …
with all the taking for granted, you never really get an inch deeper than the things I have
catalogued” (32). Yet his reading of this final interaction with Edward is predicated on precisely
those cultural silences—he is taking Edward for granted here—and this enables Dowell to write
it however he would like: Edward, after all, is not there to contradict his insistence on mutual
affection. The implement, a pen-knife, is a mischievous pun. Dowell is auditioning to play
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Edward’s sympathetic soul, his narrator, but sympathy and truthfulness are not necessarily
synonyms.
On the penultimate page of the novel, Dowell confesses, “I love him because he was just
myself. If I had had the courage and the virility and possibly also the physique of Edward
Ashburnham I should, I fancy, have done much what he did” (168). No doubt, had his mother
been Queen Victoria and his father Prince Albert, he would have been just like King Edward,
too. Still, the absurdity of this claim reveals how much Dowell’s sense of Edward is tied to a
false sense of himself: this declaration of kinship follows the similar delusion that “I myself, in
my fainter way, come into the category of the passionate, of the headstrong, and the tootruthful.” Our Dowell, the “what is called the sex instinct” Dowell? Even allowing for his
idiosyncratic definition of passion, are we really meant to believe that he is headstrong?
Moreover, what does he know about Edward’s courage and virility? Despite spending a
great deal of time together for a decade, his evidence of genuine contact, of a sincere friendship
with the man is virtually non-existent. Consider, for example, the importance of letters to this
novel: Edward’s marriage is negotiated through letters (96-7); his affair with Mrs. Basil is
discovered when her husband “got hold of … some letters and things” (118); he continues, after
their separation, to “write her long letters” (123); Leonora asserts a right to open Edward’s mail
after she mistakenly opens a letter from his blackmailer (44-5); and, of course, it is a letter from
Nancy that precedes and perhaps precipitates Edward’s suicide. Letters form a network of
knowledge exchange from which Dowell is excluded. His letters are to the Times, not to people.
He never reads Florence’s letter, perhaps a suicide note, and he never once mentions, let alone
quotes, a letter from his good soldier. Yet Edward himself clearly relies on letters as a form of
intimacy: he is convinced, remember, that Maisie and Florence both died of heart failure because
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of the absence any, and he continues to write to Mrs. Basil even after their affair has ended
(123). Without a suicide note from Edward, Dowell’s words remain the novel’s only and
therefore authoritative account of his death.
As a matter of fact, Edward’s voice is mostly absent from The Good Soldier, despite
Dowell’s insistence on their relationship as secret sharers. He may talk “like a cheap novelist,”
but we never hear it. When defending Edward’s honor, Dowell insists that “he never told a story
that couldn’t have gone into the columns of the Field more than once or twice in all the nine
years of my knowing him” (14). He tells neither the stories that could nor the stories that
couldn’t. Later, when Edward hears that Nancy is leaving for India, Dowell writes, “And that
evening Edward spoke to me,” but the line is followed by a section break and a digression about
Edward and Leonora (136). Then, the night before Edward has to drive Nancy to the station, he
tells Dowell, “I am so desperately in love with Nancy Rufford that I am dying of it”—one of
only two sentences from this conversation that Dowell will quote (165).32 Unsurprisingly, “[h]e
talked all night” is followed by yet another section break. Like a gentlemen demurring over
describing a sexual encounter, Dowell skips their evening conversation and picks up his story in
the morning. We hear none of Edward’s talk. We instead hear a great deal of Dowell’s. The
final scene of the novel tells us a little about our narrator and even less about his protagonist. If
the suicide remains a site of revelation, it is a revelation about the character of the witness, not
the victim.
Recall Dowell’s first spotting of Edward, when he gushes,
His face hitherto had, in the wonderful English fashion, expressed nothing
whatever. Nothing. There was in it neither joy nor despair; neither hope nor fear;
neither boredom nor satisfaction. He seemed to perceive no soul in that crowded
32
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room; he might have been walking in a jungle. I never came across such a perfect
expression before and I never shall again. (24)
For Dowell, this nothingness represents an opportunity: like a Rorschach inkblot, Edward can be
anyone he wants him to be, and he will eventually fill that face with joy, despair, hope, fear, and
boredom—though perhaps not satisfaction. Its perfection resides in its blankness. Dowell later
declares, “We are all so afraid, we are all so alone, we all so need from the outside the assurance
of our own worthiness to exist,” (83). In Edward, he has found this outside assurance, with the
added advantage that he gets to write both parts. Such is true of any suicide, and Edward’s is not
the only one in which Dowell claims a special if unrealized role. When recounting Florence’s
death, he insists he could have saved her life: “It is even possible that, if that feeling had not
possessed me, I should have run up sooner to her room and might have prevented her drinking
the prussic acid” (86-7). Here is the same rhetorical trick he used to compare himself to
Edward—if he had not been struck by the feeling that she “was a personality of paper … she
wasn’t real; she was just a mass of talk out of guidebooks, of drawings out of fashion-plates,” he
would have prevented her death (86). He asserts control over her suicide even as he does not
exercise that control. At the end of The Good Soldier, he again asserts control, this time over
Edward and Edward’s death: he is the monkish translator of the silent suicide note. Florence is
not the only personality of paper; language by necessity turns all of us into such. Like Narcissus,
when Dowell looks, he only sees himself. Of the suicide around which he circles again and
again and again, we know nothing.

Suicidal Modernism
In conclusion, I would like to adapt to the question of suicide Leckie’s argument that the
English novel of adultery is primarily concerned with questions of epistemology. For Leckie,
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divorce court journalistic practices included “the disruption of narrative causality and linearity,
the unreliability of the narrative itself, the multiple points of view, and the question of narrative
closure.” She adds, “Not only do these characteristics stand in opposition to the dominant
aspects of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century marriage-plot tradition, but they also match
several innovations now associated with modernism” (105). Aligned with same the
Enlightenment principles of the realist marriage-plot tradition, many Victorian accounts of
suicide offer their readers narrative causality, reliable narration, and an authoritative and
conclusive view of suicide culled from a diverse range of sources. As I argued in the previous
chapter, most nineteenth-century suicide narratives were multi-vocal and interdiscursive but
epistemologically stable. To borrow from Friedman, they were “definitive, public, and
appropriate.” In contrast, by the Edwardian era, Galsworthy and Ford register a shift as some
novelists of suicide begin to resist single, reliable perspectives, linear and causal narration, and
the communal creation of the suicide, complete with clear and definitive closure. Thus, the
tropes identified by Leckie also speak fluently to the questions raised by voluntary death. A
divorce raises questions about two competing narratives; a suicide of an empty narrative, one
that requires filling in, voicing from the outside. Suicide, an act without a participating witness,
becomes the ideal site for modernist, epistemological challenges to absolute truth.
I want to suggest, then, that there is a discernable and significant thread of modernist
thinking on suicide that assumes the same epistemological stance of Galsworthy and Ford.
These are not outliers but forbearers. For instance, early in Ulysses (1922), Leopold Bloom
remembers his father’s suicide in fragments:
That afternoon of the inquest. The redlabelled bottle on the table. The room in
the hotel with hunting pictures. Stuffy it was. Sunlight through the slats of the
Venetian blind. The coroner’s sunlit ears, big and hairy. Boots giving evidence.

107

Thought he was asleep first. Then saw like yellow streaks on his face. Verdict:
overdose. The letter. For my son Leopold.33
This is followed by a three-sentence paragraph: “No more pain. Wake no more. Nobody owns.”
Like Galsworthy’s and Ford’s, Joyce’s narrator dangles the letter before our prurience and then
eclipses the interiority of the suicide, offering us a handful of inconclusive, suggestive shards:
the implement, the face, the inquest, but no unifying voice to make sense of their connection.
This fragmentation provides an internal rebuttal to Mr. Power’s breezy condemnation, a voice
from the past: “The greatest disgrace to have in the family” (79).
In the penultimate chapter, Joyce asks, “What fractions of phrases did the lecture of those
five whole words [To my Dear Son Leopold] evoke?” (595). These “fractions” are less complete
than Bloom’s memories, raising rather than resolving questions and separated by a series of
ellipses: “Tomorrow will be a week that I received … it is no use Leopold to be … with your
dear mother … that is not more to stand … to her … all for me is out … be kind to Athos,
Leopold … my dear son … always … of me … das Herz … Gott … dein.” An early message of
empathy is distinguishable, but significant words are left out and the fractions become
progressively more illegible, culminating in a German that further distances the Irish-born
Leopold from his Hungarian father, Rudolph: “The heart … God … your.”34 While “fraction”
does not have the broken denotation of “fragment,” it still suggests a piece of a larger narrative.
Because it lacks connective tissue, the gaps generate a plurality of possible narratives in the
readers’ imaginations, as one could presumably assemble the fractions however one liked. For
Joyce, the modernist trope of an inscrutable suicide fills out the intergenerational restoration he
wants to enact between Leopold and Stephen: it is no accident that this father is simultaneously
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resurrected and exorcised as the two cement their own spiritual bond. Whereas Bloom finds new
life as a surrogate father, the death of his own is buried in ellipses.
Unlike Galsworthy, Ford, and Joyce, Woolf chooses to illuminate the interiority of her
suicide in Mrs. Dalloway (1925), but she remains as skeptical as her predecessors of the act as a
site of revelation. Her depiction of Septimus’ death remains within his stream of consciousness
until the end, when he hears Dr. Holmes coming upstairs and feels forced into “the tiresome, the
troublesome, and rather melodramatic business of opening the window and throwing himself
out.”35 In this respect, Woolf represents an optimism, a faith in language to describe voluntary
death. But it is a faith that is limited to communication between narrator and reader, not between
characters. Her vision is of madness killed by medicine, and she firmly rejects the tools of
Enlightenment that are available to her characters: the profession is represented by Dr. Holmes,
who cries out “The coward!” before administering a sedative to Rezia and assuring himself that
“no one was in the least to blame” (146). Despite the confidence of his shouted judgment, this
doctor, who shares a name with the country’s most famous fictional detective, fails to solve his
case: “And why the devil he did it, Dr. Holmes could not conceive.” Both Woolf and Septimus
are wary, too, of the postures of nineteenth-century literary suicides: “It was their idea of
tragedy,” he thinks before he jumps, “not his” (146).
This wariness is confirmed when his death reaches its second audience. At first, Clarissa
is outraged that the subject has been broached: “What business had the Bradshaws to talk of
death at her party?” (179). In the course of a few paragraphs, however, she transforms from
angry to empathic, envisioning Septimus’ final moments—“Up had flashed the ground; through

35

Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (Orlando: Harvest, 2005), 145-6. In fact, Beverly Ann Shlack suggests
that Woolf is too bound to his interiority, “too close to Septimus’ problems herself to be able to
sufficiently objectivity and universalize the material.” Beverly Ann Shlack, “A Freudian Look at Mrs.
Dalloway,” Literature and Psychology 23 (1973): 55.

109

him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes”—and even turning philosophical: “Death was
defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate … There was an embrace in death” (180).
Clarissa soon feels “somehow very like him” and “glad that he had done it; thrown it away,” as
he “made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun” (182). Though far from unified, most
critics, myself included, have read this vision with one eyebrow raised. Deborah Guth, for
example, argues that her “quasi-mystical interpretation in no way reflects Septimus’ own
experience,” while Trudi Tate warns readers against “replicating her romanticization of
Septimus’ death.”36 Like Dowell with Edward, Woolf casts severe doubt on Clarissa’s moment
of vision. Composed mostly of Romantic cliché, and unfolding far too quickly to be thoughtful
or sincere, the news borders on erotic: “her dress flamed, her body burnt” as she imagines his
experience of the suicide (179). Additionally, the “rusty spikes” are sheer invention—Clarissa
only hears that a “young man” who “had been in the army” “killed himself”—and are thus her
own poetic flourish. The game of telephone has begun, and on the whole, her reading is based
on a thorough lack of understanding about Septimus, who in fact praises life before his leap and
whose suicide, in his mind, will signify a false narrative, “their idea of tragedy.” He is correct.
Clarissa, who “feel[s] the fun,” behaves precisely like an audience member: she thrills at the
offstage tragedy, reflects for a moment on her experience of catharsis, and then returns to her
party, unchanged. Her “embrace in death” is both temporary and insubstantial. The reader,
offered privileged access to the suicide’s interiority, is the only one who emerges enlightened.
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The Waves (1931), however, offers a full-throated endorsement of the tropes outlined
above. Without narration to contextualize, clarify, and voice internal, even unacknowledged
thoughts, the suicide of Rhoda is second-hand, below-the-fold news. In the final section of the
novel, Bernard only mentions her because he sees her as a kind of double: “I evoked to serve as
opposite to myself the figure of Rhoda always so furtive, always with fear in her eyes, always
seeking some pillar in the desert, to find which she had gone; she had killed herself.”37 The
thought, buried halfway into the paragraph, evaporates almost as soon as it occurs. The formal
innovations that distinguish The Waves both from the realistic Victorian novel and from Woolf’s
own previous experimentation—the near-exclusive reliance on speech rather than narration, the
diffusion of a master narrative through an unwieldy number of central characters—coalesce here
into the report of a suicide from an unreliable narrator who is thinking more about himself than
the victim. This character, who has shared one-sixth of the burden of storytelling, is dispatched
with cruel efficiency, the use of past perfect a further degradation: in a novel that is almost
exclusively in the present, this is part of the past. The psychological and even circumstantial
details of her death, no doubt of interest to many of the novel’s readers, are left exclusively to
our imagination.
I am by no means suggesting a single modernist voice on suicide. Such a claim would be
contrary to its ethos. Laura Sager, for example, offers a credulous reading of Clarissa’s vision,
which would in turn suggest successful communication between suicide and audience.38 In this
interpretation, voluntary death is a means of creating rather than shrouding meaning. Instead,
what I am arguing is that there is a certain tendency in modernist fiction to deliberately obscure
the suicide behind a plurality of fragmented, inconsistent, and asynchronous narratives that
37
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reverses the teleological closure of many Victorian depictions of voluntary death. For these
authors, the epistemological crisis sketched by Améry—the necessarily inaccessible thoughts of
the suicide—is part of the lifeblood of modernism itself. What action could better lend itself to
epistemological doubt, narrative prevarication, and challenges to the cause-and-effect logic of
the Enlightenment? In distinction to their Victorian predecessors, these suicides do not belong to
everyone. Rather, the question becomes whether they belong to anyone.

112

3. The Dead Cannot Reply: Durkheim, Spielrein, Freud,
and the New Science of Suicide, 1881-1930
While vacationing in Pendlebury, a suburban town in Greater Manchester, Inspector
Mallett passes an evening with Leonard Dickinson. A morose eccentric who is compiling a
collection of pessimistic aphorisms for a homemade calendar, Leonard soon launches into a
depressive rant, rather embarrassing the “undemonstrative” inspector. “[W]e have this
advantage over the snail,” he says in a “hushed undertone.” “[W]e can make our trail end when
and where we wish.”1 Leonard’s body is found the following morning, and a note left behind
reads, “We are in the power of no calamity, while Death is in our own” (20; emphasis in
original). This is Thomas Browne, who coined the word “suicide,” but this is also a detective
novel, and when a suicide clause is found in Leonard’s will, his son begins to have doubts.2
“[C]an you imagine a man who really contemplated suicide devoting years of his life to selecting
and arranging the three hundred and sixty-five gloomiest observations on life that he could
find?” he asks Inspector Mallet (60). His sister agrees: “Father didn’t kill himself … I know
because I know … He just wasn’t that sort of person” (39; emphasis in original). Most
importantly, on the night of the supposed suicide, Leonard left an apple out for the next morning:
“Not a likely thing for a man to do if he knew he wasn’t going to be alive to eat it, was it?” (64).
Near the end of the novel, the final case is made by the family lawyer: “[F]rom my knowledge of
him, I should not say that he would have committed suicide—in the first year of a life policy, at
any rate. He knew that much about insurance, I have no doubt” (179).
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Thus, in Cyril Hare’s potboiler Suicide Excepted (1939), the people who knew Leonard
Dickinson best have no trouble determining that he could not have committed suicide. The
equation runs something like this: his character + the apple + the insurance policy = foul play.
This formula is not unique to Hare: the same year, in Agatha Christie’s And Then There Were
None, suicide is ruled out based solely on the character of the deceased.3 This is a sober,
positivist approach to the matter; it is an attempt to understand rationally an essentially irrational
act. What Leonard knows is privileged over what Leonard feels. The detective novel, of course,
is the genre most tied to the values of the Enlightenment—in particular, rationalism and
positivism—and it is therefore bound within its corresponding means of measurement, means
that were designed for uncovering the rational laws of the universe but have yet to fully answer
for the irrational actions of the human. Jean Améry, wrestling with the same problems, writes,
“[T]he act of leaping, no matter how full it may be of psychological impulses, can’t be open to
any further psychological insight because it breaks with the logic of life and therefore also with
psychology.” He continues, “[S]omeone standing before the leap—and in this alone it is
important to me—has at the same time one foot still in the logic of life and the other in the antilogical logic of death.”4
To translate my concerns into Améry’s language, the cast of Suicide Excepted is using
the logic of life to explain the anti-logical logic of death. They were not alone. Medical
discourse around suicide exploded at the end of the nineteenth century: by one estimate, there
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were already four thousand works on the subject by 1897.5 Here is the sociologist Jean Baechler,
summarizing the state of suicidology:
Because, except for certain exceptional cases, suicide is universally considered as
unnatural, aberrant, and, in the end, inhuman, the first tendency necessarily
consists in interpreting it as the result of a “power” exercised over the unfortunate
individual that pushes him to his death. Scientific thought changes none of this.
Simply, instead of placing this force in the gods or in fate, one seeks it in forces
either external or internal to the subject. This is why one may find but two broad
types of theories on suicide: (1) Sociological theories, which place this suicidal
power outside the individual in the social conditions under which he lives; (2)
Psychological (or psychoanalysis or psychiatric) theories that see it in the
innermost reaches of the psyche.6
Likewise, Margaret Pabst Battin, editor of the mammoth The Ethics of Suicide: Historical
Sources (2015), identifies the “full force … [of] the time of Freud and Durkheim” as the key
“transition … from the conception of suicide as a sin and a crime to the conception of it as the
product of psychological and social forces beyond an individual’s control.”7 Interrogating these
twin disciplines as the scenes of their birth, therefore, would better equip us to understand the
types of arguments against which modernist novelists are writing.
In what follows, I will argue that the totalizing rhetoric of scientific progress, culminating
in the work of Émile Durkheim, corrupted the emerging field of suicidology by insisting on
exclusively empirical explanations of the act; scientific discourse turns the suicidal subject into
the object of Baechler’s “power.” Despite failing to maintain their own standards, often grasping
for metaphor or poetic indulgence to make the facts cohere, this entails a rejection of
phenomenological experience and any object that cannot be measured by metrics. The result is
an egregiously incomplete view of suicide, one that denies voice to the suicide because they are
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not present to contribute evidence. Consider, for example, Plutarch’s Cato the Younger: like
Hare’s apple, the fact that Cato “gave his hand to bandage” makes “everybody cheerful, since
they thought he had a mind to live.” Soon, however, Cato commits a gruesome and protracted
suicide.8 The bandaging was a red herring, a gesture that does not conform to the kind of causeand-effect reasoning that would dominate post-Enlightenment suicidology. It is only through
supplementation from the humanities, better equipped to address mystery, that this view can be
restored to its proper limits. Thus, I conclude with the argument that Sigmund Freud’s
interdisciplinary approach—as exemplified in his conceptualization of suicidality, the death
drive, co-authored by Sabina Spielrein—is a more appropriate methodology for attempting to
bridge the gap between the logics of life and death. Ultimately, however, Freud’s explanation of
the death drive, like Durkheim’s, fails to imagine the phenomenology of suicide.

The Birth of Suicidology
First, a suicidological review is in order. As the field struggled through its infancy,
Enrico Morselli’s Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics (1881; revised and
translated into English 1882) served as a flashpoint. Anticipating Durkheim in his
methodological handling of suicide data and his dogmatism about the explanatory power of
“moral statistics,” Morselli places his work in the tradition of Charles Darwin, Henry Thomas
Buckle, Herbert Spencer, Alfred Russel Wallace, and Walter Bagehot. A professor and asylum
physician-in-chief, he conceives of his project as one in which “it was necessary to collect all the
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facts, to unite them together, to consider their analogy and differences.”9 Thus, he was among
the first to take suicide—which previously belonged to the domains of religion and philosophy—
into that of science.
From the beginning, the phenomenology of suicide is rejected for its immeasurability, not
its irrelevance. Morselli admits “that dealing here with the inward phenomena of conscience,
statistics cannot presume to learn the true mental state or psychical movement which has
preceded the act of suicide” (7). It must “stop short” at the “sensible phases” of “the human
conscience” (8). Still, he is unconvinced that this is prohibitively problematic: “with the laws
that regulate social organism[s], the individualism of human activities disappears” (10). Under
these laws, “individual will becomes absorbed by the general will” (187), while the “really
wonderful regularity of social phenomena” prevents any expression of spontaneity (255, 268).
Ultimately, “it needs no proof to show that the personal motives are a small and infinitesimal
portion of the collective motives” (274), that “the psychical life of the individual is but the reflex
of the nature and characteristics of that social aggregate in the midst of which it thinks, wills, and
acts” (114). Note how the use of it rather than he or she indicates that Morselli attributes
thinking, willing, and acting to “the psychical life” rather than “the individual,” to the function
rather than the person performing that function.
Morselli, then, viewed humanity—or, as he calls us early in the text, “living and
operating numbers” (3)—as a constant. Just as the mixing of cyanide and sulfate will always
yield the same result in chemistry, so too will any given combination of biological, social, and
geographical factors in the human (188). “That is not to start from a preconceived system,” he
argues, “but to base arguments on facts supplied by observation and, when possible, by
9
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experiment” (2). However, Morselli fails to acknowledge that his empiricism is itself a
“preconceived system,” one in which the whole spectrum of individual human experience is
limited to this kind of macro-reductionism or aggregative blindness, with sociological concerns
eclipsing psychological ones. Totally forgotten is “the inward phenomena of conscience,” which
surely warrant equal claim to our attention. Venturing to exhaustively explain suicide in this
manner is to ignore one of its most crucial components: the interior life of the person under
consideration, who operates under conditions that resist the metrics of the hard and social
sciences. I am not sure, as Andrew Bennett is, that suicide “fundamentally resists the socio,” but
it certainly does not rely exclusively on the socio for explanation.10 The closest Morselli comes
to acknowledging this gap between observation and experience is when he uses the phrase
paying tribute, as in “every year … humanity must pay a tribute of new victims” to voluntary
death (275). The phrase appears nineteen times in Suicide.11 Such language rings of mysticism
rather than scientific inquiry, and only in this echo of irrationality does Morselli concede to the
unknown. Appropriately, he can only do so through the use of metaphor—this is not, after all,
what the language of science was built for.
Still, the bugle call of Suicide is unmistakable: “We may rest assured that the deeper our
scientific knowledge on social phenomena becomes, so much the more will it tend to strengthen
the modern idea of the unity of forces … in the objective nature as in the subject activity of the
human mind” (35). Some of these unities are already becoming clear: the city attracts more
suicides than the country, civilization and voluntary death progress at parallel rates, “the Oriental
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populations” commit “terrible wholesale suicides … suggested always by pathological
exaggeration of the religious feeling,” while for the “cultural European,” the act is
“accomplished with indifference” (315). But the purpose of Suicide has less to do with its
ostensible subject and more with polemical objectives. Morselli’s book concludes with an
unequivocal Whig narrative: “To science alone will belong in future the functions of regulator
and moderator of public morals” (372). For Morselli, suicide is the property of science and
science alone.
In 1885, the London coroner William Wynn Westcott followed Morselli’s text with
Suicide: Its History, Literature, Jurisprudence, Causation, and Prevention, the first full-length
study of the subject in English since Forbes Winslow’s The Anatomy of Suicide (1840).
Westcott’s is a wide-ranging review, including a chapter on animal suicide, and the position of
the narrator is avowedly “scientific” as opposed to “Ethical” (6). Like Morselli, he finds “a
preponderant rate of suicide … in countries the farthest advanced in our modern ideas of
civilization, and in education, and in modern modes of thought” (81).12 His Orientalism,
however, is firmer: the Chinese and Japanese man “turns quite naturally to suicide as the proper
end of his existence” since “life is held cheaply there” (13). For Westcott, contact with
Europeans has mitigated this practice. This contradiction—suicide is a product of civilization as
well as its cure—passes unresolved. Nevertheless, he remains a committed scientific
triumphalist and proposes treating the causes of suicide “in a manner similar to that which is
ordinarily pursued with regard to diseases, in textbooks of medicine” (65). He concludes that the
cure resides in “the immediate removal from society of any person … who shows any tendency
to self-destruction” (168) combined with “a constant watchfulness,” or in other words the
12
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imposition of laboratory conditions upon the suicidal individual (173). Westcott even
appropriates Morselli’s metaphor of the chemist “combining his elements … [to] prepare a new
body,” much like the combination of two races yields a suicide rate “intermediate between them”
(76). Though Suicide is largely sober and uncontroversial, this approach can occasionally yield
ludicrous analyses. At the end of his section on morality, Westcott writes a one-sentence
paragraph—“In ‘Aurora Floyd’ and ‘Lady Audley’s Secret,’ two novels of high standing, suicide
is suggested definitely as a remedy for trouble, at least twelve times”—as if context and tone
were irrelevant, the number twelve weighty enough to blot out such literary concerns (92).
Eight years after Westcott, the physician and barrister S.A.K. Strahan begins his Suicide
and Insanity (1893) more lyrically, with an explicit call for the logic of life:
[A]s we know, even in the unreasoning brutes there is a love of life, or rather, a fear of
death, which makes them cling to existence with an energy more desperate than physical
suffering, however terrible, could ever inspire … It is this instinct, this love of life, which
impels the growing plant to raise or push aside overlying, impenetrable material of
incredible weight; and when the superincumbent mass is too great for its strength,
prompts it to creep along in darkness, crushed and distorted, in the hope of eventually
reaching life and light.13

The “love of life,” a force not dissimilar to Freud’s libido, is the primary condition of life.
However, the advance of civilization leads to “the acquired predisposition to suicide,” and those
who choose death are “mutilated and incomplete” (148, 30). In other circumstances, such people
“would promptly perish if brought forth under natural conditions,” for “[t]he absence of this
fundamental instinct (of self-preservation) is per se irrefragable proof of unfitness to live.”
Suicide is “merely one of the eliminative processes of natural selection.” Perhaps influenced by
Max Nordau’s Degeneration (1892; translated into English 1895), Strahan attributes such
circumstances to “markedly degenerate peoples” who are “deteriorating with every generation”
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(15). But he further argues that, since the process of natural selection has been interrupted by
civilization, “all these weaklings are permitted and at times even induced to contaminate the race
by the propagation or their unfitness” (69-70). Reiterating Westcott’s paradox, Strahan writes
that suicide is both a product of and a threat to Enlightenment progress and can be solved using
the corresponding tools: men should apply their knowledge of heredity to procreation just as they
do in “improving the breed of their horses and dogs,” while “every effort should be made [by a
family] to increase its vitality by attention to the laws of health, and by the infusion of fresh and
untainted blood” (82, 91). Likewise, those who are “markedly unfit to propagate their kind …
should [not] be allowed to contaminate the race and increase suffering and misery by
propagating his or her unfitness” (79). Once again, the mystical East serves as a foil to the
enlightened West, their relationship an accidental symbol of its gnarled logic: “[T]housands of
Brahmins and Buddhists still destroy their lives annually,” he writes, “but these suicides are most
plentiful where the light of Western civilisation has not yet penetrated” (36). Strahan makes no
mention of the “weaklings” this penetration spawns.
The phrases “untainted blood” and “contaminate the race” have sinister overtones to the
twenty-first century reader, but they are a symptom of Strahan’s larger failure to seriously
engage with the suicidal mind on its own terms—even its own imagined terms. There are,
however, cracks in his rationalist edifice. Metaphors of sacrifice permeate Morselli’s writing,
while Westcott frequently invokes the language of disease, as if madness and suicide were
phenomena that invaded rather than originated in human experience. Perhaps more revealingly,
Strahan refers to suicides as “breakdowns of the machine,” suggesting a model of the human
psyche that is uniform and rational: aside from malfunctions, this human machine will adhere to
utter consistency (159). Strahan ignores the variety of emotions that will always serve as the
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wrench in his mechanism, even when he acknowledges that it is “absolutely impossible
accurately to classify suicides as to the causes which prompt them to the act” (63). This is a
dismissal masked as an explanation—after all, much of Strahan’s book is dedicated to those very
causes: race, climate, religion, sex, age, etcetera. “[O]ur suicide[s] of to-day,” he writes, are
“due to madness, disgust of life, and last and greatest, that uncontrollable impulse to death which
cannot be explained” (15). This final admission skirts close to Améry’s own assessment (“every
time someone dies by his or her own hand or even just tries to die, a veil falls that no one can lift
again”) and appears to undermine his entire project: if the “last and greatest” cause cannot be
explained under the framework of suicidology, shouldn’t that framework be changed, reassessed,
or at least integrate this failure into its conclusions?
Strahan doesn’t answer this question, occasionally hedging without accepting the
implications of his hedges. In his chapter “Suicide and Insanity,” for example, he admits, “it is
certain we shall never discover a means of getting to know the mental state of the suicide just
anterior to his fatal act. It would seem impossible that we can ever arrive at the stage where
reliable statistics on the subject might be obtainable, and it is clear that all existing statistics
relative to the question are valueless” (92). In the next, “The Suicidal Impulse,” he writes that
the notion of an impulse is usually dismissed in cases where the criminal remains alive because
of “the impossibility of proving on independent evidence, the existence of such irresistible
impulse in any given case” but is acceptable with the suicide since “such decision can injure no
one” (121). Thus, the silence of the suicide allows Strahan to impose explanation where the
speech of the living criminal would prohibit it. This is an odd move, since he later warns of the
danger of “bringing charges of doubtful veracity … against the dead, who cannot reply” (17980). Again and again, Strahan pays lip service to his inability to speak on behalf of the suicide,
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and again and again he wilfully rejects this inability by resituating them in the narrative of
scientific progress. He is therefore able to conclude that “the true cause” of the decrease in
suicide among European nations is “the advance of medical and surgical science” (24).
Strahan’s Enlightenment sympathies are more comfortable here, as the pursuit of knowledge can
compete with suicide in the alleviation of pain, even as he condemns science for its interference
with Darwinism and thus its role in protecting suicidal subjects from natural selection.
Still, Strahan serves as a key predecessor to sociologists like Durkheim in his attempt to
categorize large groups of suicides. In his formulation, there are “two great classes” of voluntary
death, the rational or quasi-suicide and the irrational or true suicide. The rational suicide is
committed when “death is deliberately chosen and embraced by a rational being, as for some
reason preferable to life” (34). These fall under two categories, those who die for gain and those
who die to escape evil. Irrational suicides, on the other hand, are those “who are impelled to
destroy their lives when insane … [and] those who while sane give way to a sudden impulse”
(65). This includes those who have a mental aberration, those who experience an irresistible
impulse but have no mental aberration, and finally those who are predisposed to “the unnatural
impulse” when shocked or irritated (91). For Strahan, ancient suicides tended to be rational,
modern ones irrational. Crude as this configuration may be—how, for example, would he
classify a suicide committed to escape evil that is nonetheless the product of “a sudden
impulse”?—this represents a breakthrough in suicidology: the first comprehensive system of
classifying suicides. Nevertheless, note that Strahan reserves the name “true” for the suicide
whose actions are most inscrutable, those that most demand an act of imagination, which he does
not supply. Suicides that can be explained rationally are given the qualifier “quasi.” The
language here betrays the truth: the true suicide is beyond his means of building knowledge.
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In one Oxford undergraduate, at least, Strahan found a suicide that could stand as an
emblem for his approach as well as that of his contemporaries. Before shooting himself in his
rooms, this young man wrote, “The reason of my committing this act may, perhaps, seem
incomprehensible, but I suppose it is chiefly that my morbid desire for death from my childhood
has grown too strong for me. It may be madness, but I fear not.” Almost approvingly, Strahan
remarks, “The letter was rational, clear, logical, and sympathetic” (129). Like Leonard
Dickinson, this student can be reduced to a mathematical equation: his character + a mounting,
morbid desire for death = unequivocal irrational—or quasi—suicide.

Durkheim and the Sociology of Suicide
Thus, when Durkheim came to write Suicide (1897; translated into English 1951), he was
joining a long-running conversation, one that had already incorporated aspects of positivism,
rationalism, and the use of statistics. His contribution to suicidology was to produce an elegant if
incomplete theory that rigorously relied on statistics to substantiate its arguments. In the some
one hundred years since its publication, much of the statistical basis for those arguments has
been challenged.14 Furthermore, the specifics of his methodology have faced the kind of
revisionist scrutiny that is routine and unsurprising when an emerging science is compared to
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subsequent innovations.15 Nevertheless, for many it remains significant for establishing the
scientific credibility of a new discipline fighting for its relevance: in Social Meanings of Suicide
(1967), Jack D. Douglas writes that it is “one of the seminal works in the formation of the
academic discipline of sociology” (79). After a meticulous analysis of the book, Whitney Pope
concludes, “Judged by Durkheim’s own standard—compatibility with the data—this theory is
inadequate” (202). Still, in his final assessment, “Suicide largely lost the battles, [but] it has been
instrumental in winning the war” (204).
Born into a modest family and a long line of rabbis—and studying for a time at rabbinical
school himself16—Durkheim proved an early rationalist, renouncing Judaism while at the École
Normale Supérieure, possibly under the influence of his classmates Jean Jaurès and Henri
Bergson.17 At the time, sociology was “in some disrepute,” and at his oral defense, Paul Janet
got so angry he “smote the table and invoked the name of God.”18 Following Auguste Comte,
Durkheim saw the need to apply “the scientific attitude to the study of society,”19 a position his
contemporary critics variously called mystical and deterministic.20 He had no such doubts,
attributing an almost messianic quality to sociology: it would become “the universal science,”
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and the “other sciences” would “be regarded as great sociological facts.”21 Durkheim took
teaching posts in Bordeaux and Paris and developed a reputation for his ascetic appearance as
well as his stirring lectures and his commitment to morality as a subject for scientific research.22
However, he could prove stubborn: at the École, when his theories were undermined by the facts,
Bergson claims he would reply, unperturbed, “The facts are wrong.”23 Thus, for Durkheim,
sociology is the master key, the explanatory force that banishes or absorbs all other disciplines—
indeed, all other sciences, let alone the humanities.
Since Suicide is as much a coherent theory of one phenomenon as it is an apology for
sociology, it is important to first examine the methodology outlined in The Rules of the
Sociological Method (1895; translated into English 1939), Durkheim’s most full-throated
explanation of the tools he would employ and champion throughout his career. He begins with
the premise that “there are ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable
property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual,”24 a phenomenon he would later
term the conscience collective. Here, he is following Morselli’s belief that “the psychical life of
the individual is but the reflex of the nature and characteristics of that social aggregate.” In fact,
he may well be paraphrasing Morselli’s “really wonderful regularity of social phenomena” when
he writes, “If indeed one comes even a little into contact with social phenomena, one is on the
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contrary surprised at the outstanding regularity with which they recur in similar circumstances.
Even the most trivial and apparently most puerile practices are repeated with the most
astonishing uniformity” (81). And while Morselli had already argued that man’s behavior is
obligatory (269), Durkheim adds that it is also coercive, though the pressure of coercion may
only be felt when one struggles against it (22).
Of course, the conscience collective, like any metaphor, cannot be measured directly.
Therefore, sociologists must employ the use of “social facts,” “the sole datum afforded the
sociologist,” and determine their causal relationships to one another (36; emphasis in original).
Durkheim defines social facts as “any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting
over the individual an external constraint,” or as anything “which is general over the whole of a
given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations”
(27; emphasis in original). He insists they must be studied as things, by which he means not
“that social facts are material things, but that they are things just as are material things, although
in a different way” (7). In other words, social facts must be treated as any other scientific fact—
measured in much the same way temperature is measured by a thermometer—and sociology
must follow the other sciences in its adherence to the scientific method in the use of these facts;
therefore, the twin objectives of the text are to prove that sociology is distinct from philosophy,
which does not employ facts, and that it is “itself a distinct and autonomous science,”
independent from chemistry, biology, and so on (113).
Thus far his claims appear rather modest, at least to my eyes. However, in Durkheim’s
estimation, the statistical accumulation of social facts and their application to a “series of
variations, systematically constituted” renders the subject’s will non-existent or irrelevant (107):
“Since each one of these statistics includes without distinction all individual cases, the individual
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circumstances which may have played some part in producing the phenomenon cancel each other
out and consequently do not contribute to determining the nature of the phenomenon. What it
expresses is a certain state of the collective soul” (24; emphasis in original). We are simply
under the “illusion” that we have control over our actions (22). This notion takes on ever-more
deterministic overtones when Durkheim dismisses individual intention as “too subjective to be
dealt with scientifically” before ruling out its existence altogether (82). He takes his fellow
sociologists to task for relying on psychological explanations, arguing that they believe that “in
society there is nothing save individual consciousnesses, and it is consequently in these that is to
be found the source of all social evolution” (83).
While he is certainly correct in arguing that “the whole does not equal the sum of its
parts” (86), that society includes individuals but possesses characteristics that only occur when
those individuals come into association with one another, his dogmatism precludes any
psychological explanations: as for emotions, they have been “undergone” [subis] rather than
“generated” [faits] by the individual (22).25 In Durkheim’s worldview, the whole determines the
parts; individuals do not create but are created by society.26 This reversal of causality renders the
phenomenological experience of the subject—the object of study in psychology and literature—
supplemental rather than evidentiary. Moreover, he writes, “Feeling is an object for scientific
study, not the criterion of scientific truth”—and yet, surely, as an object of scientific study,
feeling must be admitted in part on its own terms rather than being exclusively warped to those
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of the scientist (40). After all, how can we study affect without considering the language of
those experiencing it? Durkheim continues, “[E]very time a social phenomenon is directly
explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the explanation is false”
(86). But it is unclear what could constitute a psychological phenomenon under this rubric: all
modern human behavior requires association, as even solitary activities such as reading or
writing necessitate the association between author and audience. Ultimately, his criticism in
Suicide that “it is no longer acceptable to believe that a social fact is merely an individual fact
generalized” fails to acknowledge that he, in turn, views individual facts as merely social facts
particularized (143).
What’s more, his basis for determining that “social facts tend to form outside the
consciousnesses of individuals” is specious (38). Durkheim claims that it is “a complete
contradiction” to argue “that the individual is himself the creator of a machine whose essential
role is to exercise domination and constraint over him,” as if men were never dominated by their
own creations (97). What about the Church, the stock market, or sociology itself, each manmade and clearly representations of the conscience collective that nevertheless dominate,
constrain, and coerce us? It would be more accurate to say that the individual is almost
exclusively the creator of such machines—his very use of the word “machine” [machine]
implicitly concedes as much.27 It rather seems that Durkheim simply feels he cannot engage
with the individual, since “[e]very individual is an infinity, and infinity cannot be exhausted”
(71). Of course, this is metaphor or hyperbole, since all concrete phenomena are finite.28 Still, it
speaks to an uneasiness around subjectivity, even when subjective experience is the object of
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study. Thus, when he writes that consciousness gives us “muddled impressions” of the facts of
individual psychology, that it “provides no clear, distinct notions or explanatory concepts,” he is
really complaining about the limits of scientific inquiry in producing explanatory theories for
subjectivity (8). This eclipsing of the individual is so prominent that at one point, Pope has to
remind us, during a discussion of Durkheimian integration, that “[i]t is people, of course, who
are integrated” (17).
Were it not for his totalizing rhetoric—what Richard Sennett calls his “doctrinal instance
on single-level explanation”—this would not be as much of a problem, but Durkheim
simultaneously bans the subjective from the realm of social science while producing paltry and
sterile conclusions by objective means alone.29 Consequently, in one of Suicide’s most praised
arguments, he will tell us that married men commit suicide at a lower rate than single men, while
for married women it is the reverse (179-210). What he will not do, and tells us no one can do, is
determine more than the effect of these individual variables. No wonder, then, that he abandons
a line of thought that would expose the multiplicity of such variables: “[t]o the same effect there
always corresponds the same cause,” he writes, and therefore “if suicide depends on more than
one cause it is because in reality there are several kinds of suicide” (103; emphasis in original).
Since the causes of a suicide vary to some degree in each case, every individual suicide must
have a unique cause, eliminating the possibility of testing for larger social currents.30 And no
wonder Sennett, in an otherwise laudatory introduction to Suicide, admits that “the text seems—
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at least to me—not to come to grips with the sentence, ‘I want to die’” (xvi).31 For Durkheim,
“[t]he schoolmaster was the secular successor to the priest,” and like the priest, “he is the
interpreter of the great moral ideas of his time and country.”32 Unfortunately, he falls victim to
the arrogance of the priest, and rather than interpreter he frequently plays the role of conduit
whose one-way transmission of knowledge is not open to challenge, let alone supplementation.
Let us now turn to Suicide.33 Durkheim’s central thesis, derived from the twenty-six
thousand suicides he classified with the help of his nephew Marcel Mauss, is that “suicide rates
vary inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups to which the individual
belongs” as well as the degree of regulation over that individual (224).34 What he means here is
that both a strong presence and a strong absence of social integration or regulation provoke an
individual to choose death. Perhaps “choose” is inaccurate: while each suicide contains a
“personal imprint” (307), in the end, “the individual does not belong to himself” (239) and his or
her actions are “in reality the outcome and extension of a social state to which they give external
form” (331). Thus, each suicide falls into one of four categories. The first is the egotistical
suicide, or suicide by “excessive individualism” (225). Because he has failed to integrate with
society, because he is estranged from family and the community at large, an egotistical suicide
loses the purpose for his actions. Werther, most certainly, was an egoistical suicide. The second
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is the altruistic suicide, caused by excessive integration that overwhelms the self: “the pole star
that guides his behaviour is situated outside himself, that is to say in one of the groups to which
he belongs” (239). The altruistic suicide is best exemplified by the martyr—Jesus Christ,
according to First Peter, died for our sins. The third category, the anomic suicide, describes
suicide as a response to “critical … disturbances in the collective order” (267). The readiest
example of an anomic suicide is the stock broker who kills himself after Black Tuesday, or the
suicides in the wake of an apocalyptic event, like the woman who turns on the gas after the mass
blindness that opens John Wyndham’s The Day of the Triffids (1951). Durkheim, however
argues that any upset, positive or negative, will have this effect: thus, the suddenly rich are as
susceptible as the suddenly poor, neither prepared to navigate into their new and foreign
circumstances. Famously, Durkheim relegated his final category, the fatalistic suicide, to a
single footnote. As the name suggests, the fatalistic suicide occurs under “the inescapable and
inflexible character of the rule over which one has no power” (305). Slaves have a high rate of
fatalistic suicide; the suicide pact, for example, between Oroonoko and Imoinda falls into this
category. As Christie Davies and Mark Neal observe, there is a symmetry to these categories:
egotistical and anomic suicide are detached from society, the first through a lack of integration,
the second through a lack of regulation, while altruistic and fatalistic suicides have an unhealthy
attachment to society.35 An altruistic suicide is too integrated, a fatalistic suicide too regulated.
The elegance of this solution is no small part of its appeal.
However, before he can offer such a seamless formulation, Durkheim must first eliminate
competing explanations. He begins Suicide by dismissing the relationships between voluntary
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death and “extra-social factors”: these are race, “cosmic factors,” meaning environmental
influences such as temperature or time of day, suicide by imitation, and “psychopathic states,”
like nervous disorders or alcoholism. He admits that heredity could influence suicide, but the
anecdotal nature of contemporary evidence makes it impossible to determine. This in and of
itself distinguishes Durkheim from his predecessors. Morselli, Westcott, and Strahan all
entertained arguments about racial, geographical, and psychological causes; these frequently
incorporated primitivist fantasies about the innocence of savagery and the moral corruption of
civilization. But Durkheim’s mission was to establish a science, and in an attempt to cleanse his
field of unmeasurable phenomena, he argues that they signify nothing. Still, he does not appear
entirely at ease with this gamble: though he is confident in asserting that “the intrinsic nature of
the acts that produce the outcome matters very little” (16)—note the sterile euphemism
“outcome” [résultat]36—he asks, only a few pages later,
How can one know what motive impelled the agent and whether, once he was resolved, it
was death itself that he desired or some other outcome? Intention is too intimate a matter
for it to be accessible from outside except by means of vague approximation. It even
escapes internal observation. How often do we not ourselves mistake the true motives for
our own acts! (17-18)

Here Durkheim equates unmeasurable with irrelevant, and subjectivity is banished from
sociology because it cannot be contained by the language of the discipline.
Yet, even on its own terms, his approach is problematic. For Durkheim, suicide is “any
case of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act, carried out by the
victim himself, which he was aware would produce this result” (19; emphasis in original). Pope
and John Varty have both made potent objections to this definition: in the statistics Durkheim
uses, officials did not rule death a suicide unless they had positive evidence to suggest as
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much—and therefore whether the suicide was aware that he or she would die was not a
consideration.37 (This also means that many suicides went unrecorded.) How, then, could
Durkheim substantiate any of his work when his theories and evidence used different definitions
of the main term? And despite an insistence on the “objective, specific, and methodical” (Rules
6), he frequently leans on gender essentialism and “impressionistic characterizations” of egoism
and race.38 More importantly for our purposes, Durkheim relies on the subjective awareness of
the individual only two paragraphs after rejecting the consideration of intentions for their
subjectivity.39 He writes, “[T]he reasons given for suicide or those that the suicide himself gives
to explain his actions are, most often, only the apparent causes” (154). But this is true, too, of
determining whether the suicide was aware of the results of his actions: it relies exclusively on
apparent causes. Lukes is then incorrect in depicting it as “a definition without reference to the
agent’s intention,” since intention to die is its most important characteristic (200). Furthermore,
in listing the facts that would have constituted evidence for suicide, Varty names among them
abnormality and unhappiness without remarking that Durkheim himself rejected these very types
of causes. Thus, in making his case for statistical, sociological argument rid of all subjectivity,
he invokes data recorded only when subjective causes, mainly psychological disturbance, were
apparent. Durkheim does not want sociology adulterated with subjectivity, but he cannot arrive
at any meaningful conclusions without it. In essence, he is building a science of subjectivity
disguised as objective discourse; he has confused metaphorical for literal truth.
Critics have waffled around this contradiction. Though Sennett writes that the text never
reconciles the sentence, “I want to die,” he is confident nonetheless that “Émile Durkheim taught

37

Pope, 11; Varty, 58-9.
Pope, 138 and 98.
39
“[B]y referring to the victim’s knowledge,” writes Pope, “Durkheim appealed to a phenomenon just as
subjective as the motive and intent that he excluded initially” (10).
38

134

the modern world how to think about suicide” (xi). Pope, despite declaring the war won, still
knows that “Durkheim investigated not suicide per se but social suicide rates” (11); he has no
illusions about Durkheim’s “inability to explain who among the many possible candidates in a
given social environment will actually commit suicide” (200). The two, however, are not
independent of one another. Durkheim’s rates depend upon who among the many possible
candidates did commit suicide. If he cannot tell us why one and not another, if he cannot fill the
silence that follows the statement, “I want to die,” how can be possibly claim total control over
the suicide’s narrative? Any conclusions he reaches must be understood as founded upon vague
approximation. The explanatory power of Suicide itself, absent any attention to the
phenomenology of voluntary death, is purely anecdotal.

Psychoanalytic Suicide and the Death Drive
Like Durkheim, Freud was a secular Jew eager to deflate “illusions” through empirical
scholarship—and while we do not know if Durkheim was familiar with Freud,40 we do know that
Freud read Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912).41 Indeed, some of his
late, theoretical writing, especially Civilization and Its Discontents (1930; translated into English
the same year), bears a strong resemblance to Durkheim’s sociology.42 Nevertheless, their
methods are ostensibly dichotomous: Durkheim began with the social to understand the
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individual, while Freud’s point of departure was, of course, the individual him or herself. The
first is centripetal, the second centrifugal. We might therefore expect Freud, steeped in case
studies, to compensate for the gaps in Durkheim’s method, to better reconcile with the
phenomenology of suicide. As Foucault writes in Madness and Civilization (1961; abridged and
translated into English 1964), “Freud went back to madness at the level of its language,
reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience reduced to silence by positivism …
he restored, in medical thought, the possibility of a dialogue with unreason.”43 In terms of
suicide, this “silence” of positivism is what was observed, in the previous chapter, by
Galsworthy, Ford, Joyce, and Woolf and what is practiced by Durkheim above. In contrast,
Freud’s dialogue with “unreason” is an attempt to listen to what Améry calls “logic of death.”
Durkheim writes a monologue on suicide for scientific readers rooted in the “logic of life”—in
Foucault’s terms, he is speaking in “the merciless language of non-madness,” and as a result he
writes “a monologue of reason about madness” (ix, xi; emphasis in original). Freud’s death
drive, more theoretical than clinical, has its limits, too. But he is nonetheless engaging in a
dialogue with the logic of death.44
Freud’s first work on the subject was inauspicious. At the end of his “Contributions to a
Discussion on Suicide” (1910; translated into English 1957), from a debate held on April 20 and
27 at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society over the role of secondary schools in their students’
suicides, he admits, “[W]e have failed to answer this psychological question because we have no
adequate means of approaching it,” adding, “We can, I think, only take as our starting-point the
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condition of melancholia, which is so familiar to us clinically, and a comparison between it and
the affect of mourning.”45
Seven years later, he published “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917; translated into
English 1925), his first significant foray into suicidology.46 He argues that mourning is the
subject’s response to the loss of a loved object, melancholia to “a loss in regard to his [own]
ego.”47 Upon further examination, the melancholic reveals that “the most violent” of his
“various self-accusations” fit not the patient but “someone whom the patient loves or has loved
or should love” (158). This insight unlocks the mystery of suicide. Before, the act had been
inexplicable, inconsistent with the entire psychoanalytic project: “So immense is the ego’s selflove, which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds,
and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges as
a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction” (162-3).
Though Freud has “long known” that “no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not
turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others” (162)—here he referring to a
footnote in Totem and Taboo (1913; translated into English 1918)—he now understands the
process involved: the neurotic is only able to commit suicide once he is able to treat himself as
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an object.48 As in love, suicide is a case of the object overwhelming the ego.49 In order to
explain suicide, then, Freud must rid it of its suicidality: this is, after all, a misdirected murder,
not a rational or even a lucid act of self-destruction. On Freud’s part, it is a simple fix, a denial
of suicide proper, a dismissal of the problem because the challenges it raises to the pleasure
principle are immeasurable by psychoanalytic doctrine. The word “consent” [zustimmen] betrays
an assumption that the ego is acting with unfettered agency, even during suicide.50 The logic of
life admits no room for the logic of death.51
But the center would not hold, and soon Freud was forced to confront the presence of a
competing impulse. His term “death drive”52 [Todestrieb] originates in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (1920; translated into English 1922), though Freud credits Sabina Spielrein for
anticipating a “considerable portion” of his “speculations … in an instructive and interesting
paper which, however, is unfortunately not entirely clear to me.”53 Spielrein, an émigré from
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Russia, was, like Durkheim and Freud, Jewish and secular. After several suicide attempts, she
became the first person to transition from psychiatric patient to psychoanalyst.54 Spielrein was
also the first to successfully defend a psychoanalytic doctoral dissertation, the first to use play
therapy with children, and would at one point treat a not-entirely-convinced Jean Piaget.55 In
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud is referring to her paper “Destruction as the Cause of
Coming into Being” (1912; translated into English 1994), which Spielrein first delivered to the
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in November 1911 and published the following year in C.G.
Jung’s Jahrbuch.
The reception was chilly: Victor Tausk criticized her use of deductive reasoning, while
Freud mostly ignored Spielrein, seeing it as an “opportunity for a critique of Jung,” his protégécum-nemesis.56 Afterward, he criticized “the little girl” in a letter to Jung for her subordination
of “psychological material to biological considerations,” adding, “ΨA farà da se,” or
psychoanalysis goes by itself (469).57 Four months later, he wrote again to Jung, “[H]er
destructive drive is not much to my liking, because I believe it is personally conditioned
[persönlich bedingt]” (474).58 Nevertheless, over the space of a decade—in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, The Ego and the Id (1923; translated into English 1927), and Civilization and Its

54

John Launer, Sex versus Survival: The Life and Ideas of Sabina Spielrein (New York: Overlook, 2017), 40
and 1. Her father Nikolai threatened (17) and her brother Isaac also attempted suicide (61). After
defending her dissertation, she considered suicide again, writing, “I cannot go on living. I will be very
cautious in what I claim, but I think I am capable of destroying myself with cyanide in the presence of
the idol of my youth. In my feelings I have no fear of death!” (122).
55
Ibid. 119 and 196. For Piaget, “it was probably more of an intellectual exercise … than a therapeutic
experience” (ibid. 204).
56
From the minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, quoted in Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung The
Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, ed. William McGuire,
trans. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 469.
57
This is a complaint, incidentally—a dispute over disciplinary borders—that he also had about Alfred
Adler. Gay, 222.
58
Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, Briefwechsel, eds. William McGuire and Wolfgang Sauerländer
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1976), 548.

139

Discontents—“Destruction” would serve as the groundwork for one of Freud’s most important
and most controversial late developments. Spielrein, whose work is instrumental in the
formulation of the death drive, was relegated to Freud’s footnoted comments on her “instructive
and interesting paper,” which would remain the final published mention of “Destruction” for
over seventy years.59
Before reviewing the article, however, it is important to note that Freud is patently unfair
to Spielrein. Not only would he rely heavily on “biological pre-supposition” in explaining his
death drive—this constitutes the entire sixth chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle—but
Spielrein’s paper is really quite lucid.60 Oddly, her biographer John Launer perpetuates this
myth of inscrutability, writing that “Destruction” is “confusing” because it covers too much
ground and shows off her erudition in favor of advancing her central argument (141).61 In the
context of Freud’s own digression-friendly house style, this assessment is all the more puzzling.
In any case, “Destruction” begins with a question: “Why does this most powerful drive, the
reproductive instinct, harbour negative feelings in addition to the inherently anticipated positive
feelings?”62 Spielrein then quotes from Jung’s Psychology of the Unconscious (1912; translated
into English 1916)—the libido is “the power that beautifies everything and, in certain cases,
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destroys everything” (155)—and builds upon this point in arguing that every individual is
divided between two competing instincts: one for the preservation of the species and one for selfpreservation.63 Spielrein argues that the latter instinct is static because “it must protect the
existing individual from foreign influences,” the former dynamic in that it entails “the
‘resurrection’ of the individual in a new form” (174).
Consequently, the creative is always also destructive, since the transformation into
something new necessitates the elimination of what has come before. In the title of his
biography, Launer calls this configuration Sex versus Survival (2011). Here is Spielrein, again
quoting Jung, who—it should be noted—was likely borrowing Spielrein’s ideas without
attribution:64
To be fruitful provokes one’s downfall; at the rise of the next generation, the
previous one has exceeded its peak. Our descendants become our most dangerous
enemies for whom we are unprepared. They will survive and take power from
our enfeebled hands … Whoever relinquishes experiencing a risky undertaking
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must stifle an erotic wish, committing a form of self-murder [Selbstmord].65 This
explains the death fantasies that often accompany the renunciation of the erotic
wish. (155-6)
In its most evident manifestations, this proto-death drive sees mothers endangering their own
health in the birthing of their children, or men and women in their twilight years watching as
they are replaced by their descendants in the economy of everyday life. This is what Keats is
writing about in “Ode to a Nightingale” (1819)—“No hungry generations tread thee down”—and
what Yeats laments in “Sailing to Byzantium” (1928).66
Crucially, both self-preservation and preservation of the species have a relationship to
suicide: the subject who does not engage in self-destructive, transformative, and erotic behavior
is still prone to death fantasies. As Pamela Cooper-White writes, “For Spielrein, death and
destruction are not opposed to life, but are inherent in both sexual pleasure and … in all psychic
growth and development.”67 Thus, the death drive haunts both the expression and the frustration
of the libido. And sex—or at least unprotected, heterosexual sex—is simultaneously a lifeaffirming and a suicidal gesture: the birth of a child ensures both longevity and impermanence
through succession. As clinical evidence, Spielrein mentions an analysand of Tausk’s who
interpreted intercourse as castration, the penis “amputated” by the swallowing vagina (182).
Now, Freud’s complaints probably had as much to do with his swelling Oedipal struggle
with Spielrein’s analyst and mentor, Jung, as it did with his evolutionary objections. Still, like
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Durkheim, he could be fiercely protective of his discipline and often fended off perceived
intrusions from other fields when assimilation of their findings may have proved more fruitful.68
As for showing off her erudition, Spielrein in fact offers a cogent outline of the manner in which
this self-destructive instinct can be found in a variety of human experience—that is, in the
biological, the psychological, and the mythological. In the mythological, she notes that many
creation myths begin in death, whether it is Adam and Eve disobeying God in the Garden of
Eden and thus introducing both procreation and atrophy to mankind or Christ on the cross,
offering spiritual redemption (or new life) to man as a consequence of his own suicidal selfsacrifice. As for the psychological, she describes the similar function in dreams of coffins and
wombs, of burials and impregnation; she also relates the story of her three-year-old analysand
Anna, who was told that children were angels brought to earth by storks and therefore assumed
that her grandmother would become “a little baby again” after her death (171).69 Finally, in the
realm of the biological, Spielrein writes, “During reproduction, a union of female and male cells
occur. The unity of each cell thus is destroyed and, from the product of this destruction, new life
originates” (156).
Rather than confusing, Spielrein strikes me as the only thinker here with the mental
flexibility to allow a truly interdisciplinary approach to suicide: this phenomenon of Eros and
Thanatos, rather than being strictly psychological, can be found both in the broadly mythological
as well as in the building blocks of life itself. Unfortunately, a combination of forces have
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prevented Spielrein from achieving the credit she deserves.70 She is, for example, almost
entirely excluded from Ulrike May’s otherwise magisterial account of the genesis of Beyond the
Pleasure Principle.71 Yet her far-reaching “Destruction” serves as the theoretical foundation for
Freud’s death drive as well as its implications for suicide.72
Beyond the Pleasure Principle begins with the problem of repetition compulsion: why are
we compelled to repeat actions that appear to be in direct conflict with the pleasure principle?73
This is apparent in his own grandson, who recreates the circumstances of his mother’s absence in
the fort-da game, but even more so in post-traumatic dreams that rehearse the traumatic events
night after night. Freud concludes, much like Spielrein but splitting her formulation into a
binary, that there is “an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which
the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces”
(43; emphasis in original). These “ego-instincts,” which “seek to lead what is living to death,”
exist in tension and interdependence with the sexual instincts, those that drive the individual
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toward life (55). Freud calls the latter Eros, while Paul Federn, who reviewed “Destruction” for
The Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, would term the former Thanatos.74 Thus,
repetition compulsion, motived by the death drive, is a form of self-destruction, an infliction of
pain both physical and psychological. Freud doesn’t discuss suicide in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, but he has nevertheless established the theoretical framework within which he could
resolve the problem raised in “Mourning and Melancholia.” The duality of Eros and Thanatos
enables him to welcome, in the language of Strahan, true suicide into the psychoanalytic
framework. However, because his subsequent interest in the death drive is speculative, we are
forced to speculative ourselves. Still, it isn’t difficult to imagine the revision: rather than a
murderous impulse directed inward, or in addition to a murderous impulse directed inward,
suicide is the realization of a biological impulse toward self-destruction, a triumph of Thanatos
over Eros, a psychotic manifestation of the repetition compulsion.
Three years later, in The Ego and the Id, Freud argues that “the emergence of life” is
itself a disturbance, perhaps the psychic disturbance par excellence, which the death drive seeks
to correct through dissociation, regression, or dissolution.75 The individual deals with these
“dangerous” instincts through harmless fusing with the sexual drive and aggression toward the
external world, while “to a large extent they undoubtedly continue their internal work
unhindered” (55-6). In “The Economic Problem in Masochism” (1924; translated into English
the same year), he will call this drive “the instinct of destruction, of mastery, the will to power”
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[Wille zur Macht].76 Finally, in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud laces these “concurrent or
mutually opposing” instincts into his theory of society.77 In short: “[C]ivilization is built up
upon a renunciation of instinct … it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations
have to struggle” (51-2). When civilization restricts, weakens, or disarms this hostility,
“aggressiveness directed outwards would be bound to increase … self-destruction” (78). This is,
more or less, a psychoanalytic take on Durkheim’s obligation and coercion. Its ends are “to
combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into
one great unity, the unity of mankind” (81). Unity, then, is the work of Eros; the aggression that
seeks to separate and scatter, that of Thanatos.78
By locating these urges in the individual, then making an argument about their
sociological consequences, Freud reverses Durkheim’s line of causality, and he adopts an
interdisciplinary approach that acknowledges the value of both psychological and sociological
facts. For Freud, civilization is an extension of the sexual instincts. But what should we make of
his claim that it is “responsible for our misery,” that “we should be much happier if we gave it up
and returned to primitive conditions” (38)? Freud’s dualism leaves a compelling blank: if both
sexuality and civilization cause neurotic misery, and if a return to the primitive would bring us
happiness, doesn’t that mean that self-destruction, its correlated action, is preferable to
reproduction? That life is the sickness, neuroses its symptoms, suicide its cure? Is this, finally,
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the anti-logical logic of death, or at least a shade, an imperfect shadow of its substance?
Civilization and Its Discontents is theoretical rather than clinical and therefore the question
remains unanswered.
In subsequent texts that address the death drive—New Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis, “Why War?” (both 1933; both translated into English the same year), and An
Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940; translated into English the same year)—Freud remains silent
on the suicidal implications of the death drive. In fact, despite his psychological orientation, he
does little more than Durkheim to answer the statement, “I want to die.” As May observes,
“What also remains unanswered … is the question of the clinical significance of the introduction
of the death instinct.”79 The centripetal-centrifugal model fails with suicide, since Foucault’s
“dialogue with madness” is made impossible by the nature of the act. How does one treat
voluntary death with the talking cure? Freud did not produce any clinical work on the subject,
and suicide ultimately remained relatively elusive to the psychoanalyst who had an answer to
most human phenomena. The death drive remains evocative “speculation.” Still, his
explanatory model for suicide—a combination of biological, sociological, and occasionally
mythological theorizing—serves as a successful corrective to the totalizing position of the early
sociologists. His criticism of religion, that it “promises enviable completeness,” could just as
easily be applied to Durkheim’s sociology.80 Freud’s interdisciplinary and revisionary approach
better fits the subject than a rigid and exclusively impersonal science, a science that attempts to
explain the subject by removing them from the equation.
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4. One Might Come to Fruit in Death:
D.H. Lawrence, Blood Knowledge, and Suicide in Women in Love
“[T[he cruel dawn of coming back to life / out of oblivion”
– D.H. Lawrence, “The Ship of Death”1
Despite a keen interest in psychoanalysis, there is no evidence that D.H. Lawrence read
Freud.2 In fact, he is only definitively known to have read one book on the subject, Jung’s
Psychology of the Unconscious (1912).3 Still, with characteristic Lawrencian brazenness, he
went ahead and composed his own dissertation on psychoanalysis, a new psychology, and the
result was a pair of monographs, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (1921) and Fantasia of
the Unconscious (1922). In these books, Lawrence establishes his own theory of the death drive,
one that both echoes and diverges from Jung, Freud, and their common source, Sabina
Spielrein’s “Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being” (1912; translated into English
1994). He advocates for what he calls “blood knowledge” over “mental knowledge,” for instinct
over intellect, and he argues that destruction and conflict are the necessary conditions of both
personal and cultural rebirth, from the boy who must maintain “continually increasing cleavage”
from his mother in order to achieve individuality to the poisoned civilization that must purge or
self-destruct in order to heal.4 Thus, while remaining committed to the hollow treatment given
scientific rationalism and its explanation of suicide in Galsworthy, Ford, Joyce, and Woolf,
Lawrence differs from these predecessors in his turn to mysticism, placing his work in a peculiar
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strain of modernism that looked for inspiration in a half-constructed, half-remembered vision of
mythology and the supernatural to which Yeats and his postwar Vision (1925) also belong.
In the following chapter, I will begin by outlining Lawrence’s relationship to
psychoanalysis in order to make the case that blood knowledge, the force that motivates Gerald
Crich’s suicide in Women in Love (1920), is in part a reconfiguration of the death drive. I will
then argue that, read in terms of blood knowledge, both the devastation of World War I and the
suicide of Gerald represent not the endpoint of civilization but the possibility of its restoration.
Suicide is understood in mythological rather than psychological terms, and Gerald’s selfdestruction is consequently a microcosm, a manifestation of the death drive that presages cultural
resurrection.5 I conclude that Lawrence is in fact championing the drive, enacting the kind of
regression that Freud describes. For Lawrence, then, the gap between what the suicide knows
and what the observer infers—the epistemological question, courtesy of Jean Améry, that has
informed this dissertation—is an afterthought. He has little interest in the psychological
mechanisms of the individual or in what Andrew Bennett calls “the lived experience … of
suicide.”6 Instead, interpreting suicide becomes akin to the ancient Roman practice of
anthropomancy, or divination by entrails.

Lawrence and Psychoanalysis
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Admittedly, Lawrence would have learned a great deal about psychoanalysis
secondhand.7 His wife, Frieda, had had an affair with Otto Gross, who convinced her that she
was the “Woman of the Future,” a title that came with the sexual freedom to sleep with
whomever she pleased, including, as it turned out, Lawrence.8 When the pair boarded for
Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) in 1922—this is the trip that would culminate in Frieda’s
confession of their affair to her husband, Ernest Weekley—she was carrying Gross’ letters in her
luggage.9 So intellectually promiscuous a thinker as Lawrence could surely not resist asking
about Gross’ work, at least in how it pertained to his relationship with Frieda and if only to
disparage it. Lawrence also met Ernest Jones, the President of the British Psycho-Analytical
Society and Freud’s first biographer. He was friends with David and Edith Eder, two early
British psychoanalysts, even asking David for medical help when he felt “maudlin” and “very
limp and weed-like” in April 1915.10 And he had a particularly fruitful epistolary relationship
with Edith’s sister, Barbara Low, whose term “Nirvana principle” Freud cited when first defining
his own “pleasure principle.”11 In his first published letter to her, he expresses a shared purpose:
“We must revolutionise this system of life, that is based on outside things, money, property, and
establish a system of life which is based on inside things” (emphasis in original).12 He even
7
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described her as a sort of secret sharer: “You are one of the very few people who listen to me.”
In their letters and conversations, he was no doubt exposed to Freudian ideas, even if, as he often
did, he misheard or deliberately misunderstood them to suit his own polemical purposes. His
theology was always syncretic, but sometimes he just needed punching bags.
In any case, Freud would have reached Lawrence with or without his personal
connections. When he announced on January 7, 1915 that he was splitting his “unwieldy” book
into two volumes—The Rainbow (1915) would now be followed by Women in Love—
psychoanalysis was at its peak influence in Britain.13 Only six months earlier, Leonard Woolf
reviewed the first English version of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901; translated
into English 1914), writing, “There can be no doubt that there is a substantial amount of truth in
the main thesis of Freud’s book, and that truth is of great value.”14 Woolf, of course, would
eventually publish James Strachey’s translations of Freud with Virginia at the Hogarth Press.
His review was published two weeks after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and the onset
and protraction of World War I seemed to vindicate much of the psychoanalytic
Weltanschauung. In their meticulous study of his influence in England, John Forrester and Laura
Cameron argue that after the war “Freud became ‘Freud,’ a dark figure of yearning and
disappointment who presided over the destruction of illusions about human virtue” (103).

is very beautiful here. We shall have a nice snug room for you. When are you coming? … When does
your holiday begin? Your room will be ready for you. You will be quite a princess, a whole house to
yourself. We shall have a happy time, I am sure. We want you to come” (ibid. 624). It is worth pointing
out that Freud developed similar feverish attachments to and then feverish repulsions from his intellectual
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Lawrence himself was no stranger to such disappointment and gloom, telling Low in May
1916, “The war, the approaching conscription, the sense of complete paltriness and chaotic
nastiness in life, really robs one of speech … I feel I cannot touch humanity, even in thought, it is
abhorrent to me” (emphasis in original).15 Accurately or not, such misanthropy was regularly
attributed to psychoanalysis. In his autobiography, Kingsley Martin, the editor of the New
Statesman between 1930 and 1960, explicitly links World War I and Freud with a kind of
universal postlapsarianism:
As I read accounts of Cambridge undergraduates before 1914, I see that they took
an improvement in society for granted. In one way or another, despite all the
temporary troubles, society would grow better. The war—and Freud—had killed
any such optimism.16
The index of the book even lists a subcategory for Freud: “destruction of optimism” (214).17
With nineteen million dead and twenty-three million wounded, postwar Europe served as fertile
ground for a theory that both man and mankind were engaged in suicidal behavior. Freud, the
“dark figure of yearning and disappointment,” was the ideal candidate to address what force was
motivating this cultural and personal self-destruction.
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Hence, Lawrence may have looked at Freud—a misunderstood prophet, a destroyer of
sexual illusions, a gadfly to lingering Victorian repression—and seen something of a kindred
spirit. These were all roles he would someday assume himself, both with enthusiasm and
reluctance. Like Freud, the war had soured Lawrence and turned him apocalyptic, and in Women
in Love he establishes a causal relationship between the devastation of Europe and the sexual and
spiritual decay of its people. And while both would also present an image of positive, healthy
sexuality—in Lawrence’s case of personal evolution through the clash of “male” and “female”
temperament—their work was frequently mistaken for pornography.18 After the publication of
The Rainbow, for example, The Star called for its prosecution and even tied its “unnamable and
unthinkable ugliness” to the casualties from the continent:
A thing like The Rainbow has no right to exist in the wind of war … The young men who are
dying for liberty are moral beings. They are the living repudiation of such impious denials of life
as The Rainbow. The life they lay down is a lofty thing. It is not the thing that creeps and crawls
in this novel.19
On a more fundamental level, Lawrence and Freud shared similar work practices and a
common view of human character. Both revised endlessly, more in successive books than in
successive drafts, and like many modernists they often shamelessly borrowed from others.20
Both believed man was essentially bisexual at a time when the culture considered all forms of
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queerness disorders.21 More broadly, both rejected the popular understanding of the modern
subject. In one of his most-quoted letters, Lawrence objects to his mentor Edward Garnett’s
tepid response to “The Wedding Ring,” which would eventually become The Rainbow, writing,
“You mustn’t look in my novel for the old stable ego of the character. There is another ego,
according to whose action the individual is unrecognizable, and passes through, as it were,
allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we’ve been used to exercise, to discover
are states of the same single radically-unchanged element.”22 His biographer Mark KinkeadWeekes defines the “stable ego” here as “the idea of the human being as self-determining by will
and choice”—precisely the idea Freud was resisting himself. After all, what was psychoanalysis
other than the elucidation of “another ego,” the unconscious? Allotropes are elements that occur
in two or more structurally different forms, such as carbon, which can form both diamonds and
graphite. For Lawrence, character itself is allotropic, shaped by competing forces, not unlike the
dualistic libido and death drive.23 Were he a less independent or a less stubborn thinker, then,
Lawrence might have taken his martyrdom and run into the theoretical arms of Freud.
Instead, he responded with geysers of hostility. When Low sent him Alfred Booth
Kuttner’s “Sons and Lovers: A Freudian Appreciation,” Lawrence was apoplectic, howling, “My
poor book: it was, as art, a fairly complete truth: so they carve a half lie out of it, and say ‘Viola.’
Swine!”24 Surely he could not have been surprised. An Oedipal reading of Paul and Gertrude
Morel must have proved irresistible to contemporary readers. He had himself told Garnett,
These sons are urged into life by their reciprocal love of their mother—urged on
and on. But when they come to manhood, they can’t love, because their mother is
21

Lawrence made one exception: “I can think of no being in the world so transcendently male as Shelley.
He is phenomenal. The rest of us have bodies which contain the male and the female” (71). Thomas
Hardy, 71.
22
Lawrence, Letters II, 183.
23
This is also why gender essentialism is so attractive to him.
24
Lawrence, Letters II, 655.

154

the strongest power in their lives and holds them … The son loves the mother—
all the sons hate and are jealous of the father (emphasis in original).25
Yet he’s surprised that a reader might think the book “bears such expected witness to the truth of
Freud’s remarkable psycho-sexual theory”?26 Under the circumstances, it’s a rather tepid thesis.
Perhaps the overlap between their ideas was responsible for such resentment and denial—even
Frieda saw that Paul was a “sort of Oedipus.”27
But Lawrence was fiercely defensive of his originality: in his manifesto Study of Thomas
Hardy (written 1914; published 1936 and 1938), the word “new” and its derivatives appear fifty
times, including eleven times on a single page.28 He was motivated, therefore, to draw the lines
of distinction. In the first place, Lawrence considers complexes “vicious half-statements of the
Freudians,” and the “Mutter-complex” in particular rudimentary, insufficient: “a complex is not
simply a sex relation.”29 As for psychoanalysts themselves: “Chuck ’em all overboard.” They
are “the medicine-men of our decadent society” out “to do away entirely with the moral faculty
in man,” their arguments are “[n]othing but a huge slimy serpent of sex, and heaps of excrement,
and a myriad repulsive little horrors spawned between sex and excrement” (7,8, 9). He even
suspected that in order to “solidify their windy theory of the unconscious,” Freudians would
pilfer from his Studies in Classic American Literature (1923).30 Quoting Psalms 34:14 as if he
were her spiritual leader, Lawrence wrote to Low, “Depart from evil and do good—I think
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analysis is evil.”31 Indeed, he often conceived of himself as a priest—he wrote that the future of
the novel lies in its assuming the place of the gospels—and there is a sense here that Lawrence is
playing the part of a genuine messiah fending off a false prophecy.32 In print he was no more
forgiving than in his letters. “They have crept in among us as healers and physicians,” he writes
in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, in a tone of hushed conspiracy, “growing bolder, they
have asserted their authority as scientists; two more minutes and they will appear as apostles.”
Yet apostle is precisely the role he is playing.
Considering this position, the books that follow are somewhat baffling for their virtually
flawless rehearsal of Freud’s family drama. For Lawrence, man “recognizes the fact that his
emotional, even passional, regard for his mother is deeper than it ever could be for a wife …
[and] he knows that passional communion is not complete unless it be also sexual” (13). “[O]ne
parent, usually the mother, is the object of blind devotion, whilst the other parent, usually the
father, is an object of resistance” (143). This is “a sort of incest … [a] dynamic spiritual incest”
(144), but it is physical, too, and “the intense pure love-relation between parent and child
inevitably arouses the lower centers in the child, the centres of sex” (145; emphasis in original).
It all culminates in his portrait of a happy couple:
If you want to see the real desirable wife-spirit, look at a mother with her boy of
eighteen. How she serves him, how she stimulates him, how her true female self
is his, is wife-submissive to him as never, never it could be to a husband. This is
the quiescent, flowering love of a mature woman. It is the very flower of a
woman’s love: sexually asking nothing, asking nothing of the beloved, save that
he shall be himself, and that for his living he shall accept the gift of her love.
(149)
Even without reading, say, The Interpretation of Dreams (1899; translated into English 1913),
Lawrence must have known how much he was parroting of Freud. This is in fact an Oedipal
31
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struggle with the Oedipus complex, complete with theoretical patricide. Early in Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious, Lawrence writes, as if baiting his reader to raise an objection, that “a
mother seems gratified, and is gratified, inevitably, by the excremental functioning of her child”
(28; emphasis in original). Heaps of excrement and a huge slimy serpent of sex, indeed.
In any case, the only sustained exposure Lawrence had to psychoanalysis was through
Jung, and he appreciated Psychology and the Unconscious enough to send it along to Katherine
Mansfield.33 With his mythological inclinations, his rejection of the Oedipus complex, and his
own Oedipal break from a man he once addressed as “the father,” Jung held obvious appeal for
Lawrence.34 In Psychology of the Unconscious, Jung redefines the libido as “all the unknown
and countless manifestations of the Will in the sense of Schopenhauer,” which would have
satisfied Lawrence’s frustration with the psychoanalytic reduction of all interactions to sex.35
Indeed, his own definition of sex as “the fountain head, where life bubbles up into the person
from the unknown” hews much closer to Jung’s Will than Freud’s libido.36
Most importantly for our purposes, it was through Jung that Lawrence was exposed to
Spielrein’s concept of destruction as the necessary condition of creation, which Freud would
develop into the death drive and Lawrence into blood knowledge. Naturally, the point of entry
for Jung is mythological. At the river Styx, death and life are conflated, and man wishes “that
the black water of death might be the water of life; that death, with its cold embrace, might be
the mother’s womb” (245). In Christian legend, the crucifix is transformed into the tree of life,
and in “psychologic thought … death is interpreted as entrance into the mother’s womb” (269).
For the adolescent, the arrival of sexuality augurs the death of childhood, and ultimately “the
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highest summit of life is expressed through the symbolism of death … for creation beyond one’s
self means personal death,” as the “coming generation is the end of the preceding one” (320).
Jung argues for a cyclical model of nature which positions death as the beginning of new life, a
necessary condition for rebirth. He also reiterates Spielrein’s suggestion that creation, or
procreation, is essentially suicidal in demanding the “personal death” of the creator.
Lawrence had been toying with similar ideas even before he read Jung in December
1918.37 The fluidity between life and death and the conception of time as cyclical rather than
linear permeated his reading in Frazer and Blavatsky.38 In Study of Thomas Hardy, two years
after Spielrein published “Destruction,” Lawrence attributes progress to a drive toward selfexpression and stasis to one toward self-preservation. Like Spielrein, he associates selfpreservation with stagnation and death, self-expression with death and rebirth. In our current
condition, we are “sealed in our own self-preservation as dying chrysalides,” dying because we
remain chrysalides, because we choose the self-preserving safety of the cocoon over the selfexpressive rebirth outside the cocoon (16). Rather than the machine life of modernity, Lawrence
advocates for “real, utter satisfaction,” which requires the subject to give themselves over “to
complete quivering uncertainty, to sentient non-knowledge” (35). He will later term this “blood
knowledge,” an embrace of the primitive over the civilized, a religion of sensation rather than
intellect.39 For Lawrence, suicide is one means of achieving blood knowledge: “let us tip-cat
with death,” he writes of the war, “let us rush throwing our lives away” (16). Then, “at any rate
we shall have a sensation—and ‘perhaps,’ after all, the value of life is in death.” Tip-cat is a
baseball-like game, so Lawrence is here evoking an image of bodies being knocked one after
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another into the trenches. His contemporaries, of course, would read this as a tragedy, but
Thomas Hardy suggests that the mass suicide of World War I may in fact be a form of
destructive creation, a sort of communal shock that jump-starts our relationship with blood
knowledge. We must lose our lives to save them; we must die to be reborn. One implication of
such a theology is that suicide, robbed of its finality, becomes a generative act. Resurrection is
born in the ashes of our combustion.
Seven years later, and after reading Psychology of the Unconscious, Lawrence begins
Fantasia with the argument that the process of individuation requires a rent or rupture, “the
individual asserting himself beyond all ties or claims” (77). This assertion, in its destruction of a
shared consciousness for the purpose of creating a separate subject, mutilates both parent and
child. In a broader context, it takes on larger significance: when a tree puts forth
new green tips … each new tip arises out of the apparent death of the old, the
preceding one. Old leaves have got to fall, old forms must die … And dead
leaves make good mold. And so dead men. (189)
At his most fanciful, Lawrence writes that death was the condition required for the creation of
the cosmos: “out of the death of living creatures, when their little living bodies fell dead and fell
asunder into all sorts of matter and forces and energies, sun, moons, stars and worlds,”
punctuating with wry concision, “So you got the universe” (70). For Lawrence, modern man is
singing his swan song, but instead of a healthy self-destruction, he is condemned to perish by
“this ghastly white disease of self-conscious idealism”—that is, mental knowledge. This disease
has arrested the civilizational cycle of destruction and rebirth, and the solution for Lawrence is in
rejecting self-consciousness for blood knowledge, “that other reality, our own true spontaneous
self” (118).
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The connection to suicide is now explicit: “men with any backbone would rather kill
themselves than go on with it—or kill somebody else.” This choice will be borne out Women in
Love, which has Gerald attempting to murder Gudrun before committing suicide, but for the
purpose of intergenerational evolution, blood knowledge demands mass destruction. According
to this logic, the “war was really not a bad beginning,” if not for the fact that it was fought
“under the banners of idealism,” and furthermore that it ended, forcing the British home again to
“the virus … rotting their very souls” (118). Along with his curt dismissal of the war dead
(“And so dead man”), the casual tone here emphasizes that a Lawrencian vision of history, and
of suicide, is bereft of any affective and phenomenological concerns. He is comfortable with
mass violence so long as it triggers a return to man’s primitive focus on physicality and
spontaneity over hesitant intellectualism.
This constitutes a crucial difference between Lawrence’s death drive and that of Freud.
For Freud, the death drive was a symptom produced by the disease of life—it was never the cure.
For example, when Paul Fussell made much the same argument as Lawrence in The Great War
and Modern Memory (1975), claiming that upper-class soldiers entered the trenches under a
collective nihilistic will to self-destruction, there is no mistaking this as anything but
pathology.40 Lawrence, on the other hand, would make mulch of the charnel. He, like Spielrein,
Jung, Freud, sees destruction as the cause of creation, but his focus and concern is with the
creative outcome, not the destructive condition of that outcome.41 In his introduction to
Lawrence’s books on psychoanalysis, Bruce Steele writes that one of Lawrence’s primary
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quarrels with the discipline rested in its “view of the human person derived from illness and
disorder, not from health or wholeness as he believed it should” (xxx). The same is true of their
positions on death and self-destruction. The difference is not substantial but perspectival. What
Freud saw as illness, Lawrence saw as health. Where Freud saw modern pathology, Lawrence
saw something like an ancient, primitivist, and cyclical rite of history, one that offered humanity
potential salvation. For Lawrence, the pathology was in choosing life and mental knowledge
over blood knowledge and suicide.

The Gospel of the Death Drive
His fictional explorations of the subject began contemporaneously with Thomas Hardy.
Only a few months into the war, Lawrence wrote “Ecce Homo,” published in 1915 in Harriet
Shaw Weaver’s The Egoist as “Eloi, Eloi, Lama Sabachthani?”42 The energetic, repetitive, and
overflowing prosody recalls Walt Whitman, the poem itself is a kind of deathly “Song of
Myself” (1855), which Lawrence would later write about in Studies in Classic American
Literature (1923). The speaker begins, “How I hate myself, this body which is me,” lamenting
that self-mutilation and self-destruction remain prohibited by law, “for it is written against me I
must … preserve my life from hurt” (1, 5-6).43 Still, the war provides him with solace, as it is a
mass self-destruction that serves as relief in the wake of his own frustrated suicide: “how glad I
am to hear the shells / … That gives me peace” (9, 15). For his own death, the speaker finds a
circuitous route: “I kill my shadow’s shadow of me!” (25). In other words, he heads to the
trenches, where he finds his double in a German soldier. Rather than killing himself, he kills the
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German. But since he sees no difference between brother and enemy, between self and other, the
murder is a sublimated suicide: his shadow’s shadow is, of course, himself. Lawrence has
therefore reversed Freud’s formula in “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917; translated into
English 1925): rather than explaining suicide as the murderous impulse directed inward, he sees
murder as the suicidal impulse directed outward. The ethos of blood knowledge is clear: better
to kill oneself rather than remain shackled to a body that is “agony” (18). However, since the
law—the fruits of mental knowledge—prohibits suicide, the trenches are his best recourse.
Of course, the murder is also a sexual act. The penis and bayonet are figured
interchangeably, their meanings as generative and destructive objects likewise conflated:
Like a bride he took my bayonet, wanting it,
Like a virgin the blade of my bayonet, wanting it,
And it sank to rest from me in him,
And I, the lover, am consummate,
And he is the bride, I have sown him with the seed
And planted and fertilized him. (37-42)44
The encounter reads like a rape, notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—the speaker’s refrainlike insistence on his virgin bride “wanting it.” For Lawrence, this type of assault provides the
metaphorical confluence of destructive and creative impulses: it is a violence that can result in a
child, a murder as well as fertilization.45 Incidentally, consummation is a word Lawrence also
uses indiscriminately in Women in Love to describe both sex and violence.46 In any case, the
speaker finally asks, “What I beget, must I beget of blood? / Are the guns and the steel the
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bridegroom, / Our flesh the bride?” (55-7). His transformation from bridegroom to bride
suggests that, in additional to his metaphorical suicide through the murder of the German, he will
have an opportunity for literal suicide in the arms of another soldier.
Thus, on a psychological level, the war offers death to anyone who wants it: in the
speaker’s mind, his penetration of the German soldier is an assisted suicide. But on a global
scale, this accumulation of suicides is precisely the kind of mass self-destruction necessary for
spiritual rebirth: “Eloi, Eloi” ends with the speaker walking the “earth … Cleansed and in
concord from the bed of death” (92, 96). The titles, both references to Christ, suggest
martyrdom, or suicide for the purpose of resurrection. Christ, of course, was one of Spielrein’s
examples of the death drive at work in mythology, and in his letters, Lawrence likewise posed as
a Christ figure, the war his crucifixion. Four months before the publication of “Eloi, Eloi,” he
wrote to Lady Cynthia Asquith,
And now, I feel very sick and corpse-cold, too newly risen to share yet with […]
anybody, having the smell of the grave in my nostrils, and a feel of grave clothes
about me. The [declaration of] War finished me: it was the spear through the side
of all sorrows and hopes … All the while, I swear, my soul lay in the tomb—not
dead, but with the flat stone over it, a corpse, become corpse cold … And all the
time I knew I should have to rise again.47
Even in his blackest moods, Lawrence implies a sense of hope through the comparison to Christ:
despite Longinus, despite burial, he will rise again. “Ecce Homo,” the original title, are Pontius
Pilate’s words after Christ’s flagellation, translated in the King James Version as “Behold the
man” (John 19:5). “Eloi, Eloi, Lama Sabachthani?” is closer to death, from Psalm 22:1: “My
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” In the immediate aftermath of the Marne, of
Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, “Eloi, Eloi” appropriately emphasizes doubt and despair.

47

Lawrence, Letters II, 267-9.

163

But by Women in Love, Lawrence’s position was firmer and more optimistic.
He was unsettled by the novel. “The book frightens me: it is so end-of-the-world,” he
wrote to the novelist Catherine Carswell. “But it is, it must be, the beginning of a new world
too.”48 This now-familiar cycle of devastation followed by rehabilitation—Birkin will call it
“the blood of destructive creation”—courses through the novel (172). For example, when Birkin
discusses the concept of blood knowledge with Ursula, he continually emphasizes selfdestruction as its precondition:
It is death to one self—but it is the coming into being of another … You’ve got to
lapse out before you can know what sensual reality is, lapse into unknowingness,
and give up your volition … You’ve got to learn not-to-be, before you can come
into being. (43-4)
This, of course, is an elephantine allusion to literary suicide, and by the end of the novel, Gerald
will enact Birkin’s “death to one self” and follow Hamlet into voluntary death.49 Later, Birkin
will please Ursula with the “pleasant fantasy” of an apocalypse, which he, like the speaker in
“Eloi, Eloi,” views as a cleansing: “If only man was swept off the face of the earth, creation
would go on so marvellously, with a new start … If only he were gone again, think what lovely
things would come out of the liberated days; things straight out of the fire” (128). Once again,
Lawrence employs a phoenix-adjacent metaphor, as in Thomas Hardy, when he asks, “Can I not
be born again, save out of my own ashes, save in resurrection from the dead?” (80). By the time
Birkin tells Gudrun, “If we are the end, we are not the beginning,” she is fluent enough in his
philosophy—and at this point, frankly, so are we—to reply, “The beginning comes out of the
end” (173). Following the heavy-handed tactics of a polemicist, Lawrence rehearses this form of
transformation, of rebirth in the wake of death, over and over in Women in Love.
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Apocalypse, ashes, death—all are on full display in the opening pages of the novel. After
only a few paragraphs, the Brangwen sisters find themselves “confronted by a void, a terrifying
chasm” (10). This is the first appearance of void in Women in Love, a word that will be used
thirty-four more times before the novel is through. Off the main road, “past a black patch of
common-garden … sooty cabbage stumps stood shameless.” To Gudrun, their country is “an
underworld,” or an underworld carried to the surface, since “colliers bring it above-ground with
them, shovel it up.” The second image evokes trench warfare and its scarring of the French
landscape, while the first reminds us that our common inheritance has been fouled by
mechanization and modernity. Allied victory has arrested any spiritual progress the war made in
providing an outlet for an embrace of blood knowledge and the death drive. Cabbage stumps,
denoting the “portion of the trunk of a felled tree,” also suggest the word’s primary definition as
the “part remaining of an amputated or broken-off limb,” an image commonly associated with
Great War veterans (OED). Nature, like man, has emerged from Versailles disfigured,
enervated.
For Gudrun, it is all a Platonic shadow: “Everything is a ghoulish replica of the real
world,” she tells Ursula, “a replica, a ghoul, all soiled, everything sordid.” Even in “the purer
country of the other side” (12), that is, at the upper-class wedding the sisters watch from a
distance, each of the attendees looks “like a character in a book, or a subject in a picture, or a
marionette in a theatre, a finished creation” (14). The colliers, like the Tommies, have been
reduced to a function in a machine—a consequence of Gerald’s rationalism—but even the bright
young things of Willey Green seem to follow a script. For Lawrence, who holds spontaneity as
sacred, such automatism is the nadir of modernity. Gudrun’s solution, at least, is simple: “She
would have liked them all annihilated, cleared away, so that the world was left clear for her”
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(13).50 Her words can sound harsh or nihilistic to a reader unfamiliar with Lawrence’s nonfiction, but in light of Fantasia and Thomas Hardy this represents a shimmer of possibility—
recall that the “war was really not a bad beginning.” What Lawrence is writing, then, is not glum
mimesis, or baggy-eyed fatalism, but the first panel in a triptych that ends with resurrection—
Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly Delights (c.1490-1510) in reverse. Like the Bosch, the middle
panel, the in-between state, the process of transformation, draws most of Lawrence’s interest.
What might the middle panel look like? Fortunately, Lawrence has provided us with
both a mouthpiece, Rupert Birkin, and a case study, Gerald Crich, a veteran of “the last war”
(64). Birkin’s philosophy is helpfully outlined in a letter he writes to an indiscreet acquaintance,
Halliday, who amuses himself by reading it aloud to friends in a much-cited example of
Lawrence’s ability to satirize his own proclamation-prone style.51 Still, even in humor Lawrence
plays the earnest prophet, and like a Trojan horse, the proclamation enters the narrative
nonetheless, hidden inside his self-deprecation:
There is a phase in every race … when the desire for destruction overcomes every
other desire. In the individual, this desire is ultimately a desire for destruction in
the self … It is a desire for the reduction-process in oneself, a reducing back to
the origin … to the original rudimentary conditions of being … And in the great
retrogression, the reducing back of the created body of life, we get knowledge,
and beyond knowledge, the phosphorescent ecstasy of acute sensation. (383)
This is the Lawrencian death drive, largely recycled from Fantasia but more coherent in its
revision. He links suicide to a larger, racial desire for destruction, one that yields blood
knowledge, a knowledge that transcends mental knowledge, “the phosphorescent ecstasy of
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acute sensation.” It is like Wordsworth’s dictum arrested mid-sentence: Lawrence is looking
simply for “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” recollection and tranquility be
damned. The great retrogression is the creature reaching “full achievement of itself”—returning
to a pre-mental state, the human becomes conscious on a level that privileges physicality over
thought, sensation over reflection. For Lawrence, the suicide, the person who desires
“destruction in the self,” is a component or even a microcosm of a larger restorative effort, “the
reducing back of the created body of life” that leads to blood knowledge. The connection,
perhaps, is inevitable: does any human action privilege pure sensation over intellectual
knowledge more than suicide—and could any serve Lawrence better as a metaphor for the mass
destruction that was necessary to usher in a messianic resurrection?
Suicide as restoration: the argument is Lawrencian, but it is also Freudian. Despite his
reading in Jung, and Jung’s source in Spielrein, it is actually Beyond the Pleasure Principle that
Women in Love most resembles. This short book was written after but published before
Lawrence’s novel, and its thesis is pressing enough to appear in italics: there is “an urge inherent
in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces” (43). For Freud, it naturally follows
that this state must be actual rather than imaginative, a “state from which the living entity has at
one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return” (45). There is only one such state
or one possible endpoint to a series of regressions: therefore, again in italics, “the aim of all life
is death” (46).
Up to this point, Lawrence and Freud more or less agree. Both have identified a human
urge toward self-destruction that manifests in both the individual and the culture at large. Freud,
however, was not an advocate for suicide or for the indiscriminate killing of large numbers of
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people. He identified the death drive as a psychological and even a cultural phenomenon, but he
didn’t become a partisan for it. Lawrence did—and Women in Love is a new testament, the
gospel of the death drive. In Freudian terms, that means Lawrence is enacting rather than just
chronicling the drive—he is indulging the urge, all the while transcribing the experience as best
he can. Granted, Lawrence would see it differently: from his perspective, Women in Love
advocates for a large-scale transformation that transcends ethical objections to the deaths of men
or to the suicide of an individual. Thus, he is relieving the pressure of life’s external disturbing
forces in order to begin a process of restoration to “the original rudimentary conditions of being,”
conditions whose value far exceeds their cost. Gerald, a veteran of the war and accordingly
familiar with an embrace of the death drive, continues the conversation that began in “Eloi,
Eloi.” He commits suicide as a gesture toward an apocalyptic and blood-soaked spiritual
cleansing.
Early in the novel, Gerald is examining the art in Halliday’s rooms and sees something of
a self-reflection:
[T]here were several negro statues, wood-carvings from West Africa, strange and
disturbing, the carved negroes looked almost like the foetus of a human being.
One was of a woman sitting naked in a strange posture, and looking tortured, her
abdomen stuck out. The young Russian explained that she was sitting in
childbirth, clutching the ends of the band that hung from her neck, one in each
hand, so that she could bear down, and help labour. The strange, transfixed,
rudimentary face of the woman again reminded Gerald of a foetus, it was also
rather wonderful, conveying the extreme of physical sensation, beyond the limits
of mental consciousness. (74)
The inspiration is assuredly primitivist, and the recognition of the self in the other is a trope that
did not originate with Lawrence; it is, after all, the premise of Heart of Darkness (1899). Be that
as it may, Lawrence did spend much of his life searching for a reality that would match his
imagined version of the primitive, ultimately finding disappointment in the real people he met in
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Australia, the United States, and Mexico. For Lawrence, ancient, non-European religions better
understood blood knowledge than the spiritually-emaciated Europeans of the twentieth century.
Like Picasso in painting, he invents an image of West Africa, a region he never visited, to suit
his artistic and polemical needs. Specifically, the statue’s mixture of life and death forces—of
childbirth and torture, of the shared prenatal development of the fetus and postpartum
individuation of the mother—offers Gerald an image of creation through self-mutilation. The
mother is herself a fetus, which further undermines the Whig narrative against which Lawrence
is writing: history is not linear but cyclical, something suggested even in her posture, in the
semicircular, crescent moon shape she assumes while bearing down for labor. As it happens, this
is the same image Lawrence uses for Anton Skrebensky, Ursula’s beau in The Rainbow, who
dies “curled in the deepest darkness he could find,” and whose death liberates Ursula and is
immediately followed by her restorative vision of the rainbow as “a living fabric of Truth, fitting
to the over-arching heaven.”52
Gerald is disgusted—“[Y]ou can’t call it high art”—but Birkin assures him it represents
“[p]ure culture in sensation, culture in the physical consciousness, really ultimate physical
consciousness, mindless, utterly sensual. It is so sensual as to be final, supreme” (79; emphasis
in original). Birkin is clearly enthusiastic, but he is also reminding us of the death that comes
with blood knowledge, linking “physical consciousness” with words like ultimate, final, and
supreme. Later, during another of his lectures, Birkin says, “the West Africans, controlled by the
burning death-abstraction of the Sahara, had been fulfilled in sun-destruction, the putrescent
mystery of sun-rays,” whereas the “white races, having the arctic north behind them, the vast
abstraction of ice and snow, would fulfil a mystery of ice-destructive knowledge, snow-abstract
52
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annihilation (254). Significantly, the West Africans have already fulfilled their divine purpose,
while the “white races” are still awaiting their transformation—“us awful whites with our
machines,” as he later wrote to Harriet Monroe.53 Lawrence makes it patently clear whom he has
nominated to represent them, and in the novel’s conclusion, he will use Gerald’s suicide in the
Alps as an illustration of snow-abstract annihilation.
To begin, consider the avalanche of metaphors he uses to introduce Gerald. In the
opening scene of the novel, Gudrun identifies “something northern” about him that “magnetised
her,” a pun on the arctic poles. His hair has “a glisten like cold sunshine refracted through
crystals,” his look is “new, unbroached, pure as an arctic thing” (14). She can’t identify his
age—perhaps he is thirty, perhaps older—and he kindles a feeling of “nostalgia” in her (15).
This apparent contradiction—new and unbroached but timeless and an object of nostalgia—can
only be reconciled if new and old are synonyms, as they would be under this cyclical model of
history. Gerald is new because he embodies what is to come, and he is old because, according to
Lawrence’s prophecy, a revival of the old is precisely what’s coming. Flip forward two hundred
pages and you find Birkin similarly rapt:
He was one of these strange white wonderful demons from the north, fulfilled in
the destructive frost mystery. And was he fated to pass away in this knowledge,
this one process of frost-knowledge, death by perfect cold? Was he a messenger,
an omen of the universal dissolution into whiteness and snow? (254)54
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The answer, considered in light of his ultimate death, is unmistakable. When Gerald and Gudrun
finally consummate their relationship—the scene will encompass both Lawrence’s meanings of
the word—he will remind her of “an apparition, the young Hermes” (343). Like that messenger
of the gods, who travelled between the worlds of the mortal and the divine, Gerald bears at least
one message himself: his suicide, a herald of the destruction that resurrection demands. In an
unkind moment, Lawrence wrote that the poet Richard Barham Middleton “only really expressed
himself once—when he killed himself.”55 Gerald’s suicide is another such expression, another
dramatic break from an otherwise unremarkable life.56
Back in Halliday’s room, Gerald turns and notices “one or two new pictures in the room,
in the Futurist manner,” which along with “some ordinary London lodging-house furniture of the
better sort, completed the whole” (74). F.T. Marinetti, who in his “Manifesto of Futurism”
championed “the enthusiastic fervor of the primordial elements,” declared war “the only hygiene
of the world,” glorified “the destructive gesture of anarchists,” and fantasized about being
murdered by his successors, shares much common intellectual ground with Lawrence—and with
the Freud of Totem and Taboo (1913; translated into English 1918).57 Lawrence did admire the
Futurists’ passionate rejection of tradition (and he certainly shared their love of hyperbole), but
he ultimately found their solution, enthralled as it was by modernity, untenable. Three days
before effusing to Garnett about “another ego,” Lawrence wrote of the Futurists to Arthur
McLeod, “They will progress down the purely male or intellectual or scientific purpose”—in
other words, they are limited by mental knowledge or the “ultra-ultra intellectual.”58 To Garnett,
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he was blunter: “[T]he futurists are stupid … they will only look for the phenomena of the
science of physics to be found in human being.”59 By grouping their paintings with furniture “of
the better sort,” as just another commodity for the bohemian collector, Lawrence dismisses their
authenticity, their integrity, and therefore the truth value of their museum-razing message of
creation through destruction.60 He clearly favors the “strange and disturbing” statue, and in this
scene he stages the West African fulfillment of creative self-destruction confronting its northern
counterpart. Gerald has yet to approach the mystery of ice-destructive knowledge, but by the
end of the novel, as Charles L. Ross observes, he will be “frozen into a northern fetish statue.”61
First, however, he must undergo a symbolic transformation in “Death and Love,” a
chapter with a title that syntactically couples the opposing forces of destruction and creation,
ordering love as succeeding death and hinting at its generative potential. True to its name,
“Death and Love” prepares the reader for Gerald’s suicide by metaphorically rehearsing his
regression, death, and rebirth. When his father finally succumbs to his long illness, Gerald feels
himself writhing “on the edge of the chasm, suspended in chains of invisible physical life” and
worries that he “could not fall into this infinite void, and rise again” (337). Nevertheless, this is
exactly what he does. Two days after the funeral, he is seized by some mysterious force,
stumbling and feeling his way through the woods “automatically” and “[w]ithout thought or
sensation” (338). This is not, however, the automatism of the colliers, but the transcendent
instinctiveness of blood knowledge—automatic in the sense of “self-generated, spontaneous”
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and “without conscious thought” rather than the antonymic “works by itself under fixed
conditions” (OED).
When he emerges from the darkness and the woods, he passes through an “outlet,” much
like a newborn (338).62 The destruction of the father has caused the rebirth of the man, who is
now attuned in proper Lawrencian manner to sensation rather than intellect. He descends into
the churchyard where his father is buried and, even in the darkness, sees “the heaped pallor of
old white flowers at his feet” and smells “a raw scent of chrysanthemums and tube-roses,
deadened” (338). Chrysanthemums and their scent had long symbolized death for Lawrence—
most notably in “Odour of Chrysanthemums” (1911)—but in Women in Love, flowers and
flowering take on a more complex meaning, symbolizing death as a precondition for life.63 At
the beginning of the novel, for example, Gerald’s sister arrives at her wedding in a carriage,
emerging from “a shower of fine foliage and flowers, a whiteness of satin and lace.”
Superficially, this appears to be a flurry of fertile imagery. But despite the restorative
associations of shower, a flower that is showering or falling is dying. Metaphors of life demand
literal death.64 Likewise, at the graveyard it is the smell of the chrysanthemums and tuberoses,
killed for the purpose of commemoration, that stun Gerald into action. Repulsed by their raw,
deadened scent, he turns to Gudrun, the source of his rebirth.65
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The journey to her home is one from darkness to light, a reflection of his own spiritual
enlightenment: he walks past “dark shops” and ends in “a field of darkness,” hesitating before
approaching her house as it, too, may be “closed in darkness” (340). But he has nothing to fear:
he soon sees “a big lighted window” and the door “shedding a soft, coloured light from the hall
lamp.” Inside, in a suggestion that he is communing with blood knowledge, he is described in
mystical terms that favor touch over thought: “Gerald stood a second suspended … His senses
were so finely, almost supernaturally keen, that he seemed to cast his own will over the halfunconscious house” (341). While “half-unconscious” refers to the sleeping residents, it also
applies to Gerald’s semi-somnambulant state: “With an almost occult carefulness … he seemed
to create a silence about himself, an obliviousness.” He is still motivated by will, but a will that
precedes and supersedes cognition. This is what Birkin described above as the need to “lapse
out before you can know what sensual reality is, lapse into unknowingness, and give up your
volition.” Gerald enters her brother’s room by accident—a nod to his recent failure to undergo
transformation through friendship with Birkin in “Gladiatorial”—and continues, once again,
toward a “door afar” and its “faint light.” Like a child being born, he is blind, deprived of all but
his “tactile sense … [f]eeling his way forward with the tips of his fingers” and relying on his
alert, “preternaturally fine senses” to find Gudrun’s bedroom (342).
Upon reaching her, “his outstretched hand touched her warm breast.” Sex heals him, and
frequently the pair are figured as mother and child. The following passage abounds in allusions
to the womb and amniotic fluid, to baptism and the creative fire of the phoenix:
[H]e was whole again … he plunged deeper into her enveloping soft warmth, a
wonderful creative heat that penetrated his veins and gave him life again. He felt
himself sinking to rest in a bath of her living strength … His blood, which seemed
to have been drawn back into death, came ebbing on the return, surely,
knowledge? Aren’t we exchanging the substance for the shadow, aren’t we forfeiting life for this dead
quantity of knowledge?” (41).
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beautifully, powerfully … He was a man again, strong and rounded. And he was
a child, so soothed and restored and full of gratitude … Mother and substance of
all life she was … [T]he miraculous, soft effluence of her breast suffused over
him … like a soft, soothing flow of life itself, perfect as if he were bathed in the
womb again. (344)
Once finished, “He buried his small, hard head between her breasts,” a sly coupling of death
(buried) and life (breasts) but also an indication that mental concerns, residing in the head, are
being laid to rest (345). Drained of Thanatos, he sleeps “the sleep of complete exhaustion and
restoration.”
However, there is a cost to this restoration, a victim of his rebirth. While still beside the
grave, a “dangerous resolve formed in his heart … he could get at her—he would get at her … if
it cost him his life” (339; emphasis in original). Like the bride and bridegroom in “Eloi, Eloi,”
the roles of murderer and murdered are shared by both partners: Gerald is willing to risk his life,
but the language more frequently suggests violence toward Gudrun. He drags the mud and clay
from the churchyard into her room—she worries he may have left footprints—and in a reversal
of the romantic cliché, “His heart did not beat” (342). His undressing sounds like “pistol-shots,”
the sex itself like a slow-motion bullet piercing her soul:
Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death … And she,
subject, received him as a vessel filled with his bitter poison of death … The
terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and she received it in an ecstasy of
subjection, in throes of acute, violent sensation. (344)
Thus, Gerald reaches blood knowledge at the price of condemning Gudrun to mental knowledge.
He lies in “perfect sleep” while she remains awake, “destroyed into perfect consciousness … an
exhausting super-consciousness” (345, 346). Worst of all, she is damned to “automatic
consciousness,” or the obsessive fixation on mental concerns: “all the happenings she had not
understood, pertaining to herself, to her family, to her friends, her lovers, her acquaintances,
everybody.” Her entire life. The man who once represented escape from the colliers’
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automatism has only achieved that freedom for himself. This is the death drive of “Eloi, Eloi,”
sublimated into a murderous impulse.
“Death and Love,” then, is just a dress rehearsal. “Snowed Up” is a live performance.
Lawrence begins the chapter with Gudrun and Loerke picnicking in the snow, sharing “some
mocking dream of the destruction of the world by a ridiculous catastrophe of man’s invention”
(453). This is the same dream that was shared by Birkin and Ursula, but here it is warped into
the replica Gudrun begins the novel condemning. It has become a fashionable bohemian
provocation rather than a sincere expression of the death drive. Gerald appears as if from
nowhere, at first seeming “a vague white figure,” a description that circles back to his first
appearance as “an arctic thing” (470). His voice sounds out “like a judgment in the whitish air of
twilight,” but when Loerke cries, “[Y]ou come like a ghost!” he does not answer. Living in the
liminal space between life and death, he is now a mixture of otherworldly apparition and
otherworldly silence.
One last time, Gerald and Gudrun play murderer and murdered: after he tosses aside
Loerke, she clenches her fist and brings it down on him. The violence stuns Gerald into
recognition: “Wide, wide his soul opened, in wonder, feeling the pain … at last to take the apple
of his desire” (471). The apple here evokes the fall of man, and Scott Sanders has made the
argument that Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1928) reads as “an inverted form of the Eden myth.”66
Much the same could be said of Women in Love: the novel is a restoration myth, one that pairs
sexuality and violence in a manner than demands death in return for spiritual resurrection.
Rather than “Adam and Eve … cast back into the garden,” it takes as its subject the force that
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casts them there (ibid.; emphasis in original). The cost of admission is blood, and Gerald’s
desire, for now, is to strangle Gudrun:
[H]e could feel the slippery chords of her life. And this he crushed, this he could
crush. What bliss! Oh what bliss, at last, what satisfaction, at last! … what a
god-given gratification, at last! He was unconscious of her fighting and
struggling. That struggling was her reciprocal lustful passion in this embrace, the
more violent it became, the greater the frenzy of delight, till the zenith was
reached, the crisis, the struggle was overborne, her movement became softer,
appeased. (471-2)
The scene overflows with erotic language. Rhythmically it mimics the choreography of sex,
beginning with longer sentences before turning to a series of staccato phrases culminating in a
“zenith.” Crisis was Lawrence’s favorite euphemism for an orgasm, which in and of itself
demonstrates how wrought with “struggle” he found the act.67 In order to achieve the spiritual
revelation sex offers, partners must first engage in a violent confrontation of opposing forces.
Consequently, orgasm and lifelessness are indistinguishable, Gudrun’s “softer, appeased”
movements ambiguous enough to indicate either the refractory period or unconsciousness.
While sex is always deathly, so too is death always sexual, creative. At first glance, for example,
the “slippery chords of her life” refer to Gudrun’s vocal cords. The spelling suggests otherwise.
Gerald’s murderous impulse, and the instrumentality of her body, her vocal “chords,” create a
kind of music. Creation as the fruits of destruction.
Like the speaker in “Eloi, Eloi,” Gerald turns his destructive instinct from other to self.
After the body has been found, Birkin interprets his suicide as a creative violence. He is,
admittedly, repulsed by Gerald’s body, “the frozen carcase of a dead male,” and his anatomical

67

See, for a later example, chapter one of Lady Chatterley’s Lover: “Certainly she could take him without
giving herself into his power. Rather she could use this sex thing to have power over him. For she had
only to hold herself back, in the sexual intercourse, and let him finish and expend himself without herself
coming to the crisis: and then she could prolong the connection and achieve her orgasm and her crisis
while he was merely a tool.” D.H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover and A Propos of ‘Lady
Chatterley’s Lover,’ ed. Michael Squires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7-8.

177

language mocks the paltry explanations of mental knowledge (480). Still, he is able to glimpse
the outline of divine purpose: “Whatever the mystery which has brought forth man and the
universe, it is a non-human mystery, it has its own great ends, man is not the criterion” (478).
Birkin has heard the suicide’s call. The death is like that of the mastodons: God is free to
dispense with any species that has “failed to creatively develop,” and why would this exclude
humans? In their place will rise new generations, “new races and new species,” perhaps even
“new forms of consciousness” (479).
Vibrating with such a consciousness, Gerald recreates his walk from the graveyard to
Gudrun’s bed in “Death and Love,” though this time the suicide is literal and the rebirth
unwritten. Again stumbling through the landscape, Gerald is driven to a single purpose: “[H]e
wanted to go on and on, to the end. Never again to stay, till he came to the end, that was all the
desire that remained to him” (472). Desire recalls “the apple of his desire,” reinforcing the sense
that, like the apple in this inverted Eden, his desire for death will lead to the creation of a new
world, ascended rather than fallen. Hence the mountain, which Gerald climbs spotting “the
vague shadow of something higher” and thinking to himself, “Always higher, always higher”
(473). The word unconscious, as in “unconsciously climbing” and even “he was not really
conscious,” peppers the final pages—as in “Death and Love,” Gerald is submitting to blood
knowledge and therefore his body has entered a trance-like state that has no use for mental
knowledge (472, 473). Gerald simply wants to “keep going, until it was finished.” His last
words are, “I’ve had enough—I want to go to sleep. I’ve had enough.” Sleep, earlier associated
with his restoration, has always served as a seductive euphemism for suicide, such as Edward’s
exit line in The Good Soldier (1915): “I must have a bit of a rest, you know.”68 In their final

68

Ford Madox Ford, The Good Soldier, ed. Martin Stannard (New York: Norton, 2012), 169.

178

moments, both Edward and Gerald borrow on the cadences of British modesty, but in the case of
the latter the speech is clear, unsentimental, and unambiguous. The death is, at least in part, selfwilled.
Still, Gerald is motivated by outside forces as well. The mountain he climbs, with “fallen
masses of rock and veins of snow slashing vaguely in and about,” echoes two common means of
suicide. Even the weather colludes with his underlying desire, and when he stands near a cliff,
“very much afraid of falling, very much afraid of falling … [there] moved a wind that almost
overpowered him with a sleep-heavy iciness” (473). Intuiting divine purpose, he knows he is
supposed to fall elsewhere: “Only it was not here, the end, he must still go on.” Like many a
prophet, he resists the suicidal martyrdom he has been assigned. In addition to his fear of falling,
Gerald dreads being murdered, and after strangling Gudrun, Lawrence’s free indirect discourse
asks, almost pleads, “Must he see, must he know?” (472). Ultimately, blood knowledge
overpowers mental knowledge, and we read that his dread is a kind that “stood outside him, like
his own ghost” (473). In fact, the chapter as a whole stands outside Gerald, too: his actions are
described in detail, but there are few references to affective states, despite the impending suicide.
In suspending his consciousness, Lawrence has also suspended his voice.
Regressing into animality, Gerald “slither[s] down a sheer snow-slope,” ignoring a
crucifix half-buried in the snow. Acting on advice from Bertrand Russell, Lawrence had decided
to give up on Christian language to express his philosophy, and Gerald appropriately fails to
reach the nearby Marienhütte, literally “Mary Hut.”69 Still, the half-buried cross mirrors his own
snowy martyrdom, which serves as a northern counterpart to Christ’s crucifixion. Gerald asks,
“Lord Jesus, was it then bound to be—Lord Jesus?” the phrasing of which allows for two
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possible readings: he could either be asking Christ if he is “bound” to his death, or he is asking
an unnamed, apostrophic subject if he is “bound to be—Lord Jesus.” In the theology of Women
in Love, the latter interpretation is plausible. But as the word slither suggests, Lawrence was
never himself bound to any single symbolic order, and the novel is also full of scientific
metaphor: “Characters appear as solids, liquids and gases; they are likened to mud, clay, steel,
radium and bronze,” writes Sanders, and “[u]nder the stress of violent emotions, persons tend to
dissolve into lumps of matter or lines of force, interacting by means of electricity, magnetism,
friction, radio-activity or gravitation” (100).
In these terms, Gerald’s suicide is not martyrdom but a transference of energy, which of
course is another form of destructive creation. As Spielrein reminds us, “During reproduction, a
union of female and male cells occur. The unity of each cell thus is destroyed and, from the
product of this destruction, new life originates.”70 Earlier in the novel, Birkin uses an older,
natural metaphor, claiming that “humanity never gets beyond the caterpillar stage—it rots in the
chrysalis,” paraphrasing his author’s argument in Thomas Hardy that we are “dying chrysalides,”
too afraid to leave our shells (128, 16). Here, I would argue, Gerald has slithered and hardened
into a healthy chrysalis, preparing for metamorphosis. For Lawrence, in this metaphor, the
butterfly represents freedom through blood knowledge: the third panel of the triptych. In each
iteration—as martyr, as energy, as larva—Gerald represents the self-destruction that causes
creation.
Unfortunately for the reader, and for all who remain committed to mental knowledge as a
central means of understanding the universe, the substance of this experience is untranslatable
into language. Lawrence will never, indeed can never, write the butterfly. He can only gesture
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toward it. Sanders calls this the “paradox lies at the heart of all Lawrence’s work: he could only
use verbal means to explore those dimensions of experience which, he maintained, were
incompatible with language” (30). A tool of mental knowledge, language cannot measure the
sort of restoration Lawrence envisions, and once Gerald has frozen into the northern fetish statue,
blood knowledge disappears with him. The description of his death is thus uncharacteristically
succinct:
He had come to the hollow basin of snow, surrounded by sheer slopes and
precipices, out of which rose a track that brought one to the top of the mountain.
But he wandered on unconsciously, till he slipped and fell down, and as he fell
something broke in his soul, and immediately he went to sleep. (474)
There is a fairy-tale simplicity to the language here, and elsewhere Lawrence would have
produced reams of words in place of “something broke in his soul.” Through Gerald’s death,
sleep reconciles its restorative and suicidal connotations: in snow-abstract annihilation, he has
gained the ultimate, final, and supreme blood knowledge. The reader can only peek over his
shoulder.
Thus, the final cost of blood knowledge is free will—an irony Lawrence may not have
recognized. In Women in Love, the radical individualism that he champions is in fact scripted,
his characters performing quiet accompaniment to the beats of a cosmic music. Gerald’s suicide
is a herald of a larger transformation, one that transcends the psychological motivations of
Lawrence’s characters. In Thomas Hardy, Lawrence writes, “[T]here is exists a great
background, vital and vivid, which matters more than the people who move upon it” (28). The
characters of this novel live against that great background, the great background that uses people
as functions, their actions fulfilling divine will. Despite his rejection of scientific rationalism,
Lawrence maintains its relationship to the suicidal subject: he silences while he explains, and
Bennett’s “lived experience … of suicide” is not only ignored—it is irrelevant. Granted,
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Lawrence’s embrace of divinity and consequently his reverence for mystery offers a muchneeded counterweight to figures like Durkheim who confused facts with the entirety of the truth.
But in doing so, he sacrifices subjectivity to mythological cohesion. The suicidal subject
himself, the phenomenology of voluntary death, persists as a literary blind spot. Consigned to
the logic of life, squinting at the logic of death, Lawrence, like his nineteenth-century
predecessors, defers the answer to higher powers.
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